Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 281835Z NOV 25 REFERENCE: PREVIOUS SITREP 281830Z NOV 25; DAILY SUMMARY 281530Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL PRIORITY: Mitigate immediate threat of synchronized Strategic Strike (Deep Rear) and Political Collapse (NCA Destabilization) preceding the Huliaipole assault.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Huliaipole Axis (ZAPORIZHZHIA): Tactical containment by UAF 33 OShP holds. RF forces (Vostok Group) are maintaining fire saturation (KAB) and conducting preparatory activities (Confirmed enemy minelaying near Stepnohirsk foiled by UAF 210 OShP). This confirms the kinetic pause is merely preparation for the anticipated mechanized thrust NLT 300000Z NOV.
• Deep Rear / CI Protection: Drone reconnaissance flights confirmed targeting preparation over Odesa (from Black Sea), Kharkiv, and Novhorod-Siverskyi (Chernihiv region). This confirms RF intent to execute widespread strikes targeting critical infrastructure (CI) across multiple oblasts.
• Black Sea LOGISTICS: Confirmed UAF maritime operations have successfully struck multiple RF shadow fleet tankers (Kairos, VIRAT, 5-7 total per initial BDA) near the Turkish coast. This significantly disrupts RF oil supply lines and forces allocation of RF naval assets away from operational theaters.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant environmental changes noted. Reports of "Huliaipole fogs" from pro-RF sources may indicate localized conditions slightly complicating advanced ISR, but not preventing KAB/UAV operations or the planned mechanized assault.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF (Red): RF is focused on synchronized multi-domain preparatory attacks:
  1. Kinetic preparation (UAV/KAB).
  2. Deep logistics disruption (Confirmed fire at Alabuga SEZ, Tatarstan—UAV production site).
  3. Political/diplomatic pressure (Exploitation of Yermak resignation; timing of Witkoff/Putin meeting).
• UAF (Blue): Tactical units maintain cohesion (Stepnohirsk drone success). Strategic focus remains divided between managing the NCA crisis and preparing for the predicted strategic strike wave NLT 290400Z NOV. AD posture remains the critical vulnerability.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities: RF demonstrates high capacity for multi-domain synchronization. The strategic ability to couple political destabilization (Yermak crisis) directly with major international diplomacy (Witkoff/Putin meeting) creates a highly volatile decision environment for Ukraine.
• Intentions (Immediate 6-12 Hours):
  1. Maximize Political Contagion: Sustain the narrative that the UAF NCA is corrupt and illegitimate, leveraging international reporting (Politico, Tusk) to pressure Kyiv into political concessions and halt Western support flow. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  2. Execute Strategic Strike Wave (Kinetic): Proceed with the planned combined missile/UAV strike NLT 290400Z NOV, leveraging the confusion generated by the simultaneous political crisis.
  3. Prepare Ground Assault: Continue KAB strikes and minelaying/obstacle deployment on the Huliaipole axis ahead of the NLT 300000Z NOV mechanized launch.

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed attack/incident at the Alabuga SEZ (UAV manufacturing) represents a critical operational setback for RF force generation, especially concerning future Geran-2 (Shahed) supply. The RF response has been muted, focusing public attention elsewhere (Putin's scholarship announcement).

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF shadow fleet logistics are severely disrupted by the successful UAF maritime attacks. This compounds previous pressure on RF fuel lines. If the Alabuga incident is confirmed as a successful strike, the RF operational tempo for massed drone usage will degrade within 30-45 days.

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective in hybrid warfare. The immediate exploitation of the Yermak resignation and the sequencing of the Witkoff/Putin meeting (reported by TASS) demonstrates strategic-level control over the information and diplomatic domains aimed at isolating Kyiv.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are under intense pressure across all domains (kinetic, logistical, cognitive).

• Defensive Cohesion: Tactical resilience is high (Stepnohirsk anti-mining success).
• Strategic Vulnerability: The resignation and subsequent international amplification of the corruption crisis represents a critical vulnerability. Polish PM Tusk's statement linking the chaos to Western support plans validates the RF IO effort. NCA stability must be rapidly restored.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Confirmed successful targeting of 5-7 RF shadow fleet tankers in the Black Sea. Confirmed incident/strike at Alabuga SEZ (UAV production). Successful defensive anti-mining operations (210 OShP) on the Huliaipole approach.
• Setbacks: Severe and accelerating political destabilization of the NCA due to the Yermak resignation and subsequent RF/international exploitation.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Political Signal. The immediate appointment of a trusted, transparent successor to Yermak is required NLT 291200Z NOV to prevent the political crisis from metastasizing further, particularly before the Witkoff/Putin meeting.
• LOGISTICAL: Konstiantynivka GLOC remains critical. Must be secured before the predicted Huliaipole assault NLT 300000Z NOV.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Core Narrative: The focus is on the "illegitimacy" and "corruption" of the Kyiv leadership following the Yermak resignation. RF media (TASS, Operatsiya Z) are successfully framing this as a domestic collapse that justifies international disengagement.
• Foreign Policy Contagion: Polish PM Tusk's concern over the "fatal combination" of the chaos and the US peace plan narrative confirms the RF IO campaign is achieving its operational goal: causing international actors to question the integrity and stability of the UAF NCA at a critical juncture.
• RF Deflection: Putin's focus on trivial domestic matters (scholarships) and RF MoD engagement with the ICRC are standard deflection efforts to mask the strategic failures (Yasny, maritime losses, Alabuga incident).

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic Ukrainian morale is directly threatened by the perceived instability in the Office of the President and the international pressure regarding corruption. Tactical successes (maritime strikes) provide brief boosts but are insufficient to counter the strategic IO offensive.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

HIGH ALERT: The announced meeting between Witkoff (representing US peace efforts) and Putin in Moscow early next week (TASS confirmed) introduces extreme risk. The UAF must stabilize its internal political C2 before this meeting to prevent an externally brokered solution that leverages Ukraine's current weakness.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(Confidence: HIGH) RF will maintain synchronization across all domains to achieve operational shock:

1. Strategic Strike & IO Max (D-Day Minus 1): RF executes the coordinated missile/UAV strike wave NLT 290400Z NOV. Simultaneously, RF IO leverages the Yermak crisis peak to delegitimize any UAF response or negotiation stance.
2. GLOC Severance: Kurier UGV activity achieves operational interdiction of the Konstiantynivka GLOC by 291800Z NOV.
3. Ground Offensive: RF Vostok Group launches the massed mechanized assault on 300000Z NOV, aiming to exploit ammunition shortages and C2 degradation.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(Confidence: HIGH - Increased due to Tusk/Witkoff news)

1. NCA Collapse & Diplomatic Isolation: The NCA fails to appoint a credible successor, leading to severe political fragmentation. This collapse is synchronized with the strategic strike wave and Kurier GLOC strangulation. Witkoff subsequently meets Putin and announces a unilateral "ceasefire framework" highly favorable to RF, which fractures international support and forces Kyiv into compliance under duress, rendering the Huliaipole defense meaningless.
2. Strategic Targeting of Alabuga Replacements: Following the Alabuga incident BDA, RF launches immediate, overwhelming strategic strikes specifically targeting any perceived UAF command and control infrastructure associated with deep strike operations (e.g., specific long-range UAV facilities or supporting SOF bases).

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J6 (AIR DEFENSE & C2 PROTECTION)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 1 - STRIKE MITIGATION): AD RESOURCE SHIFT AND C2 HARDENING. Immediately execute the Strike Readiness Protocol (DEFCON 2). Shift high-value AD assets (NASAMS/Patriot where available) from less vulnerable sectors to protect the designated C2 nodes and the most critical energy infrastructure identified by the current UAV tracks (Odesa, Kharkiv, Kyiv CI). Ensure complete redundancy of communication nets for 290000Z NOV to 290800Z NOV.
• RATIONALE: Mitigate the MLCOA of a synchronized strategic strike targeting C2 effectiveness and CI capacity.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2. NCA/J2/J5 (POLITICAL STABILIZATION & COUNTER-IO)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 1 - NCA INTEGRITY): IMMEDIATE POLITICAL ACTION. The President must appoint a successor to the Head of the Office of the President NLT 290800Z NOV. This successor must be perceived domestically and internationally as transparent and staunchly anti-corruption. This move must be globally amplified via UAF IO channels to preempt RF narratives and stabilize the political environment ahead of the Witkoff/Putin meeting.
• RATIONALE: Counter the MDCOA of political collapse and diplomatic isolation. Restore confidence in the NCA.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3. J3/SOF (GLOC SECURITY)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 1 - GLOC SANITIZATION): ACCELERATED UGV COUNTER-OPERATION. Deploy all available thermal-equipped SOF/EW assets to clear the Konstiantynivka GLOC of Kurier UGVs by 291200Z NOV. Task J4 to identify and prepare alternate emergency logistics lanes in case sanitization fails.
• RATIONALE: Secure the Konstiantynivka GLOC to ensure 33 OShP combat effectiveness for the 300000Z NOV assault.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

4. J2/J7 (BDA & TARGETING EXPLOITATION)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 2 - ALABUGA & MARITIME): PRIORITIZE STRATEGIC BDA. Launch high-priority collection assets (SIGINT/IMINT) to confirm the extent of damage at the Alabuga SEZ (UAV production) and confirmed damage/loss of the Kairos tanker and other shadow fleet assets. Exploit the resulting RF logistics gap with follow-on deep strikes on logistics nodes supporting the Vostok Group.
• RATIONALE: Exploit confirmed RF sustainment setbacks to degrade their ability to execute the Huliaipole assault and future drone warfare.
• CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM (Pending BDA results).

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//END OF REPORT//