Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE

DTG: 291200Z NOV 2025 SUBJECT: Post-Strike Consolidation // Logistical Chokepoint Status // Strategic Naval Exploitation

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The operational environment has transitioned from the Russian Federation's (RF) immediate punitive strike cycle back to sustained multi-domain efforts aimed at degrading Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) C2, energy resilience, and critical frontline logistics. UAF deep strike persistence in the Black Sea represents a major operational counter-pressure.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Deep Rear (Kyiv/Oblast): The RF massive aerial assault (36 missiles, 596 UAVs) resulted in confirmed civilian casualties (2 KIA, 30+ WIA in Kyiv region) and widespread power instability (70,000 households without power). This confirms the high lethality of the strikes despite the UAF's high interception rate (91.3%).
• C2 Infrastructure: RF claimed a successful strike on the Cyber Security C2 center near Krolevets, Konotop District, Sumy Oblast (291003Z).
• Black Sea/Maritime: CRITICAL FACT. UAF Naval Forces/drones executed a repeated, confirmed drone attack on the oil tanker Virat (Gambia Flag, confirmed shadow fleet asset) near the Turkish coast (290935Z, 290953Z). This demonstrates sustained UAF capability to enforce deep maritime interdiction post-KTK strike.
• Frontline (Kupyansk Axis): RF forces are actively utilizing ISDM Zemledeliye (remote mining systems) to fix UAF advance/maneuver capabilities, complementing artillery and drone strikes.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

• Sub-freezing conditions continue to compound the effects of energy disruption (power loss, heating capability) and complicate logistical movement, especially on secondary routes.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF MoD officially confirmed the massive strike as retaliation (291003Z), framing it as successful and targeting military/energy infrastructure. RF Vostok Group continues localized infantry pressure and KAB strikes (Zaporizhzhia) while prioritizing logistical strangulation.
• UAF: Air Defense posture remains effective but strained (due to high interceptor expenditure). Frontline posture is focused on maintaining containment and rapidly re-securing the rear area GLOCs.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

The enemy has returned to the MLCOA of logistical and C2 strangulation. The immediate kinetic retaliation phase is complete, marking a shift back to preparation for ground operations predicated on UAF resource depletion.

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capability (C2 Denial): The alleged strike on a Cyber Security C2 facility confirms RF intent and capability to target high-value UAF command and information infrastructure, validating the MDCOA concern regarding C2 paralysis. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Capability (Hybrid Warfare): RF channels are amplifying the kinetic success (power outages) and using third-party statements (Orbán, 290947Z) to reinforce the narrative of UAF's inevitable defeat, eroding internal and international morale.
• Intentions (Tactical/Logistical): The high volume of Kurier UGV deployment on the Konstiantynivka GLOC, combined with remote mining (Zemledeliye) on other axes, indicates the RF primary intent is to immobilize and starve UAF frontline units (33 OShP) before committing mechanized reserves.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Remote Interdiction: Increased reliance on remote/unmanned assets (Kurier UGVs, Zemledeliye) to avoid direct contact and maximize attrition on UAF logistics personnel/vehicles.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (RF)

• The repeated UAF attack on the Virat tanker (shadow fleet) confirms that RF is attempting to bypass established sanctions via maritime routes, and that UAF's naval drone capability remains a persistent, strategic threat to this gray logistics network. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• INTERNAL VULNERABILITY (Pokrovsk): Public dissent among relatives of the RF 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (MRB) (290958Z) highlights acute personnel morale and resource issues within a critical RF fighting unit. This is an immediate, actionable PSYOP opportunity.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains successful at synchronizing large-scale deep strikes and subsequent IO campaigns. However, the UAF's ability to repeatedly strike RF naval/economic assets suggests a persistent gap in RF defensive C2 coverage outside the immediate frontline.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Deep Strike Posture (HIGH): The follow-up strike on the Virat tanker demonstrates strategic persistence and successful exploitation of the RF maritime vulnerability identified during the KTK strike.
• Logistical Readiness (CRITICAL LOW): The inability to report successful neutralization of the Kurier UGVs on the Konstiantynivka GLOC remains the single most critical tactical constraint. The 33 OShP is operating on borrowed time.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS: Sustained naval deep strike operational tempo (KTK + VIRAT).
• SETBACK: Confirmed loss of C2 facility (Krolevets) and continued, unmitigated threat to the primary logistical route (Konstiantynivka).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT: EW and SOF assets dedicated to GLOC clearance (Kurier UGV mitigation).
• SECONDARY REQUIREMENT: Urgent domestic energy repair and stabilization in Kyiv Oblast following the massive attack.
• CONSTRAINT: High expenditure of specialized AD munitions remains a long-term resource problem exacerbated by the RF's saturation UAV strategy.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Primary Narrative Shift: The narrative has shifted from "punitive retaliation" to "inevitable victory/collapse." Orbán's statement (290947Z) provides international legitimacy to this defeatist framing.
• IO Target: Domestic Stability: RF actively amplifies the impact of the energy strikes (70k without power) to degrade domestic confidence in UAF resilience.
• Internal RF Vulnerability (EXPLOIT): The public outcry by 74th MRB relatives provides a highly credible, exploitable narrative of RF troop exhaustion and mismanagement on the Pokrovsk axis.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Kyiv casualties and power loss will negatively affect civilian morale, counteracting the positive impact of the KTK/Saki strikes.
• Warning regarding POW exchange scams (291000Z) indicates significant family anxiety, which RF could exploit by offering seemingly viable "private exchange" channels to sow distrust.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The high-level US delegation visit remains a focal point for RF IO, which seeks to frame it as a negotiation attempt. The strong messaging from Hungary (Orbán) attempts to normalize the acceptance of Russian victory among Western partners. UAF must rapidly deploy counter-narratives.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

The RF is actively implementing the prerequisite conditions (logistical and C2 degradation) for the renewed Huliaipole assault. The window for UAF counter-action on the GLOC is rapidly closing.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Maximized Logistical Strangulation & Targeted C2 Softening (NLT 301200Z NOV) (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF operational groups will delay a decisive push until they assess 33 OShP resupply is critically degraded (NLT 48 hours).

1. GLOC Lockdown: RF reinforces Kurier UGV density and FPV drone activity on the Konstiantynivka GLOC to achieve complete supply route denial.
2. Increased C2 Pressure: Following the strike on the Cyber Security C2 facility, RF attempts localized degradation or denial of critical UAF satellite communications (Starlink) in the Zaporizhzhia/Kherson operational sectors (NLT 291800Z).
3. KAB/TOS Prep Fire: Continued high-volume KAB usage and introduction of heavy thermobaric systems (TOS-2) to suppress defenses along the Huliaipole line.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Synchronized C2 Denial and Breakthrough Assault (NLT 010600Z DEC) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF synchronizes theater-wide electronic denial with the frontline assault.

1. C2 Blackout: RF executes a major C2 disruption event (localized Starlink denial, widespread GPS jamming, and targeted cyber attacks) creating a command vacuum in the Southern Theatre.
2. Armor Commitment: Under cover of C2 paralysis and confirmed resource shortages at 33 OShP (due to Kurier success), Vostok Group launches the massed mechanized assault against the Huliaipole line, aiming for a rapid operational rupture and potential isolation of UAF pockets.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate focus must be shifted entirely to securing the Konstiantynivka GLOC and exploiting new RF internal vulnerabilities while maintaining strategic pressure on maritime economic targets.

1. COUNTER-INTERDICTION OPERATIONS (J3/SOF):

   • ACTION: Immediate execution of focused EW/FPV drone "Search and Destroy" missions against Kurier UGV control positions on the Konstiantynivka GLOC, NLT 291600Z. These operations must receive priority allocation over all other tactical ISR assets in the sector.
   • RATIONALE: Logistical starvation of the 33 OShP is the most direct path to a tactical breakthrough for the RF Vostok Group. Clearing this route is an existential requirement.

2. STRATEGIC & PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE (IO/J3):

   • ACTION: Initiate a targeted PSYOP campaign immediately leveraging the 74th MRB public appeals. Broadcast verifiable reports of troop exhaustion and logistical failures in the Pokrovsk direction to encourage desertion across the RF Vostok Group and fix RF reserves.
   • RATIONALE: Exploit confirmed RF morale vulnerabilities to reduce combat effectiveness and decrease RF freedom of movement on secondary axes.

3. NAVAL STRIKE CONTINUITY (VMS/SSO):

   • ACTION: Plan and authorize sustained, repeated attacks on confirmed RF shadow fleet tankers (e.g., Virat) and supporting infrastructure in the Black Sea/Azov Sea approaches.
   • RATIONALE: Maintain strategic economic pressure achieved by the KTK strike, demonstrating UAF control over RF wartime gray logistics and further deteriorating the RF revenue base.

//END OF REPORT//