Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 292030Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: RF Kinetic Escalation at Krasny Liman/Siversk (TOS-2 Deployment) // Confirmed RF Night Infiltration Adaptation // Stabilizing UAF Command Communications

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The Russian Federation (RF) has escalated the kinetic capability of its secondary fixation axis, confirming the deployment of the heavy thermobaric flamethrower system, TOS-2 "Tosochka," in the Krasny Liman direction. This action dramatically increases the threat level against UAF defensive positions near Siversk. Concurrently, RF forces continue hybrid warfare efforts, employing adaptive low-signature infiltration tactics on the ground and amplifying narratives of strategic confusion in the information domain.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky Salient (CRITICAL CAI): Remains the primary area of friction and RF Vostok Group main effort. Pressure is sustained following the 33 OShP retrograde.
• Northern Donbas (CRITICAL CAI - ESCALATED): Confirmed deployment and operational use of the TOS-2 "Tosochka" system by RF forces in the Krasny Liman direction (291824Z). This directly supports the previously identified operational fixation targeting Siversk. The use of this high-yield, high-area-effect weapon suggests RF intent to quickly breach or neutralize entrenched UAF positions in the sector, drawing critical UAF reserves.
• Donetsk Axis: UAF 30th Separate Mechanized Brigade reports sustained RF tactical adaptation, specifically noting small infantry groups utilizing anti-thermal blankets for nighttime infiltration (291811Z). This adaptation aims to neutralize UAF advantages in night vision and thermal targeting.
• Deep Rear: Air alarms in Zaporizhzhia concluded (291811Z). A persistent low-level UAV threat remains, confirmed by tracking in Southern Kharkiv moving west (291811Z).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Weather: No significant change. Fog/mist expected to lift NLT 300400Z, remaining the key tactical trigger for RF Vostok Group ground exploitation at Stepnohorsk.
• Environmental Factors: Continued low temperatures and "Thermal Denial" strikes necessitate resource allocation to sustain civilian resilience.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: Zapad Group has introduced TOS-2 into the line of contact (LOC) near Krasny Liman. Their tactics are evolving to counter UAF technological superiority in the dark (anti-thermal blankets). ISR confirms continued US/NATO surveillance over the Black Sea (Artemis II flight, 291810Z), potentially monitoring RF long-range strike preparations.
• UAF: UAF command structure (DShV Commander) is proactively engaging media to address strategic concerns regarding rear-area logistics (Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad) and maintain morale (291827Z, 291829Z). Tactical units (30th Brigade, FPV teams) demonstrate continued operational effectiveness and adaptability.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Intentions: RF intent remains dual-axis fixation, aiming for a breach at Stepnohorsk while forcing UAF reserve commitment to the Siversk sector through the application of overwhelming kinetic force (TOS-2).
• Kinetic Capability (Siversk): HIGH CONFIDENCE that RF Zapad Group possesses the immediate capability to execute devastating, short-duration preparatory fires utilizing the TOS-2 system against UAF defenses. This weapon system's presence shortens the decision cycle for UAF commanders in the Siversk AOR.
• Infiltration Capability: MEDIUM CONFIDENCE in RF infantry's ability to effectively utilize anti-thermal blankets to achieve localized infiltration and combat patrols undetected, increasing the threat to forward observation posts and supply caches during night hours in the Donetsk AOR.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The deployment of TOS-2 represents a significant kinetic upgrade to the Siversk offensive vector. Furthermore, the RF adoption of anti-thermal blankets indicates a successful tactical adaptation to counter UAF night advantage, signaling a low-cost, high-impact countermeasure against Western-supplied optics.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The previous assessment regarding RF logistical resilience via Kazakh routes remains valid. The continued surge in RF AD assets (SAR score rising for 1488th AAM Regt) is a likely defensive measure to protect the operational rear and newly established supply chains from UAF deep strikes.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in synchronizing the dual-axis kinetic plan with ongoing, specific IO targeting UAF strategic communications. Their rapid exploitation of UAF strategic statements (Zelensky's change of plan) indicates highly responsive IO C2 integration.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF Command is actively executing the information defense plan through high-profile, strategic interviews (DShV Commander) to manage expectations and stabilize the rear area regarding the logistical and operational challenges near Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad. UAF tactical readiness is confirmed by the successful counter-UAS operations and the active FPV drone hunting efforts (291759Z).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: UAF Command is proactively addressing rear-area operational issues through public discourse, minimizing the RF IO impact on operational cohesion. Active FPV deployment against personnel remains effective.
• Setbacks: The immediate threat profile at Siversk is severely elevated due to TOS-2 deployment. The presence of RF infantry utilizing anti-thermal countermeasures suggests a temporary erosion of UAF night superiority in localized sectors.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Counter-TOS-2 Response: Immediate intelligence and counter-battery resources are required to locate and neutralize the deployed TOS-2 platforms before the NLT 301200Z Siversk escalation window.
2. Night Counter-Infiltration: Frontline units require immediate technical guidance or enhanced kinetic assets (e.g., highly sensitive IR detectors, ground sensors) to counter the new RF anti-thermal blanket infiltration tactic.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

RF IO is capitalizing on high-level UAF strategic discussions and continues low-level geopolitical distractions.

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Strategic Disarray Narrative: RF sources immediately seized upon the announcement that Zelensky intends to "change the defense plan" (291813Z), framing it as confirmation of strategic failure and reactive chaos within UAF High Command.
2. Kinetic Amplification: WarGonzo published a special report on the TOS-2 deployment (291824Z), aiming to amplify the psychological effect of thermobaric weapons on UAF frontline troops and demoralize the defense in the Krasny Liman/Siversk sector.
3. Geopolitical Distraction: RF military and state-affiliated channels are promoting non-related international conspiracy theories (Epstein/Israel/Côte d'Ivoire, 291827Z), attempting to muddy the global information space and distract attention from kinetic failures.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The proactive public address by the DShV Commander (291827Z, 291829Z) is a crucial morale measure, demonstrating that UAF command is aware of and addressing critical issues. The clarity of Polish PM Tusk's statement on NATO's purpose (291810Z) provides a positive anchor regarding international strategic alignment.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Confirmed US ISR over the Black Sea (Artemis II) validates continued NATO intelligence support, aiding UAF deep operational awareness. Tusk’s statement reinforces the cohesion and deterrence mandate of NATO against Russian aggression.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Thermobaric Breaching and Dual-Axis Reserve Fixation (NLT 301200Z DEC 25) (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF Zapad Group will execute concentrated preparatory fires utilizing the TOS-2 system against UAF defenses near Siversk NLT 301200Z. This will be followed by limited ground assaults designed to draw UAF reserves. Simultaneously, RF Vostok Group will execute the main breach attempt at Stepnohorsk post-fog lift (300400Z), relying on A2A UAV suppression of UAF ISR.

• Focus: Utilize maximum kinetic shock (TOS-2) to induce operational paralysis on the secondary axis, ensuring UAF reserves cannot reinforce the critical Stepnohorsk sector.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Strategic C2/AD Decapitation via Cyber-Kinetic Synchronization (NLT 011200Z DEC 25) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) No change. RF exploits the operational fixation and NCA absence to launch a synchronized long-range strike package (Ballistic/Cruise Missiles and Shahed UAVs) aimed at the JFC C2 headquarters or the primary ADOC. The strike would be preceded or accompanied by severe localized Starlink jamming/cyber intrusion to maximize disruption, leading to operational disintegration on the front lines.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate objective is to neutralize the critical kinetic threat at Siversk (TOS-2) while rapidly adapting to the new RF night infiltration tactic.

1. NEUTRALIZE TOS-2 THREAT (J3/G2):

   • ACTION: Designate immediate High-Payoff Target (HPT) status for all confirmed or suspected TOS-2 operating positions in the Krasny Liman/Siversk area. Utilize long-range precision fires (MLRS, ATACMS if available) for a proactive TOS-2 Hunter-Killer mission NLT 300600Z.
   • RATIONALE: The TOS-2 represents an operational-level threat capable of destroying UAF defensive strong points faster than any previous system in this sector, requiring immediate preemption.

2. COUNTER-INFILTRATION FORCE PROTECTION (J3/J4):

   • ACTION: Issue an immediate Tactical Flash Advisory to all frontline formations in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia detailing the RF use of anti-thermal blankets. Mandate the immediate deployment of acoustic/seismic ground sensors and trip flares/lighting systems, augmenting thermal surveillance during night hours.
   • RATIONALE: Prevents RF low-signature infiltration from achieving tactical surprises, ambushes, or intelligence collection, preserving UAF night advantage.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS COUNTER-NARRATIVE (NCA/J7):

   • ACTION: Following Recommendation 2 from the previous SITREP (addressing corruption), J7 must prepare a communications package that frames the NCA’s current discussion on "changing the defense plan" not as failure, but as proactive strategic adjustment necessary to counter RF hybrid evolution (i.e., A2A drones and TOS-2 deployment). Release NLT 300000Z.
   • RATIONALE: Directly counters the immediate RF IO effort that seeks to portray UAF leadership as reactionary and in disarray.

4. AD ASSET ALERT (J3/AD):

   • ACTION: Increase the readiness level of AD units protecting C2 nodes (e.g., JFC, ADOC) and logistics hubs (Dnipro/Kharkiv/Odesa) from ALERT LEVEL 2 to ALERT LEVEL 1 (Maximum Standby) NLT 300000Z, aligning with the MDCOA threat window.
   • RATIONALE: Prepares the air defense network to handle a potential high-intensity, synchronized long-range strike attempting to exploit the operational fixation efforts.

//END OF REPORT//