Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE: STRATEGIC LOGISTICS CATASTROPHE // C2 NETWORKED THREAT ESCALATES

DTG: 291700Z NOV 2025 SUBJECT: UAF BEC Strike on Caspian Pipeline Terminal (CPC) // Persistent Konstiantynivka GLOC Interdiction // Escalation of RF Networked Drone Threat

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The operational advantage achieved by Ukrainian strategic assets (UAF BECs) is now imposing catastrophic, systemic economic and logistical constraints on the Russian Federation (RF). However, this success is masked by a critical tactical vulnerability: the persistent physical chokehold on the Southern Front’s main supply artery (Konstiantynivka GLOC) and the confirmed escalation of RF multi-domain warfare (networked UAVs).

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Strategic Rear (Energy Denial): Confirmed successful UAF BEC attack on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) marine terminal. This targets critical oil transit infrastructure vital for RF export revenue and further degrades RF global logistical flexibility following the maritime tanker strikes (KAIRO, VIRAT). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole/Konstiantynivka): RF sources claim localized advances near Huliaipole, though these are likely small tactical probes seeking to exploit UAF logistical stress. The Konstiantynivka GLOC remains functionally blocked by NTK Kurier UGVs, jeopardizing the defensive posture of the 33 OShP.
• Eastern/Central Airspace: UAV activity confirmed moving southwest from Northern Poltava region (291247Z), highly likely conducting reconnaissance or ingress for follow-on strikes utilizing the new Geran-2 variants. RF tactical aviation executed KAB strikes on the Sumy region.
• Kyiv Sector: Confirmed RF strike damage to a Nova Poshta (postal logistics) facility in Kyiv Oblast, demonstrating continued intent to degrade non-military, dual-use infrastructure.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No significant change. Sub-freezing temperatures persist across the operational theater, favoring ground mobility for armored units pending adequate POL resupply. The RF logistical crisis makes POL availability the dominant environmental factor.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF Vostok Group is maintaining localized pressure (drones, artillery) near Huliaipole and Novopavlivka (confirmed drone strikes on UAF 42 OMBr/59 OShBr personnel). RF effort is focused on adapting kinetic capability to the deep-strike vulnerability (UAV training, defensive measures).
• UAF: Strategic forces are achieving high-impact denial objectives (CPC, maritime). Tactical forces are contained by the Konstiantynivka bottleneck. The immediate UAF priority is establishing logistical redundancy and neutralizing the networked C4ISR threat.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capability (Technological Adaptation): RF is increasing investment in long-term drone warfare supremacy, evidenced by active recruitment and training for UAV operators at the "Archangel UAV Operator Training Center" (Tuapse). This supports the existing intelligence on the upgraded, networked Geran-2 platforms. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Intentions (Kinetic): RF intends to exploit the tactical opportunity presented by the Konstiantynivka logistical failure by maintaining low-level kinetic attrition in the Southern Axis while using networked UAVs and KABs to paralyze UAF C2 and AD elsewhere (Poltava/Sumy).
• Intentions (Hybrid/IO): Intent to achieve internal destabilization in Kyiv by amplifying corruption allegations and leadership crises (Yermak dismissal claims).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF Telegram channels report internal issues with logistical integrity, specifically fraud leading to the supply of ineffective Radio Electronic Warfare (EW) equipment to frontline units (Krasnoarmeyskoye direction). This suggests a potential tactical vulnerability in RF C2 hardening efforts. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (RF)

CATASTROPHIC LOGISTICAL CRISIS. The CPC Terminal strike significantly escalates the RF energy denial campaign initiated by UAF. Kazakhstan's immediate activation of alternative supply routes confirms the severity of the damage and the threat to RF energy revenue. RF military POL reserves are now under immense strain, guaranteeing continued reliance on non-mechanized warfare (drone/artillery/KABs) for the immediate term (NLT 96 hours). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains adaptive in technological deployment (UAVs). However, the documented failure in EW equipment procurement suggests persistent internal corruption issues that UAF EW/SIGINT forces may be able to exploit at the tactical edge. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Strategic Posture: High. UAF is dictating the terms of engagement in the logistical and energy domains.
• Tactical Posture: HIGH RISK. While defense lines hold, the persistence of the Konstiantynivka blockage combined with continued RF pressure (Novopavlivka strikes) places the 33 OShP at heightened risk of systemic failure if resupply is delayed past the 48-hour window.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESSES: Confirmed BEC strike on the CPC terminal; continued international alignment (Australia/NZ PURL contribution).
• SETBACKS: Confirmed KAB strikes on Sumy; damage to Nova Poshta infrastructure; Konstiantynivka GLOC blockage persists.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid, non-conventional logistics plan refinement (airdrop, specialized SOF convoy) if the Konstiantynivka GLOC cannot be physically cleared NLT 291800Z.
• STRATEGIC REQUIREMENT: Accelerate integration of PURL (C-UAS) program funds toward systems capable of disrupting networked swarm attacks (Geran-2).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO has achieved a high saturation point regarding the Yermak allegations, with multiple high-profile channels (Два майора, Операция Z) dedicating resources to amplifying claims of his dismissal and internal political collapse. This campaign is highly coordinated and synchronized with kinetic strikes to maximize psychological impact. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is challenged by constant kinetic threats to civilian logistics (Nova Poshta) and infrastructure. However, international support and continued strategic military success provide resilience. RF IO efforts are focused on breaking the institutional bond between the NCA and the military leadership.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Australia and New Zealand's commitment to the PURL program (NATO procurement) provides clear, demonstrable evidence of continued, expanding global support for UAF C-UAS requirements. This must be highlighted internally and externally to counter RF IO narratives of isolation.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Logistical War Escalation and Networked Recon-Strike (NLT 72 hours) (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF adapts its operations to the extreme POL shortage by prioritizing networked kinetic strikes and defense of its remaining land logistics.

1. Networked Air Dominance: Increased deployment of Geran-2 (networked) UAVs targeting UAF logistics, C2, and AD systems in Central and Eastern regions (Poltava/Sumy axes), seeking operational paralysis.
2. GLOC Fixation: Kurier UGV interdiction maintains the blockade on Konstiantynivka GLOC, seeking to force a logistical surrender by 33 OShP NLT 011200Z DEC.
3. Domestic Political Disruption: RF IO achieves maximum output attempting to create a self-fulfilling prophecy regarding NCA instability (Yermak/Zelensky).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Synchronized Networked Air/Ground Assault – Breach of Southern Front (NLT 011800Z DEC) (HIGH CONFIDENCE) The extreme RF POL crisis makes a rapid, decisive breakthrough operation necessary for RF Vostok Group before total fuel exhaustion limits all maneuver.

1. C2/AD Saturation Strike: Massed, networked Geran-2 strike targets brigade rear C2 nodes and the Starlink/Radio network supporting the 33 OShP, achieving C4ISR denial.
2. GLOC Exploitation: Kurier UGVs maintain the blockade, preventing last-minute resupply.
3. Shock Assault: RF Vostok Group utilizes residual POL reserves to launch VDV/elite mechanized units in a highly coordinated, high-risk shock assault to breach the weakened, logistically starved 33 OShP defensive positions near Huliaipole.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The UAF must simultaneously exploit the strategic logistical crisis inflicted on RF and execute a critical tactical rescue of the 33 OShP.

1. EXECUTE LOGISTICAL RESCUE OPERATION (J3/SOF):

   • ACTION: Execute Operation CONSTANTINE CONVOY NLT 291800Z. If physical clearance of the GLOC route cannot be guaranteed, authorize immediate, high-risk SOF-led resupply operations (e.g., heavily armored, decentralized convoys, or limited air drop windows) bypassing the Kurier UGV choke point, focusing on high-priority ammunition.
   • RATIONALE: The immediate risk of the 33 OShP collapse outweighs the risk of asset loss during resupply. Logistical failure is RF Vostok Group's main objective.

2. NETWORKED AD HARDENING AND EXPLOITATION (J6/J3):

   • ACTION: Initiate a theater-wide transition to ultra-low EMCON for critical C2 nodes NLT 300000Z. Concurrently, capitalize on the reported RF EW equipment failure (CR PRIORITY 2) by increasing UAF EW activity and drone counter-C2 targeting in the specific areas of reported RF weakness (Krasnoarmeyskoye direction).
   • RATIONALE: Mitigate the networked Geran-2 threat while simultaneously leveraging confirmed RF technological vulnerabilities.

3. STRATEGIC LOGISTICS PRESSURE (J2/J3):

   • ACTION: Capitalize on the shock of the CPC strike. Authorize immediate follow-on kinetic operations targeting the RF land logistics network (rail classification yards, large storage depots) supporting Vostok Group, forcing RF to divert scarce resources to infrastructure defense rather than frontline POL resupply.
   • RATIONALE: Compound the effects of the maritime and pipeline strikes, denying RF any chance for rapid recovery of mechanized maneuver capability.

//END OF REPORT//