Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 291900Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: RF Operational Fixation Execution // Strategic Commitment Confirmed // Critical Energy and Personnel Management

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The enemy (RF) continues its combined-arms fixation effort, exploiting the closing weather window at Stepnohorsk while simultaneously utilizing deep strikes to degrade Ukrainian (UAF) infrastructure and launching aggressive Information Operations (IO) targeting Western solidarity. New intelligence confirms RF long-term military commitment via budget allocation and details of resulting UAF energy constraints.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky Salient (CRITICAL): UAF 3rd Assault Brigade is engaged in stabilizing the defensive line following the retrograde of the 33rd OShP. The tactical situation is highly fluid but currently holding.
• Eastern Axis (Kupyansk Direction): RF forces continue localized ground assaults, confirming three additional UAF personnel captured (LOW CONFIDENCE, sourced from RF propagandists). This indicates sustained, low-level operational tempo designed to fix UAF reserves.
• Rear Area Kinetic Activity: Confirmed civilian casualty in Kramatorsk due to enemy shelling/strike (291649Z). This validates RF intent to maintain wide-area kinetic disruption, extending beyond the immediate front line.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Weather: No change. Fog/mist expected to dissipate NLT 300400Z. This shortens the UAF window for EW/C-UAS integration and dictates that RF Vostok Group will attempt to maximize ground gains before that time.
• Environmental Constraint (NEW): Ukrenergo confirms nationwide scheduled electricity consumption limits ("light schedules") for 30 NOV (291644Z). This is a direct operational consequence of the RF "Thermal Denial" strategy and constitutes a new, systemic constraint on UAF rear area logistics, C2, and civil support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: Dispositions confirm maximum tactical commitment at Stepnohorsk, supported by preparatory fires in the Pokrovsk direction. Strategic posture is reinforced by the political passage of the 2026 budget, dedicating nearly one-third of expenditure to military goals.
• UAF: UAF Command is actively addressing internal constraints, confirmed by the meeting between President Zelenskyy and General Palisa to refine personnel distribution parameters (291649Z). Simultaneous high-level diplomatic travel (US, France) maintains strategic initiative.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Intentions: RF intent is multi-layered: 1) Achieve operational success at Stepnohorsk before 300400Z. 2) Systemically degrade UAF national resilience via infrastructure strikes (Thermal Denial). 3) Undermine Western support using strategic IO.
• Capability (Long-term Sustainment): CRITICAL ASSESSMENT: RF approval of the 2026 budget ($166B dedicated to military) provides HIGH CONFIDENCE that RF will sustain high-intensity warfare, personnel generation, and materiel replacement rates for the next 12-18 months. This analysis overrides near-term assumptions of logistical exhaustion.
• Capability (Asymmetric Force Generation): RF is utilizing global recruitment efforts (e.g., South African political scandal, 291641Z) to supplement internal mobilization, increasing the likelihood of utilizing foreign volunteer/mercenary contingents in high-intensity areas.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF IO has rapidly adapted its focus to exploit US political dynamics (Witkoff/Trump narratives) concurrently with confirmed UAF energy degradation (power cuts). This synchronizes kinetic impact with cognitive shock, increasing the strategic weight of localized tactical gains.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Long-term sustainment is guaranteed by political funding. Tactical sustainment remains focused on protecting the Kazakh rail/road corridors (assessed in previous reports) and preventing UAF deep strike attacks on rear AD assets (1488th AA Regiment surge).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in synchronizing tactical military pressure with strategic political signaling (budget approval, foreign recruitment). C2 effectiveness is highly reliant on preventing UAF interdiction of BPS C2 nodes, which manage the new A2A UAV doctrine.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensively robust but logistically strained. The need to refine personnel distribution (Zelenskyy/Palisa) indicates ongoing pressure on rotation and combat effectiveness across the LOC. Readiness is compromised by the nationwide energy curtailments.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Active Command engagement in force structure optimization, signaling proactive readiness management.
• Setbacks: Nationwide power consumption limits confirmed for 30 NOV (HIGH CONFIDENCE). This represents the first clear, systemic success of the RF Thermal Denial strategy, forcing energy management at the operational level.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Energy Security: Immediate need for mobile, hardened power generation for critical C2, medical, and repair facilities in the operational zones NLT 300000Z.
2. Personnel Allocation: Requirement for rapid, rational implementation of the new personnel distribution parameters to reinforce strained brigades and ensure adequate rest/rotation.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

RF IO is operating at the strategic level, attempting to erode international support by creating narratives of Western betrayal and internal collapse, synchronized with the Stepnohorsk kinetic push.

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF channels are pushing complex, targeted narratives:

1. US Aid Sabotage: Fabricated claims, supposedly based on WSJ, alleging a Trump associate (Witkoff) is sabotaging Tomahawk missile supplies in favor of economic deals (291637Z). Aim: Generate distrust among UAF political leadership toward US support channels.
2. Alliance Fragmentation: Promotion of a "secret German plan" for war with Russia (291646Z). Aim: Sow suspicion between NATO members (Germany, US).
3. Inevitability of War: RF military budget figures are broadcast globally to convey the inevitability of long-term attrition and Russian persistence (291637Z, 291659Z).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Diplomatic activity (US, France trips) provides a strong counter-narrative, focusing on defining a "dignified end" to the war. However, the confirmed nationwide power cuts risk undermining civilian morale and could potentially impact the psychological readiness of reserve mobilization cohorts.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• UAF diplomatic efforts are highly active (Zelenskyy traveling to US and France). This signals commitment to the Geneva peace points and is a critical counter-IO measure against RF claims of political paralysis.
• The IO environment suggests high potential for RF actors to interfere with the strategic dialogue while the Ukrainian delegation is abroad.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Synchronized Tactical Breach and Strategic Energy Attrition (NLT 300600Z) (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF Vostok Group will execute maximum ground pressure at Stepnohorsk immediately after the fog lifts (NLT 300400Z), capitalizing on BPS aerial dominance (Operation SKY SWEEPER target) and the immediate constraints imposed by the nationwide power curtailments.

• Focus: Achieve localized operational rupture towards Velyka Novosilka, using the energy crisis as a force multiplier by limiting UAF C2 and rear-area logistical responsiveness.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Hybrid Operational Rupture and Strategic Command Paralysis (NLT 301200Z) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF synchronizes the tactical success at Stepnohorsk with a targeted, massed strike package (missiles/UAVs) against specific, deep UAF military C2 nodes in the East/South (e.g., Joint Forces Command headquarters, critical logistics hubs) that lack robust mobile power backup. This strike package leverages the known weaknesses exposed by the power curtailments, leading to a temporary loss of operational control and enabling an operational pursuit by RF forces.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The tactical and strategic imperatives necessitate the protection of aerial reconnaissance and critical infrastructure stability while leveraging strategic diplomatic momentum.

1. IMMEDIATE SKY SWEEPER ACTIVATION (J3/EW):

   • ACTION: Immediately deploy all available mobile EW/C-UAS platforms to establish a dense, redundant protective dome over the 3rd Assault Brigade’s blocking positions NLT 292300Z, prioritizing the negation of the anticipated A2A UAV surge.
   • RATIONALE: This action directly counters the RF MLCOA and prevents the UAF from going "blind" at the decisive point.

2. ENERGY VULNERABILITY MITIGATION (J4):

   • ACTION: Execute Emergency Power Protocol. Prioritize and deploy all mobile generation assets (generators, vehicle-mounted systems) to secure essential C2, intelligence fusion centers, and medical facilities in the operational zones NLT 300000Z to ensure continuous operation during national power curtailments.
   • RATIONALE: Mitigates the operational impact of RF's successful Thermal Denial strategy and safeguards C2 resilience against the MDCOA.

3. INTERDICT BPS COMMAND AND CONTROL (J3/J2):

   • ACTION: Augment planned deep strike missions (NLT 30000Z) against the 27th MRD with a dedicated Hunter-Killer effort targeting confirmed or suspected C2 nodes for the newly formalized RF Drone Systems Troops (BPS) in the Zaporizhzhia/Pokrovsk area.
   • RATIONALE: Directly attacks RF's technological adaptation and degrades their ability to synchronize ground maneuver with A2A suppression.

4. LEVERAGE DIPLOMATIC MOMENTUM (NCA/J7):

   • ACTION: Use the ongoing strategic diplomatic visits (US/France) as the primary public information focus for the next 48 hours. Frame the visits and the 'Geneva points' as clear, proactive UAF steps toward dictating terms for a "dignified end to the war," directly countering RF IO narratives of chaos and betrayal.
   • RATIONALE: Maintaining cognitive dominance at the strategic level is essential to sustain international support and domestic resolve against the long-term threat confirmed by the RF 2026 budget.

//END OF REPORT//