INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE: LOGISTICAL RACE
DTG: 291100Z NOV 2025
SUBJECT: Multi-Domain Synchronization // Strategic Deep Strike Effectiveness // Critical GLOC Vulnerability
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)
The operational environment is characterized by a high-tempo exchange of deep strategic strikes aimed at crippling the opponent's sustained warfighting capacity, while the frontline focuses on critical logistical and C2 denial. The RF has initiated immediate hybrid pressure following the massed kinetic attacks.
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
- Deep Rear (RF): Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) deep strike capability is confirmed successful against high-value RF strategic targets:
- Afipsky Oil Refinery (NPZ): Confirmed hit; fire extinguished, technical equipment damaged. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Taganrog Aviation Plant (Tu-95/A-50 Maintenance): Confirmed strike, fire reported in the repair workshop. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Black Sea/Maritime: CRITICAL FACT. The RF shadow fleet tanker Virat was attacked again near the Turkish coast, confirming sustained UAF operational capability to enforce maritime interdiction against RF gray logistics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Capital Region (Kyiv Oblast): Post-strike consolidation is ongoing. Civilian casualties rose to 37 WIA/KIA. Infrastructure damage includes power stabilization issues (previous 70k households affected) and new reports of water supply disruption in four Kyiv districts. A major logistics depot (Nova Poshta depot in Vyshnieve) was also severely damaged.
- Frontline (Konstiantynivka GLOC): The persistent, unmitigated threat posed by NTK Kurier UGVs to the main supply route supporting the 33rd Separate Assault Regiment (33 OShP) remains the highest tactical priority.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors
- Sub-freezing conditions amplify the impact of disrupted water and heating infrastructure in Kyiv, increasing civilian strain.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
- RF: RF forces continue deep strike operations (KAB/UAV/missile use confirmed in Kharkiv Oblast). The RF Ministry of Defence (MoD) released a standard daily summary affirming ongoing operations but offered no verifiable detail regarding UAF deep strike damage.
- UAF: UAF deep strike synchronization (Kinetic and Naval Drone) demonstrates high strategic operational tempo and effective asset allocation. Frontline forces (33 OShP) remain focused on containment while suffering critical logistical strain.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)
The enemy strategy is a race to achieve logistical paralysis before UAF deep strikes fundamentally degrade RF's strategic resources (aircraft and fuel).
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
- Capability (Counter-C2/Hybrid): RF is actively pursuing C2 paralysis through kinetic strikes (Krolevets C2 loss) and hybrid measures (Starlink threat, Polish railway pressure).
- Intentions (Strategic): RF political messaging (Orbán citing Ukraine as a necessary "buffer state") indicates the maximalist objective of territorial and political subjugation remains the ultimate intent, using sustained attrition as the primary method. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Intentions (Tactical/Logistical): The failure to mitigate the Kurier UGV threat is confirming to RF analysts that GLOC denial is highly effective and likely achievable within the 48-hour timeframe. RF will prioritize maintaining this ground interdiction while UAF repairs rear-area damage.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
- RF is reacting to UAF deep strikes by attempting to exploit the damage in the rear. KAB/UAV strikes are immediately targeting key infrastructure (e.g., Kharkiv region civilian sites) to fix UAF AD resources away from the frontline sectors.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (RF)
- DEGRADED SUSTAINMENT: Confirmed strikes on Afipsky NPZ and the Virat tanker directly impact RF petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) supply, both domestically and via bypass routes. The destruction of the Taganrog aviation maintenance facility further degrades RF strategic bomber (Tu-95) and ISR (A-50) sustainment capacity. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE on overall impact, HIGH CONFIDENCE on hits).
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
- RF successfully continues to synchronize IO campaigns with kinetic strikes. However, RF deep AD networks are demonstrably insufficient to protect high-value strategic repair facilities, indicating a persistent C2 or resource gap in deep area defense. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
- Offensive Posture (Strategic): HIGH. UAF deep strike effectiveness against RF strategic targets is at a peak operational tempo.
- Defensive Posture (Tactical): CRITICAL. Logistical readiness for the 33 OShP is deteriorating due to the persistent Kurier UGV threat. Rear area resilience is challenged by compounding infrastructure damage (power, water, logistics depots).
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
- SUCCESSES: Confirmed destruction of two enemy Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) using FPV drones (Pokrovsk direction). Successful strategic strikes on three major RF targets (Afipsky, Taganrog, Virat tanker).
- SETBACKS: Sustained damage to Kyiv water supply and a major logistics depot (Vyshnieve) exacerbates resource demands and degrades morale.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
- PRIORITY REQUIREMENT: EW, SOF, and FPV assets dedicated to Konstiantynivka GLOC security and Kurier UGV control node neutralization.
- CRITICAL DOMESTIC REQUIREMENT: Engineering and AD assets for rapid repair and protection of Kyiv water supply and power infrastructure.
- CONSTRAINT: Operational necessity demands high expenditure of AD interceptors to protect critical rear area infrastructure, straining long-term reserves.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
- RF IO Focus: RF channels immediately amplified the replacement of Andriy Yermak by Rustem Umerov (NSDC Secretary) as the head of the peace negotiation delegation. This is framed as a sign of internal political instability or forced compromise under US pressure. RF continues to use proxies (Orbán) to normalize the perception of Ukrainian defeat.
- UAF Internal Security (Exploited): Rumors of searches and seizures targeting Yermak (Operation Z report) are likely disinformation intended to create friction between the Office of the President and key security institutions.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
- The high success rate of UAF deep strikes offers a significant morale boost, but this is immediately counteracted by the tangible, painful impact of the massive strike in Kyiv (water shortage, casualties). Domestic focus will shift rapidly to basic survival needs.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
- The appointment of Umerov to lead the negotiation delegation is a key signal to international partners. UAF must rapidly deploy clear, unified messaging regarding this change to prevent RF IO from exploiting it as evidence of internal chaos or geopolitical coercion.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)
The window for the RF Vostok Group's renewed mechanized assault (MDCOA) is directly tied to the confirmed denial of the Konstiantynivka GLOC.
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)
MLCOA: Logistical Denial and Fixed AD Resources (NLT 300600Z NOV) (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF will prioritize the exhaustion of UAF defensive resources and personnel before committing armor.
- GLOC Total Denial: RF doubles down on Kurier UGV density and persistent FPV/Artillery strikes on the Konstiantynivka GLOC, aiming to completely halt resupply for 33 OShP within 12 hours.
- Infrastructure Targeting: RF executes follow-on missile/drone strikes specifically targeting the water supply infrastructure repair points and mobile AD systems protecting them in Kyiv Oblast, forcing UAF to divert resources from the front.
- IO Escalation: RF uses the Umerov appointment to demand immediate cessation of deep strikes (Afipsky, Taganrog) as a precondition for any negotiation, attempting to paralyze UAF strategic counter-pressure.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)
MDCOA: Synchronized C2 Denial and Breakthrough Assault (NLT 010600Z DEC) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
RF synchronizes theater-wide electronic warfare and ground assault.
- C2 BLACKOUT: RF implements widespread, localized Starlink denial (electronic or technical) across the Zaporizhzhia sector.
- Mechanized Rush: Utilizing the confirmed starvation of 33 OShP, Vostok Group launches a massed mechanized assault on the Huliaipole line, supported by overwhelming TOS-2 thermobaric and heavy KAB fire, aiming to achieve an operational breakthrough and sever the Southern Front.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
| Event | Estimated DTG | Criticality | Decision Point |
|---|
| Konstiantynivka GLOC Status (Uninterdicted) | NLT 291500Z | CRITICAL | If Kurier UGV nodes are not neutralized, shift to high-risk, armored, night-time resupply convoys immediately, escorted by EW and FPV assets, accepting higher attrition rates until daylight clearance. |
| Kyiv Water Supply Stabilization | NLT 291800Z | HIGH | Allocate dedicated ground force protection (SOF/NSF) to all critical water infrastructure repair teams and confirmed staging areas. |
| RF C2 Denial Initiation (Starlink) | NLT 292000Z | HIGH | Initiate mandatory switch to redundant VHF/UHF encrypted communication nets (Operation Guardian Shield) in frontline units across the Southern Theater. |
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gap | Collection Requirement (CR) | Domain | Confidence Assessment |
|---|
| PRIORITY 1 (TECHINT/LOGISTICS) | Kurier UGV Control Node Location & Power Source | Dedicated SIGINT/ELINT sweep (UAV/Ground) to pinpoint operational C2 signatures and determine power sustainment methods (batteries/generators) to calculate operational persistence. | SIGINT, ISR (Drone) | HIGH |
| PRIORITY 2 (BDA/STRATEGIC) | Damage Assessment Taganrog/Afipsky NPZ | IMINT (SAR/Optical) targeting of the Taganrog aviation plant repair bay and Afipsky refinery technical equipment to quantify delay/disruption to strategic aviation and POL output. | IMINT | MEDIUM |
| PRIORITY 3 (HYBRID/C2) | RF Starlink Denial Vector | TECHINT analysis and HUMINT reporting to determine if the Starlink threat is primarily electronic (jamming/hardware), geopolitical (SpaceX pressure), or a combined cyber threat. | TECHINT, HUMINT | HIGH |
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
The current environment necessitates a dual focus: immediate kinetic defense of frontline logistics and strategic IO to manage domestic and international perceptions of leadership stability.
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FRONTAL LOGISTICS SANITIZATION (J3/SOF):
- ACTION: Authorize and execute air support (fixed-wing or heavy UGV/loitering munition) for the Hunter-Killer Teams (HKT) targeting Kurier UGV control nodes on the Konstiantynivka GLOC. Ground-only clearance has proven insufficient; apply overwhelming kinetic superiority to neutralize control positions NLT 291500Z.
- RATIONALE: Preventing logistical collapse of the 33 OShP is the single most critical tactical objective to deny the RF Vostok Group a decisive operational advantage.
-
REAR AREA FORCE PROTECTION (J3/J6):
- ACTION: Establish 24/7 AD and dedicated counter-drone protection (EW/FPV) rings around critical water and power repair infrastructure in Kyiv Oblast. Failure to secure essential civilian services directly facilitates RF psychological warfare goals.
- RATIONALE: Mitigate secondary strikes aimed at repair teams and ensure domestic stability following the massed attack.
-
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS COUNTER-IO (IO/NCA):
- ACTION: Immediately launch a coordinated information campaign highlighting the strategic success of the Taganrog and Afipsky NPZ strikes. This campaign must be run concurrently with clear, unified messaging regarding the Umerov delegation change, framing it as a shift to a more security-focused negotiation posture, not a sign of instability.
- RATIONALE: Exploit strategic successes to counter the RF narrative of inevitable victory and offset domestic morale degradation caused by the Kyiv infrastructure strikes and political rumors.
//END OF REPORT//