INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL ESCALATION
DTG: 291600Z NOV 25
SUBJECT: RF Synchronized Attack Assessment // A2A UAV Mitigation Required // Krasnoarmeysk Threat Surge Confirmed
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)
The operational environment has moved from localized attrition to active tactical escalation, characterized by synchronized RF pressure across the Southern and Eastern axes. RF intent is to fix UAF reserves through kinetic and hybrid means while exploiting the breach at Stepnohorsk.
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
- Southern Axis (Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky): Remains the critical threat zone. The retrograde of the 33rd Separate Assault Regiment (33 OShP) due to logistical strangulation is confirmed, creating a vulnerable gap. UAF 3rd Assault Brigade is establishing blocking positions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia Oblast): Confirmed use of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB/FAB) by RF tactical aviation. This signals a phase transition from preparatory drone strikes to coordinated fires ahead of a potential ground maneuver in the Huliaipole/Novopavlivka area. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Eastern Axis (Krasnoarmeysk/Pokrovsk Direction): Intelligence confirms the preparation of RF 27th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) assault detachments for operations in this sector. This indicates a potential synchronized offensive designed to fix UAF assets dedicated to the Donetsk operational zone. UAF DShV forces report a successful defensive operation completion near Dobropillya, indicating successful tactical defense against local RF thrusts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Odesa Oblast: UAF Air Force reports active enemy UAV reconnaissance flights, potentially functioning as forward spotters or target designators for longer-range fires. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
No significant changes from the 291500Z SITREP. Rasputitsa (mud) conditions continue to favor RF dismounted BPS units and UGV operations (Kurier) over heavy mechanized thrusts in the Southern Axis.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
- RF: RF Vostok Group is aggressively exploiting the Stepnohorsk breach while maintaining the BPS attrition campaign against UAF 42nd and 59th Brigades in Novopavlivka. RF Tsentr Group is preparing to engage the Krasnoarmeysk sector, likely to prevent the redeployment of UAF assets from Pokrovsk.
- UAF: UAF Command has prioritized stabilization efforts at Stepnohorsk (3rd Assault Brigade). Urgent C-UAS reallocation remains critical, as the current posture risks operational "blindness" due to A2A UAV threats.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
- Intent (Operational Fixation): The primary RF intention is now assessed as achieving operational fixation across the Donbas-Zaporizhzhia line, preventing UAF from committing deep reserves to stabilize the critical Stepnohorsk sector. The deployment of the 27th MRD to Krasnoarmeysk supports this intent. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Capability (Aerial Denial): RF BPS units possess the immediate capability to achieve localized tactical air superiority using A2A UAVs ("Geran-fighters"), effectively blinding UAF ISR and fire correction NLT 300600Z NOV. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Capability (Pre-Assault Fires): The confirmed use of KAB/FAB against Zaporizhzhia targets indicates the ability to conduct high-intensity pre-assault fire preparation, designed to suppress defenses and destroy hardened command/logistics nodes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
The confirmed deployment of the 27th MRD towards Krasnoarmeysk is the most significant tactical adaptation, confirming RF's ability to coordinate large-scale maneuvers across multiple operational groups (Vostok and Tsentr) in rapid succession. This demands UAF reassess the risk to the Pokrovsk salient.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF logistics are adapting well to deep strikes, having activated alternative Kazakh rail/road corridors. Although UAF SZR (Foreign Intelligence Service) suggests RF is selling gold reserves (economic strain), this does not negate the immediate short-term effectiveness of the operational logistics, which are projected to stabilize POL stocks NLT 72 hours.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 remains highly adaptive and synchronized across kinetic, technological (BPS/A2A), and geographical domains (Vostok-Tsentr coordination). The simultaneous use of IO targeting Western support (Trump/Tariffs) and internal UAF cohesion (Yermak) demonstrates a cohesive multi-domain C2 structure.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
UAF forces are currently in a crisis management posture at Stepnohorsk. While the overall defense remains resilient (DShV success at Dobropillya), the necessity to commit the 3rd Assault Brigade confirms the severity of the threat posed by the 33 OShP logistical collapse.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
- Successes: UAF Airborne Assault Forces (DShV) successfully completed an operation in the Dobropillya/Pokrovsk direction, likely repulsing a localized RF probe or securing a crucial defensive line. Continued effective handling of infrastructure strike aftermath in Kyiv (resilience narrative confirmed).
- Setbacks: The operational damage caused by the fragmentation of the 33 OShP has necessitated a crisis deployment of reserve forces, degrading the overall flexibility of the Southern Front Command. The inability to rapidly mitigate the A2A UAV threat exacerbates this setback.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
The CRITICAL REQUIREMENT is now dual-layered:
- Immediate mobile C-UAS/EW coverage for the Stepnohorsk-Novopavlivka axis to negate the BPS/A2A threat.
- Precision fires (loitering munitions/artillery) to immediately counter the newly deployed 27th MRD concentration areas near Krasnoarmeysk before they fully deploy.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF Information Operations (IO) are actively attempting to dilute Western focus and political will.
- Western Focus Dilution: RF state media (TASS) and associated channels are amplifying US political instability narratives (Trump, Venezuela, Trump Vodka).
- Support Undermining: RF sources frame Western support proposals (like US customs duty exemptions) as weak substitutes for critical kinetic aid (e.g., Tomahawk missiles), intending to generate cynicism within the UAF support base.
- Financial Warfare: UAF intelligence reports RF selling state gold reserves; RF IO attempts to counter by shifting focus to EU's alleged obstruction of peace.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
Public morale remains supported by confirmed resilience narratives (Kyiv rescue efforts). However, sustained RF success on the frontline, particularly if coupled with a perceived vacuum in high-level military communication or unresolved political rumors, risks localized demoralization.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
The internal US political focus (Trump) is an ongoing strategic distraction. The suggestion of a 10-year US customs duty exemption represents a valuable long-term economic commitment, which UAF IO must highlight as enduring support, contrasting with the RF narrative of weakening aid.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)
MLCOA: Synchronized Fixation and Stepnohorsk Breakthrough (NLT 010600Z DEC) (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF will execute a highly coordinated operational attack:
- Phase I (Aerial Denial/Attrition): BPS forces achieve effective aerial denial (A2A UAVs) and attrition (FPV/strike drones) over the Stepnohorsk salient and Novopavlivka reserve areas (NLT 302000Z NOV).
- Phase II (Fixation): The 27th MRD launches limited, high-intensity probing attacks on the Krasnoarmeysk axis, forcing UAF J3 to hold reserves in place.
- Phase III (Ground Exploitation): RF Vostok Group commits primary ground forces to exploit the weakened 33 OShP area at Stepnohorsk, aiming for a decisive operational breakthrough.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)
MDCOA: Operational Encirclement via Deep Penetration (NLT 302000Z NOV) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
RF Vostok Group achieves a rapid, successful tactical breach at Stepnohorsk and utilizes the mobility of its 4th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade elements, supported by UGV/BPS forces, to bypass the 3rd Assault Brigade's blocking line. This deep penetration targets the rear of the Novopavlivka/Vremyevsky line, threatening the encirclement of UAF 42nd and 59th Brigades currently under drone attrition.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
| Event | Estimated DTG | Criticality | Decision Point |
|---|
| C-UAS/EW Shield Establishment | NLT 292000Z | CRITICAL | J3 must confirm operational status of C-UAS/EW density sufficient to negate BPS/A2A UAV threat in Stepnohorsk/Novopavlivka. |
| Response to 27th MRD Deployment | NLT 292200Z | HIGH | J3/J2 must authorize and execute target acquisition and deep fires against identified 27th MRD staging areas near Krasnoarmeysk/Horlivka axis. |
| 3rd Assault Brigade Blocking Position Consolidation | NLT 300600Z | HIGH | J3 must confirm 3rd Assault Brigade has secured secondary defensive positions and is prepared to receive and integrate remaining 33 OShP personnel. |
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gap | Collection Requirement (CR) | Domain | Confidence Assessment |
|---|
| PRIORITY 1 (TECHINT/EW) | A2A UAV C2/Frequency | Acquire real-time frequency spectrum data and communication protocols of RF A2A UAVs to refine EW jamming parameters and develop effective counter-TTPs. | SIGINT, ELINT | HIGH |
| PRIORITY 2 (IMINT/HUMINT) | 27th MRD Commitment Strength | Determine the exact unit strength, specific staging locations, and confirmed operational timeline for the RF 27th MRD thrust toward Krasnoarmeysk. | IMINT, HUMINT | HIGH |
| PRIORITY 3 (IMINT/GEOSPATIAL) | RF KAB/FAB Launcher Origin | Identify the launch/sortie origin point for RF tactical aviation conducting KAB/FAB strikes in Zaporizhzhia to enable targeted airbase denial operations. | IMINT, MASINT | MEDIUM |
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
The focus must shift immediately from mitigation to active counter-denial and synchronized operational defense.
-
NEGATE AERIAL DENIAL CAPABILITY (J3/J6/EW):
- ACTION: Execute Operation "SKY SWEEPER" (immediate C-UAS/EW reallocation to Stepnohorsk/Novopavlivka) as ordered. Additionally, task UAF SOF Hunter-Killer teams with actively hunting known BPS C2 nodes (from previous CR) to disrupt the A2A/drone attrition synchronization.
- RATIONALE: If RF achieves aerial superiority (A2A), UAF defensive operations will collapse rapidly under coordinated fire and maneuver. Targeted C2 disruption is necessary to break the BPS doctrine.
-
PRE-EMPT KRASNOARMEYSK THREAT (J3/J2):
- ACTION: Immediately leverage UAF long-range precision fires (HIMARS, deep strike assets) to interdict confirmed 27th MRD staging and forward logistical points in the Krasnoarmeysk direction. Prioritize soft targets (POL, command vehicles, concentration points).
- RATIONALE: Fixing the 27th MRD before it engages is critical to prevent RF from successfully executing the synchronized operational fixation (MLCOA). UAF DShV success offers a temporary window of opportunity to strike.
-
SOLIDIFY STEPNOHORSK DEFENSE (J3/J4):
- ACTION: Prioritize the rapid redeployment and establishment of minefields and engineer obstacles along the flanks of the 3rd Assault Brigade's blocking positions to compensate for the tactical gap left by the 33 OShP retrograde. Authorize destruction of all unrecoverable heavy equipment by 33 OShP personnel.
- RATIONALE: Preserving personnel and slowing RF advance is paramount. The use of scorched earth tactics and obstacles buys time for the 3rd Assault Brigade to fully integrate the defensive line.
//END OF REPORT//