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Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-29 13:34:31Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-11-29 13:04:33Z)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE: TACTICAL COLLAPSE IMMINENT // LOGISTICAL FAILURE CONFIRMED

DTG: 291800Z NOV 2025 SUBJECT: Constrained Logistical Failure Near Konstiantynivka // Escalation of RF Systemic Warfare (Thermal Denial) // Confirmed Damage to RF Shadow Fleet


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The operational picture has transitioned from critical risk to localized failure concerning the logistical support for the 33 OShP (Separate Assault Regiment). RF Information Operations (IO) have successfully capitalized on the physical interdiction of the Konstiantynivka GLOC, leveraging the resulting supply denial to break unit cohesion. Concurrently, the Russian Federation (RF) has intensified systemic warfare against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, targeting key heat and energy assets in the Kyiv sector.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

  • Southern Axis (Konstiantynivka/Huliaipole): The logistical chokehold imposed by NTK Kurier UGVs and layered RF fires has achieved its objective. RF propaganda claims (Colonelcassad) show captured UAF personnel from the 24th Brigade near Konstiantynivka stating unit abandonment due to ammunition and supply starvation. This corroborates the previous assessment that the 33 OShP defense is critically compromised by logistical failure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Kyiv Sector (Strategic Rear): RF kinetic action has successfully targeted civil heating infrastructure. Multiple reports confirm partial loss of heat supply in half of Kyiv’s districts following overnight attacks, with significant civilian infrastructure damage (e.g., 300 windows damaged in Sviatoshynskyi District). This signals a renewed focus on Thermal Denial warfare. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Maritime/Black Sea: UAF Navy and SBU claim a successful joint strike on an RF "shadow fleet" vessel. This reinforces the strategic denial campaign against RF energy transport assets, compounding the effect of the CPC strike. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  • Dnipropetrovsk/East: Air Force monitoring confirms UAV movement on a westward course from Eastern Dnipropetrovsk. This indicates an imminent deep strike threat, likely targeting logistics or C2 in the Central region. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Novoselivka: UAF forces report successful clearing operations by a Quick Reaction Group (QRGs). (LOW CONFIDENCE, awaiting BDA).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

Sub-freezing temperatures amplify the military effectiveness of the RF Thermal Denial campaign, increasing public strain and resource requirements for the National Civil Authority (NCA) following the Kyiv infrastructure strikes.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

  • RF: RF Vostok Group is maintaining maximum pressure (IO and localized fire) to achieve fragmentation of the 33 OShP without committing scarce mechanized reserves. The main effort is focused on systemic denial (energy, logistics, IO).
  • UAF: UAF strategic forces maintain initiative in the deep rear (CPC, maritime strikes). Tactical forces, particularly the 33 OShP, are likely transitioning to decentralized defense or tactical retreat due to failed resupply. Immediate priority is preventing systemic collapse in the Huliaipole area and rapidly restoring heating/energy infrastructure in Kyiv.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

  • Capability (Thermal/Systemic): RF has demonstrated the capability and intent to conduct coordinated precision strikes against dual-use civilian infrastructure (Nova Poshta, Kyiv Heating Network) during winter conditions to maximize civilian discomfort and destabilize the rear.
  • Intentions (Tactical Exploitation): RF intends to fully exploit the confirmed logistical failure at Konstiantynivka, forcing the collapse or costly tactical withdrawal of the 33 OShP. The objective is to free up Vostok Group reserves and gain a physical foothold in the Southern Front line.
  • Intentions (IO): RF continues its high-saturation IO campaign (Yermak/Umerov claims) synchronized with kinetic action to create a perception of political chaos and failure of command.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF is utilizing kinetic success (Konstiantynivka blockade) as primary source material for immediate, high-impact propaganda broadcasts, rapidly linking tactical victories to strategic IO goals (undermining UAF morale and institutional legitimacy).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (RF)

CATASTROPHIC LOGISTICAL CRISIS CONFIRMED. Kazakhstan's official comments regarding the CPC terminal situation validate the severity of the UAF strategic denial campaign. This guarantees RF reliance on deep strikes (KAB, Geran-2) and highly targeted mechanized attacks rather than large-scale maneuver for the coming weeks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating multi-domain effects (IO, kinetic strikes, proxy forces/UGVs). The use of the Konstiantynivka logistical choke point confirms successful centralized C2 planning and execution by the RF Vostok Group against the UAF GLOC. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

  • Southern Front: CRITICAL/DETERIORATING. The window for maintaining a cohesive defense by the 33 OShP has likely closed. Immediate efforts must shift from direct resupply to extracting high-value assets, establishing strong second-echelon blocking positions, and ensuring controlled, destructive tactical withdrawal.
  • Rear Posture: Under increasing stress due to thermal denial attacks in Kyiv. Readiness requires immediate Civil-Military (CIMIC) coordination to restore essential services.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • SUCCESSES: Continued strategic denial operations (Shadow Fleet strike); successful localized clearing operation at Novoselivka.
  • SETBACKS: Confirmed logistical failure resulting in troop fragmentation near Konstiantynivka; significant damage to Kyiv thermal infrastructure.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

  • CRITICAL REQUIREMENT (Southern): Immediate allocation of specialized engineers and counter-UAS assets (EW/SOF) to cover the tactical withdrawal and destruction of equipment left by the 33 OShP.
  • CRITICAL REQUIREMENT (Civil): Emergency repair teams, materials, and AD assets dedicated to protecting critical energy and heating infrastructure in major urban centers (Kyiv, Kharkiv).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO focus is achieving tactical/strategic convergence:

  1. Logistical Failure Amplification: Propaganda (Colonelcassad) effectively links UAF equipment abandonment directly to command failure ("cut off from supplies").
  2. Political Chaos Narration: Persistent, synchronized claims regarding the dismissal or demotion of NCA leadership (Yermak replaced by Umerov for peace talks, amplified by multiple RF/Proxy sources) are designed to undermine international and domestic confidence in Kyiv's stability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The combination of strategic IO attacks and cold-weather kinetic strikes (thermal denial) poses the highest risk to civilian morale since the early winter 2023 energy attacks. The NCA must immediately stabilize heat supply and issue a unified, transparent statement regarding the situation at Konstiantynivka to counter RF narratives.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Continued noise generation by RF-aligned channels (e.g., Trump/Venezuela claims) aims to divert Western political focus away from Ukrainian strategic successes (CPC strike). UAF must highlight its energy denial success to maintain international attention and leverage PURL C-UAS funding commitments.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Exploitation of Konstiantynivka Collapse and Systemic Attrition (NLT 48 hours) (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will capitalize on the tactical momentum gained from the successful logistical interdiction, but will prioritize preserving scarce POL reserves.

  1. Consolidation of GLOC Breach: RF Vostok Group uses long-range fire (artillery, KABs) and enhanced reconnaissance (UAVs confirmed WSW movement) to suppress any UAF blocking positions forming behind the 33 OShP, effectively widening the breach.
  2. Escalated Thermal Denial: New, synchronized kinetic strikes against remaining thermal power and distribution infrastructure in major population centers NLT 301200Z NOV, leveraging cold weather conditions.
  3. IO Domination: RF achieves maximum output from the Yermak/Umerov narrative to compel a domestic political response, potentially forcing an unnecessary internal investigation or restructuring.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Shock Assault Leveraging Operational Paralysis (NLT 302000Z NOV) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF Vostok Group views the 33 OShP fragmentation as a decisive opportunity and commits residual mechanized assets for a deep penetration.

  1. Breach and Encirclement: RF VDV/elite motorized units, supported by heavy drone/KAB saturation, bypass the main defensive line near Huliaipole, aiming to sever secondary UAF lines of retreat and disrupt the formation of the second echelon defense.
  2. C2 Denial Synchronization: The assault is synchronized with a localized, critical Starlink or AD network denial event, creating C4ISR vacuum at the point of penetration.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated DTGCriticalityDecision Point
UAF 33 OShP Controlled Withdrawal/ExtractionNLT 292200ZCATASTROPHICAuthorize use of all available SOF, EW, and engineer assets to cover and facilitate controlled retrograde operations and prevent large-scale equipment capture.
Major RF Thermal Denial Strike (Next Wave)NLT 301200ZHIGHRe-allocate 25% of strategic mobile AD reserves (SAM) to protect critical municipal heating and energy distribution infrastructure in Kyiv/Kharkiv.
NCA Counter-IO StatementNLT 292000ZHIGHNCA must issue a unified public address confirming institutional stability and demonstrating operational transparency regarding the Konstiantynivka failure.
Exploitation of RF Logistical ShockOngoingHIGHImmediate follow-on deep strikes authorized targeting Kazakhstan's potential alternative oil supply routes (rail classification yards, storage depots) now known to be activated.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGapCollection Requirement (CR)DomainConfidence Assessment
PRIORITY 1 (IMINT/TECHINT)33 OShP Status and Equipment LossesDedicated 24/7 IMINT/FMV assets over the Konstiantynivka/Huliaipole area to confirm equipment abandonment, enemy forward movement, and the stability of second-echelon defense lines.IMINT, TECHINTHIGH
PRIORITY 2 (TECHINT/C4ISR)RF Thermal Strike Platform OriginSIGINT/ELINT analysis of strike vectors and launch sites responsible for the Kyiv thermal infrastructure damage (KAB carriers, specific drone launch locations) to inform pre-emptive targeting.SIGINT, ELINTMEDIUM
PRIORITY 3 (HUMINT/OSINT)RF Vostok Group Intent/POL ReservesHUMINT/OSINT collection focused on RF Vostok Group rear areas to detect indicators of high-POL consumption (e.g., massive queuing, rapid movement of POL trucks) that would signal the activation of the MDCOA ground assault.HUMINT, OSINTMEDIUM

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The UAF must manage a tactical crisis in the South while stabilizing the rear against systemic kinetic pressure.

  1. EXECUTE CONTROLLED RETROGRADE AND LOGISTICAL FIX (J3/SOF):

    • ACTION: Initiate Operation SCORCHED EARTH NLT 292200Z in the 33 OShP sector. Prioritize controlled, destructive withdrawal (denial of captured assets) and establish robust, high-density blocking positions using pre-positioned anti-tank mines and fire saturation. Logistical priority shifts from front-line resupply to emergency support for the new blocking positions.
    • RATIONALE: The GLOC failure is confirmed. Preventing an RF breakthrough is now paramount; assets must be protected, and enemy gains denied.
  2. COUNTER-THERMAL DENIAL (J3/CIMIC):

    • ACTION: Implement heightened AD readiness (SAM deployment) for all critical heating and energy nodes NLT 300000Z. CIMIC forces must immediately coordinate with emergency services to prioritize rapid repair efforts using military engineering assets.
    • RATIONALE: Maintain domestic stability and resilience against RF systemic warfare efforts intended to break the civilian will during winter.
  3. STRATEGIC LOGISTICAL STRIKE EXPANSION (J2/J3):

    • ACTION: Target Kazakhstan's newly activated alternative rail routes (rail classification yards, large POL/grain depots) that support RF military logistics NLT 300600Z. Exploit the confirmed logistical instability to amplify RF Vostok Group's POL deprivation.
    • RATIONALE: Compound the effects of the CPC strike, maximizing the operational constraint on RF ground maneuver capability before they can adapt.

//END OF REPORT//

Previous (2025-11-29 13:04:33Z)

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