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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-29 12:34:32Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-11-29 12:04:31Z)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE: MARITIME LOGISTICS CRIPPLED // GLOC REMAINS CRITICAL

DTG: 291600Z NOV 2025 SUBJECT: Compounding RF Logistical Failure // RF Technological Adaptation (Geran Upgrade) // Critical Konstiantynivka GLOC Status


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The operational advantage gained by Ukrainian forces through deep-strike and maritime interdiction continues to severely degrade the Russian Federation (RF) logistical capacity. However, RF forces are rapidly adapting their kinetic capabilities (UAV upgrades) while maintaining a critical physical chokehold on the Ukrainian operational rear via the persistent closure of the Konstiantynivka Ground Line of Communication (GLOC).

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

  • Strategic Rear (Black Sea/Energy Denial): Confirmed successful use of Sea Baby Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs) by SBU/VMS to strike two RF 'shadow fleet' oil tankers, KAIRO and VIRAT, near Turkish waters. This directly compounds the logistics crisis initiated by the Affipsky NPZ strike (previous SITREP). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole/Konstiantynivka): UAF 100th Separate Mechanized Brigade (ОМБр) is actively engaged in FPV drone strikes near Kostiantynivka. This indicates ongoing localized tactical effort to counter the NTK Kurier UGV interdiction, but the GLOC remains functionally closed. Fire saturation continues, resulting in civilian casualties, including a child, in the Pology district.
  • Central/Eastern Airspace: RF UAV activity confirmed moving towards Izium (Kharkiv region) and Poltavshchyna, suggesting reconnaissance or preparation for subsequent deep strikes, likely utilizing newly adapted assets.
  • Kyiv Sector: Traffic movement restored on the Kharkiv Highway following the massed missile strike, indicating effective UAF/DTEK damage control and rapid infrastructure recovery.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No change. Sub-freezing temperatures persist. RF meteorological reports indicate delayed heavy snow formation in Moscow (NLT mid-December), suggesting cold, but operationally feasible, conditions will continue to favor the attacker in open terrain pending POL availability.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

  • RF: Vostok Group is currently prioritizing fire support (KABs, artillery) and advanced technological deployment (Geran-2 upgrades) over large-scale mechanized maneuver, necessitated by the critical POL shortage. Focus remains on achieving a logistical fix on the UAF 33 OShP.
  • UAF: UAF strategic assets (SBU/VMS) are successfully executing a high-impact maritime denial strategy. Tactical forces (33 OShP, 100th OМБр) are fighting simultaneous battles—defending the line and attempting to clear the critical Konstiantynivka GLOC. High-level defense coordination continues (Zelensky/Shmyhal meeting).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

  • Capability (Technological Adaptation): CRITICAL UPGRADE CONFIRMED. RF is fielding upgraded Geran-2 (Shahed-136) UAVs equipped with network modems and enhanced EW protection. This transforms the munition from a simple loitering asset into a networked reconnaissance-strike platform, significantly complicating UAF air defense (AD) and C2 hardening efforts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Intentions (Operational Shift): RF intention is shifting. Given the POL scarcity, the RF will pivot from maneuver warfare reliance to maximizing networked, multi-domain kinetic pressure, using upgraded UAVs, persistent UGVs (Kurier), and KABs to achieve operational exhaustion of UAF defensive forces.
  • Intentions (Hybrid/IO): RF continues high-intensity IO, focusing on fracturing Ukrainian leadership legitimacy (Yermak allegations) and internal morale (PWS abuse claims) to prevent UAF kinetic success from translating into strategic political gain.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

  • RF: Confirmed deployment of sophisticated, networked Geran-2 variants, likely tested and deployed following previous UAF AD successes and deep strikes (Lipetsk, Yasny).
  • UAF: Confirmed active counter-UGV operations by the 100th OМБр, indicating dedicated tactical efforts to resolve the Konstiantynivka blockage, though the overall success status remains critical/unconfirmed.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (RF)

SEVERELY DEGRADED. The dual success of the Affipsky NPZ strike and the confirmed maritime interdiction of two shadow fleet tankers (KAIRO, VIRAT) guarantees a compounding RF POL and financial crisis. This ensures a prolonged operational pause for RF mechanized forces. RF command must now prioritize logistics for the technologically adapted air/drone assets over ground maneuver units. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating successful adaptation in the technical domain (UAV upgrade deployment). Tactical C2 is capable of synchronized drone-artillery fire missions (MoD Russia). However, RF personnel morale remains visibly low, with documented contempt for leadership. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

  • Strategic Posture: EXCELLENT. UAF has maximized strategic leverage by inflicting systemic damage on RF energy and financial streams.
  • Tactical Posture: CRITICAL/HIGH-RISK. While defensive lines hold and counter-UGV operations are active, the failure to definitively clear the Konstiantynivka GLOC renders the 33 OShP critically vulnerable to ammunition starvation should the RF MDCOA materialize.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • SUCCESSES: Destruction of KAIRO and VIRAT tankers; successful FPV strikes by 100th OМБр; rapid recovery of Kyiv transportation infrastructure.
  • SETBACKS: Continued fire saturation causing civilian casualties in the Zaporizhzhia axis; Konstiantynivka GLOC blockage persists.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

  • IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT: Overwhelming commitment of SOF/Engineer/EW assets for the Konstiantynivka GLOC clearance.
  • NEW REQUIREMENT: Immediate revision of AD doctrine and acquisition strategy to defend against the networked, EW-protected Geran-2 UAV threat.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is leveraging domestic dissent (Bezuhla/Yermak) and psychological manipulation (PWS claims about British instructors) to undermine the National Command Authority (NCA) and foreign support structure. Simultaneously, RF state media is attempting to divert international attention by focusing on foreign crises (Gaza, US societal decline). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is reinforced by the clear strategic military successes (maritime and deep strikes). Civilian resilience is maintained by rapid infrastructure restoration, though constantly challenged by kinetic strikes and the pervasive threat of RF IO. RF frontline morale is confirmed to be poor.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The coincidence of the maritime strikes and confirmed high-level diplomatic meetings in Ankara (Turkey-Russia-Ukraine) suggests effective synchronization between UAF kinetic operations and diplomatic positioning. This synchronization must be maintained to maximize leverage against the RF narrative of Ukrainian political instability.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Drone Supremacy and Sustained Logistical Interdiction (NLT 72 hours) (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will exploit its temporary operational pause by accelerating the deployment of technologically superior drone warfare to achieve local dominance while waiting for POL resupply.

  1. Networked Drone Testing: RF increases deployment of upgraded Geran-2 variants in Central/Eastern Ukraine (Izium/Poltava) to test mesh networking, EW resistance, and coordination with artillery.
  2. Kurier Fixation: Persistent UGV deployment and drone ambushes continue to render Konstiantynivka GLOC unusable, aiming for logistical failure of 33 OShP NLT 302000Z NOV.
  3. Domestic IO Escalation: RF media prioritizes internal Ukrainian political scandal narratives (Yermak/Bezuhla) over external BDA to sow maximum internal discord.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Synchronized Networked Air/Ground Assault (NLT 011800Z DEC) (HIGH CONFIDENCE - elevated risk due to Geran upgrade) RF executes a devastating, technologically advanced strike sequence while UAF logistics fail.

  1. C2/AD Saturation Strike: A massed wave of networked, EW-resistant Geran-2 UAVs targets UAF brigade-level C2 nodes, AD systems, and known Starlink relay locations in the Zaporizhzhia axis.
  2. GLOC Exploitation: Kurier UGV interdiction is maintained until 33 OShP ammunition status is critical.
  3. Shock Assault: Vostok Group launches a limited, highly coordinated mechanized shock assault (VDV/elite armor units utilizing prioritized POL reserves) aimed at achieving a rapid, localized breach against the logistically starved 33 OShP forces.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated DTGCriticalityDecision Point
Konstiantynivka GLOC Clearance (Achieved)NLT 291800ZCATASTROPHICImmediate commitment of all necessary assets (EW, heavy armor, engineers) to ensure physical clearance and protection of the first relief convoy. Failure beyond this point guarantees the eventual tactical collapse of the 33 OShP.
RF Networked UAV Swarm ThreatNLT 300000ZHIGHInitiate pre-planned J6 (C2) and J3 (AD) redundancy protocols (Operation GUARDIAN SHIELD). Prioritize mobile AD assets capable of engaging large networked swarms.
UAF Counter-IO StatementNLT 291900ZHIGHNCA must issue a unified political response that addresses the Yermak allegations, reinforcing institutional legitimacy and linking kinetic success to political resolve.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGapCollection Requirement (CR)DomainConfidence Assessment
PRIORITY 1 (TECHINT/GLOC)Kurier UGV C2 Node and Deployment PatternDedicated 24/7 EW/SIGINT collection focused on the Konstiantynivka axis to locate frequency hopping and mesh signatures used by Kurier UGV control.SIGINT, EWHIGH
PRIORITY 2 (TECHINT/AIR DEFENSE)Geran-2 Networked CapabilitiesDedicated HUMINT/TECHINT focused on captured UAV components and RF military bloggers (e.g., WarGonzo) to ascertain precise technical specifications (frequency, mesh protocol, jamming resilience) of the upgraded Geran-2 variant.TECHINT, HUMINTHIGH
PRIORITY 3 (HUMINT/POL)Vostok Group POL PrioritizationHUMINT/OSINT targeting RF rear area communications to confirm which specific units (brigade level) have received POL reserves and are designated for the potential MDCOA mechanized assault against 33 OShP.HUMINT, OSINTMEDIUM

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The UAF must decisively resolve the tactical logistical crisis at Konstiantynivka while simultaneously preparing for a new era of RF networked drone warfare.

  1. DECISIVE GLOC CLEARANCE (J3/J6):

    • ACTION: Execute the GLOC clearance operation NLT 291800Z using maximal force projection. Allocate dedicated, non-divestible assets (heavy EOD teams, T-80/T-90 level armor, and comprehensive EW jamming coverage) to neutralize UGV and drone threats along the route. Accept the asset risk.
    • RATIONALE: The strategic advantage gained by crippling RF logistics will be lost if the 33 OShP is forced to withdraw due to ammunition exhaustion. Tactical stability is the prerequisite for exploiting strategic success.
  2. C4ISR/AD PIVOT (J3/J6/J7):

    • ACTION: Immediately revise AD protocols to counter networked UAV swarms. Initiate a rapid acquisition/deployment program for Counter-UAS (C-UAS) systems capable of disrupting mesh networks. All C2 nodes must be prepared for complete radio silence and reliance on hardened, non-commercial satellite/radio links.
    • RATIONALE: The Geran-2 upgrade represents a critical escalation. UAF must preempt the MDCOA by mitigating the risk of mass C2/AD denial.
  3. INFORMATION WARFARE COUNTER-STRIKE (NCA/MFA):

    • ACTION: Issue a unified, decisive NCA statement NLT 291900Z that links the SBU/VMS maritime strikes and the NPZ damage directly to a calculated strategy to impose financial costs on the aggressor. Concurrently, release a detailed report debunking the Yermak allegations and reinforcing institutional integrity.
    • RATIONALE: Translate kinetic success into domestic confidence and international negotiating strength, thereby neutralizing the ongoing RF IO campaign targeting political stability.

//END OF REPORT//

Previous (2025-11-29 12:04:31Z)

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