Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE

DTG: 292100Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: RF Tactical Exploitation at Stepnohorsk // Counter-Logistical Adaptation Required // NCA Strategic Planning Shift

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The operational environment is characterized by coordinated Russian Federation (RF) attempts to simultaneously exploit a confirmed tactical breach in the South and maximize systemic pressure on Ukraine's strategic rear through thermal denial and information warfare. Critical attention is required for the RF logistical adaptation following the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal strike.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Southern Axis (Konstiantynivka/Huliaipole): The logistical failure on the Konstiantynivka Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) remains the central crisis. The UAF 33 OShP (Separate Assault Regiment) is assessed as executing a necessary, controlled retrograde operation. RF Vostok Group is maintaining fire saturation and has redirected ground pressure toward adjacent sectors. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Zaporizhzhia/Vremyevsky Corridor: Confirmed heavy RF assault operations near Stepnohorsk and the Vremyevsky direction, utilizing UAVs and likely motorized rifle elements (37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, Vostok Group). This indicates the RF primary tactical exploitation effort is shifting slightly north/east of the immediate Konstiantynivka breach, aiming for localized operational consolidation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Kyiv Sector (Strategic Rear): Continued kinetic action targeting residential and heating infrastructure (Kyiv Sviatoshynskyi District confirmed damage). Patrol Police and civil authorities are managing the immediate aftermath, confirming RF commitment to Thermal Denial warfare during sub-freezing conditions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Stepnohorsk Consolidation: UAF forces, including elements of the 3rd Assault Brigade, are confirmed conducting localized clearing and consolidation operations, indicating successful localized containment against limited RF advances in specific areas. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

Sub-freezing temperatures amplify the strategic effect of RF deep strikes against civilian thermal infrastructure, increasing strain on CIMIC and National Civil Authority (NCA) resources and rapidly degrading civilian morale.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF efforts are multi-domain: Tactical pressure in the South (Stepnohorsk), Strategic denial (Thermal/Logistics), and Cognitive destabilization (IO targeting Kyiv leadership). RF Vostok Group is prioritizing targeted engagements (drone strikes, small-unit advances) over large-scale mechanized maneuver due to confirmed internal logistical constraints.
• UAF: The immediate UAF priority is stabilizing the perimeter around the 33 OShP withdrawal and establishing robust fire support/blocking positions in the Stepnohorsk area. At the strategic level, the NCA has directed the preparation of a new national defense plan, signaling a high-level strategic reassessment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capability (Technological): RF capabilities include persistent low-profile interdiction (Kurier UGVs confirmed on Konstiantynivka GLOC) and advanced multi-role UAV functions (Recon, Signal Relay, Mining). There is an assessed growing capability for Air-to-Air drone combat (FPV-PVO) systems aimed at degrading UAF ISR capability. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• Intentions (Tactical): RF Vostok Group intends to convert the Konstiantynivka logistical chokehold into a territorial gain by applying concentrated pressure at adjacent vulnerabilities, notably Stepnohorsk, to force deeper UAF withdrawals.
• Intentions (Systemic/IO): RF seeks to sustain pressure on Kyiv's energy grid and simultaneously demoralize the domestic population by amplifying narratives of internal political collapse and Western dissatisfaction with Ukrainian leadership (Yermak removal narrative).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed RF assault efforts near Stepnohorsk and Vremyevsky suggest an opportunistic pivot, seeking softer points of penetration following the successful logistical interdiction, rather than a direct, costly frontal breakthrough at Huliaipole.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

CRITICAL LOGISTICAL ADAPTATION CONFIRMED. Kazakhstan's Ministry of Energy has officially activated alternative oil transport routes to bypass the damaged CPC terminal. This confirms the strategic success of the UAF deep strike campaign but indicates RF allies are immediately moving to mitigate the logistical shock. This adaptation requires an immediate UAF response. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in multi-domain synchronization (kinetic action, technological deployment, and IO). The confirmed deployment and targeting success of specialized assets (Kurier UGVs, FPV units of the 37th Brigade) show coherent, targeted C2 planning.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Southern Front: CRITICAL/DETERIORATING. The focus is on preserving combat power through controlled withdrawal and ensuring fire discipline at the new defensive line. Readiness is high, but logistics remain severely constrained in the Konstiantynivka sector.
• Strategic Posture: REASSESSING. The Presidential directive to draft a new defense plan signals necessary strategic flexibility and responsiveness to the current hybrid threat environment (systemic denial, constrained Western logistics).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESSES: Confirmed UAF 3rd Assault Brigade clearing operations (local tactical success). Strategic success in damaging the RF oil export system (CPC terminal).
• SETBACKS: Confirmed logistical failure (Konstiantynivka) and high civilian infrastructure damage from Thermal Denial strikes in Kyiv.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid deployment of counter-logistics assets to target Kazakhstan's newly activated alternative rail/road routes supporting RF POL supply.
• CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Accelerated C4ISR redundancy implementation, per previous recommendations, given the persistent Starlink denial threat.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• Leadership Erosion: RF media (TASS, Russian military channels) is intensely amplifying narratives alleging NCA internal conflict, claiming the removal or political weakening of key figures (Yermak) due to US pressure or incompetence. This is a deliberate attempt to fracture domestic and international confidence in Kyiv's ability to command and negotiate. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Diversionary Tactics: Continued use of geopolitical distraction (Trump/Venezuela airspace claims) to dilute Western focus on the Russian logistical crisis caused by UAF deep strikes.
• Psychological Warfare: RF MoD is utilizing captured UAF POW interviews to degrade internal morale, claiming British instructors abused Ukrainian troops.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment in the rear is severely stressed by the combination of cold weather and successful kinetic strikes on residential and thermal infrastructure. NCA transparency regarding the tactical retreat in the South and the stability of the central government is paramount to mitigating RF IO effects. UAF volunteer fundraising (DeepState) remains active, indicating resilient civilian support despite setbacks.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Kazakhstan's public announcement regarding oil rerouting confirms the tangible international effect of UAF strategic denial operations. This must be highlighted to Western partners to secure expedited delivery of long-range strike capabilities.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Sustained Pressure on Vremyevsky/Stepnohorsk and Systemic Denial (NLT 48 hours) (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF Vostok Group will consolidate control over the Konstiantynivka GLOC breach using layered fire and UGVs, while committing available mechanized and light assets to expand tactical gains on the Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky axis.

1. Tactical Deep Strike Coordination: RF utilizes confirmed UAV/FPV dominance to rapidly prosecute UAF forces executing retrograde operations, preventing the formation of robust secondary defense lines.
2. Logistical Mitigation: RF executes operational measures to manage internal POL deficits by relying on the newly activated alternative Kazakh routes (rail/road). RF deep strikes will be maintained against UAF critical infrastructure.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Optimized Hybrid Shock Assault (NLT 302000Z NOV) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF C2 synchronizes a localized C4ISR denial event (e.g., concentrated Starlink jamming near Stepnohorsk) with the commitment of VDV reserves to bypass UAF blocking positions.

1. C2 Denial and Breach: A breakthrough in the Stepnohorsk area is leveraged by limited but highly effective VDV counter-attacks, supported by heavy glide bomb (KAB) strikes, attempting to disrupt the flow of the UAF strategic defense planning process.
2. Political Paralysis: RF simultaneously maximizes the NCA leadership destabilization IO narrative, aiming to force a political crisis that distracts from the tactical failure.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The UAF must counter RF's strategic logistical resilience while preventing tactical collapse in the South.

1. EXECUTE COUNTER-LOGISTICAL INTERDICTION 2.0 (J3/J2):

   • ACTION: Immediate authorization for deep strike targeting packages against confirmed rail classification yards and large capacity transshipment facilities identified as part of Kazakhstan's new alternative logistical routes NLT 300600Z.
   • RATIONALE: The immediate RF adaptation must be met with overwhelming disruption to sustain the crippling effect of the CPC strike and constrain Vostok Group maneuverability.

2. STABILIZE SOUTHERN FRONT (J3/SOF/J4):

   • ACTION: Expedite deployment of the committed mobile reserve (e.g., elements of 3rd Assault Brigade) to establish a dedicated, high-density defensive line utilizing specialized EW and anti-UGV/drone hunter-killer teams in the Stepnohorsk-Vremyevsky sector NLT 300000Z. Ensure this line receives priority logistics, diverting resources from the now compromised Konstiantynivka GLOC.
   • RATIONALE: Prevent RF from converting a logistical success into a deep operational breakthrough.

3. IMPLEMENT STRATEGIC DEFENSE DIRECTIVE (NCA/J6):

   • ACTION: J6 must immediately prioritize C4ISR redundancy efforts as outlined in the previous report (Operation GUARDIAN SHIELD) and allocate SAM/AD assets (25% of mobile reserve) solely to critical energy/thermal infrastructure protection NLT 301200Z.
   • RATIONALE: Ensure the UAF can execute the newly mandated defense plan under extreme operational pressure and protect the civilian population from systemic attrition.

//END OF REPORT//