Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 292000Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: RF Operational Fixation on Siversk/Stepnohorsk // NCA Diplomacy Under Information Attack // Enhanced AD Required in Southern and Northern Sectors

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The Russian Federation (RF) is executing synchronized multi-domain pressure aimed at achieving tactical breakthroughs in the Donbas AOR while degrading UAF strategic coherence via concentrated Information Operations (IO) targeting high-level political stability during the National Command Authority (NCA) diplomatic mission. Tactical indicators suggest the RF is activating a secondary axis of advance in the Northern Donbas.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky Salient (CRITICAL CAI): RF ground pressure remains the decisive kinetic effort, involving the 27th MRD and 37th GMRB. UAF 3rd Assault Brigade continues forward deployment to stabilize the line of contact.
• Northern Donbas (NEW ALERT): RF-aligned sources issued a specific, immediate warning regarding the town of Siversk (291739Z), suggesting intent to increase ground operations or preparatory fires against this axis. This aligns with confirmed RF Zapad Group operations in the Krasny Liman direction utilizing advanced ISR (SKAT-350M UAVs) for artillery correction (291801Z).
• Deep Rear: Air alarms have concluded in Zaporizhzhia (291737Z). UAF AD was successful in negating 3x RF UAVs in Dnipropetrovsk (291751Z). However, a single RF UAV was detected transiting from Sumy toward Chernihiv (291742Z), indicating continued probing of the Northern AD screen.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Weather: No change. Fog/mist expected to dissipate NLT 300400Z, remaining the key tactical trigger for RF Vostok Group ground exploitation at Stepnohorsk.
• Environmental Constraint: Nationwide scheduled electricity consumption limits ("light schedules") remain in effect for 30 NOV, reinforcing the RF "Thermal Denial" strategy.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: Dispositions confirm Vostok Group commitment at Stepnohorsk. Zapad Group activity confirmed in the Krasny Liman/Siversk vicinity, indicative of an operational fixation effort to draw UAF reserves away from the primary Southern effort. RF is utilizing high-yield munitions (ODAB-1500) to clear UAF fortified positions (291803Z).
• UAF: NCA diplomatic travel to the US is confirmed (291740Z), emphasizing UAF focus on diplomatic offensive. Defensive stabilization remains the priority at Stepnohorsk. Successful maritime denial confirmed via SBU/UAF responsibility for the Virat tanker strike (291758Z).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Intentions: RF intent is shifting to a two-front tactical fixation (Stepnohorsk and Siversk/Krasny Liman) while simultaneously executing a cognitive deep strike by flooding the information environment with political corruption narratives to undermine the NCA’s authority while abroad.
• Capability (Precision Fires): HIGH CONFIDENCE that RF retains enhanced tactical fire correction capability across the Eastern front, validated by the integration of SKAT-350M ISR drones with artillery teams in the Krasny Liman sector.
• Capability (IO Synchronization): HIGH CONFIDENCE in RF’s ability to synchronize major corruption allegations (291735Z) with the critical NCA travel window, maximizing domestic political friction.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF is demonstrably activating secondary axes (Siversk alert) to force UAF command to commit reserve assets outside the critical Stepnohorsk sector. Furthermore, the extensive use of ODAB-1500 munitions indicates an adaptation to overcome well-entrenched UAF defenses with overwhelming kinetic force, mitigating RF ground troop casualties in the initial breach phase.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

While the previous report highlighted RF logistical resilience (Kazakh routes), new RF internal messaging soliciting donations (291800Z) suggests localized or persistent materiel shortages may exist, requiring private support, specifically concerning UAV and logistical needs. Internal personnel issues (demobilization due to severe obesity, 291750Z) suggest quality control issues within mobilized forces, offering a long-term UAF advantage.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust, coordinating the Zapad Group's operations (Krasny Liman) and Vostok Group's main effort (Stepnohorsk). The rapid dissemination of politically damaging IO indicates centralized C2 authority over the cognitive domain.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF maintains a determined defensive posture, effectively utilizing air defense assets in the Central and Southern AORs (Dnipropetrovsk success). The NCA's immediate address regarding the US trip (291740Z) attempts to preempt IO efforts to destabilize C2, projecting confidence and clear strategic direction.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Confirmed successful UAF targeting of RF shadow fleet tankers (Virat) near the Turkish coast, sustaining economic pressure (291758Z). Confirmed negation of three (3) RF UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk (291751Z).
• Setbacks: The tactical situation at Stepnohorsk remains critical (Localized Breach & Retrograde, per previous report). High-profile corruption allegations directed at former high-ranking officials require immediate damage control at the strategic level.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Air Defense Saturation: UAF must rapidly prioritize and allocate AD assets to counter the anticipated RF ground exploitation attempts at Stepnohorsk and the newly activated Siversk axis, while maintaining coverage of logistics hubs (Odesa/Mykolaiv) and preventing deep UAV penetration (Sumy/Chernihiv).
2. Information Defense: Immediate resource commitment is required to counter the political destabilization narrative targeting high-level former officials, mitigating internal friction while the NCA is abroad.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

RF IO operations are highly synchronized with the operational tempo and specifically leveraged against the NCA’s absence.

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Targeted Political Destabilization: RF-aligned channels are aggressively disseminating highly damaging, specific corruption allegations against former high-ranking UAF officials (e.g., Danilov, sanctions trading) (291735Z).
2. Command Erosion (Internal): RF targets key operational commanders (225th Assault Regiment Commander, 291742Z), alleging dereliction of duty and exploiting civil-military friction points to lower troop morale and generate mistrust in frontline leadership.
3. Strategic Mockery: RF internal critics mock the failure of the government to protect key strategic assets (Novorossiysk port attack, 291734Z), increasing domestic political pressure on Putin's leadership, which indirectly aids the UAF narrative of sustained RF vulnerability.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The NCA’s clear communication regarding the diplomatic mission (291740Z) acts as a high-level morale stabilizer. However, the high-intensity IO campaign regarding corruption and commander failures is designed to generate short-term public cynicism and erode trust in the government’s commitment to internal accountability.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The confirmed US trip anchors international support. The public confirmation of UAF responsibility for the naval tanker strikes (291758Z) reinforces the UAF’s strategic narrative of economic warfare capability and deterrence in the Black Sea.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Coordinated Dual-Axis Assault and Information Siege (NLT 301200Z DEC 25) (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF Vostok Group will execute the Stepnohorsk breach attempt NLT 300400Z (post-fog lift), supported by BPS A2A UAVs. Simultaneously, RF Zapad Group will increase preparatory fires (Artillery/ODAB-1500) and localized probing attacks in the Siversk/Krasny Liman vector to fix UAF 10th and 14th Brigades, preventing reserve transfer to the Stepnohorsk critical sector. This kinetic synchronization will be covered by a maximal IO push, attempting to link tactical failures to political instability.

• Focus: Force UAF to overcommit reserves to two widely separated operational axes while destabilizing the strategic rear via IO.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Strategic C2/AD Decapitation (NLT 011200Z DEC 25) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) The RF, exploiting the NCA's absence and the operational distraction caused by the dual-axis fixation, conducts a concentrated ballistic missile and long-range UAV strike aimed at neutralizing the main Joint Forces Command (JFC) C2 headquarters or the primary air defense operations center (ADOC) in Central Ukraine. The simultaneous loss of C2 and AD capability would facilitate massed aerial assaults (ODAB/KAB) on frontline UAF concentrations, triggering an operational rout at Stepnohorsk and Siversk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate objective is to stabilize the two primary tactical fronts (Stepnohorsk, Siversk) while securing the strategic cognitive domain during the diplomatic window.

1. AD ASSET DIVERSIFICATION (J3/J4):

   • ACTION: Immediately reallocate one (1) Long-Range Radar (LRR) asset from a stable Western sector to support AD coverage over the Siversk-Krasny Liman axis NLT 300600Z.
   • RATIONALE: The confirmed dual-axis threat requires UAF to preemptively counter potential RF air superiority (A2A UAVs, ODAB strikes) on the Siversk front before the offensive fully materializes, protecting newly exposed reserves.

2. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS COUNTER-IO (NCA/J7):

   • ACTION: The NCA or the acting Head of the Office must issue an immediate, coordinated statement (NLT 292200Z) that directly addresses the political corruption allegations, affirming institutional accountability and demonstrating the integrity of the remaining command structure.
   • RATIONALE: Mitigates the tactical effectiveness of the RF cognitive strike, stabilizing domestic political support and denying RF the ability to amplify the narrative of strategic chaos.

3. ENHANCED C2 SECURITY PROTOCOL (J2/J6):

   • ACTION: Reinforce Protocol SHIELD DIPLOMACY. J6 must implement real-time, 24/7 monitoring of the JFC and ADOC network nodes for indicators of cyber intrusion, denial-of-service preparations, or Starlink jamming attempts, specifically NLT 010000Z DEC.
   • RATIONALE: Directly counters the MDCOA of strategic C2 decapitation, which RF often attempts when NCA attention is diverted.

4. SKY SWEEPER ACTIVATION – CRITICAL URGENCY (J3/EW):

   • ACTION: Confirm that all mobile EW/C-UAS platforms are in place and actively operating over the 3rd Assault Brigade’s blocking positions at Stepnohorsk. Utilize thermal imaging assets to cue short-range kinetic C-UAS systems against RF A2A UAVs before 300400Z fog lift.
   • RATIONALE: This remains the critical enabler for the Stepnohorsk defense; failure to deny RF ISR will result in catastrophic fire losses for the UAF.

//END OF REPORT//