Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 281830Z NOV 25 REFERENCE: PREVIOUS SITREP 281800Z NOV 25; DAILY SUMMARY 281530Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL PRIORITY: Mitigate immediate threat of synchronized Strategic Strike (Deep Rear) and Logistical Strangulation (GLOC).

ANALYST JUDGMENT: The Red Force (RF) has completed the sequencing for its next operational shock. The kinetic phase appears imminent, predicated on the success of the hybrid preparatory phase (Yermak resignation, Polish IO, Kurier UGV deployment). Confirmed RF strategic aviation C2 activity strongly suggests a major follow-up missile/UAV strike wave targeting critical infrastructure (CI) and Command & Control nodes NLT 290400Z NOV. This strike is the precursor to the anticipated Huliaipole mechanized assault. UAF must assume the goal is to achieve C2 confusion and energy grid collapse concurrent with the ground offensive launch.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Deep Rear (CENTRAL/NORTH): RF fires successfully targeted CI in Slavutych, Kyiv Oblast (power grid), confirming ongoing intent to degrade energy and domestic morale. This indicates RF is expanding CI targeting beyond previous primary targets like Starokostiantyniv.
• Logistics Axis (Konstiantynivka GLOC): Remains the critical choke point. Interdiction by Kurier UGVs continues to be the primary threat vector against UAF sustainment. Loss of this GLOC will render the Huliaipole defense unsustainable.
• Eastern Front (Krasny Liman): RF reports of sustained offensive actions in the Krasnolymansky direction, confirming RF's strategy of fixing UAF reserves in the East while preparing for the main breakthrough attempt in Zaporizhzhia.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant environmental changes noted that would impede strategic missile/UAV operations or Kurier UGV deployment.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF (Red): RF strategic aviation C2 elements are active and signaling readiness for launch (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Ground forces maintain high-intensity attrition fire (KABs, drones) on the Huliaipole axis, resisting any impulse for premature mechanized maneuver until the logistical and C2 conditions are optimal.
• UAF (Blue): NCA stability is under pressure from RF IO and domestic speculation regarding the Yermak resignation and corruption allegations. President Zelenskyy has issued a high-profile statement emphasizing national unity and perseverance. Tactical units are engaged in localized counter-armor/FPV operations (CONFIRMED: Third Army Corps FPV success).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities: RF demonstrates high strategic coordination between IO (Medvedev/TASS political attacks) and kinetic preparations (Strategic Aviation signaling). The capacity for deep, simultaneous CI strikes is assessed as high.
• Intentions (Immediate 6-12 Hours):
  1. Execute Strategic Strike Wave (PRIORITY 1): Launch coordinated missile/UAV strike NLT 290400Z NOV targeting the UAF power grid, C2 nodes, and key logistics hubs to achieve tactical paralysis and degrade AD effectiveness.
  2. Maximize Political Disruption: Amplify Yermak-related corruption narratives and delegitimize NCA (Medvedev statements confirmed via TASS) to sow internal distrust.
  3. Sustain Logistical Decay: Ensure Kurier UGV activity maximizes GLOC interdiction ahead of the Huliaipole push.

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift to explicit strategic aviation C2 activity marks the transition from the hybrid preparatory phase to the kinetic execution phase. This is an adaptation to the UAF's successful containment of the immediate Huliaipole ground assault, indicating the RF needs greater preparatory damage before committing armor.

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics supporting Vostok Group are stable but reliant on the window opening NLT 300000Z NOV. The successful UAF maritime disruption (Novorossiysk tanker) pressures RF fuel supply lines, but the effect is not yet operationally critical.

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF hybrid C2 remains highly effective in synchronizing IO, political pressure, and kinetic threats. The messaging on the strategic failure (Yasny) is being managed via deflection (domestic news) rather than frontal denial.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces must now shift focus from recovery post-Kinzhal alert to pre-emptive AD readiness against the signaled strategic aviation strike wave.

• NCA: Resilience is being tested; swift action on Yermak's successor is required to minimize the political opportunity seized by RF.
• Defense: Tactical resilience is high, evidenced by FPV drone successes against fortified RF positions ("mangals" ineffective).

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Confirmed UAF FPV operations resulting in destruction of RF positions/armor. Maintenance of the maritime pressure on Novorossiysk.
• Setbacks: Power loss in Slavutych (CI degradation). High political turbulence due to Yermak's situation, which must be immediately contained.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: AD Readiness Status. All UAF AD assets must be brought to MCO (Mission Capable Operational) status, assuming a multiple-wave attack using mixed missile/UAV assets targeting CI and C2 nodes in Central/Northern Ukraine.
• LOGISTICAL: The time window to sanitize the Konstiantynivka GLOC before the Huliaipole assault is rapidly closing.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• Delegitimization Vector: Medvedev's pronouncements (re-amplified by TASS) that Zelenskyy is "illegitimate" and cannot sign a peace treaty is the core RF message, explicitly aimed at undermining both domestic and international confidence in the Ukrainian NCA. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Distraction/Deflection: RF media is actively using high-profile domestic news (e.g., Moscow ice rink, legal cases) to draw domestic Russian attention away from the Yasny strategic missile failure.
• Mercenary Recruitment: Reports of South African political figures aiding RF mercenary recruitment underline the continuous, global nature of RF hybrid sustainment efforts.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is highly sensitive to the political crisis surrounding the NCA. The successful defense of Kyiv and tactical successes (FPV videos) provide positive counter-narratives, but these risk being overwhelmed by synchronized strategic strikes and IO attacks.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The Polish logistics crisis remains actively exploited by RF IO. The need for a joint Polish-Ukrainian security mechanism to debunk the sabotage narrative is now more urgent than ever to ensure continuous supply flow ahead of the Huliaipole assault.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(Confidence: HIGH) RF will execute the kinetic phase of its operational shock:

1. Strategic Strike Wave (D-Day Minus 1): RF launches a significant combined missile/UAV strike wave (targeting 5-8 CI nodes and 2 C2 sites) NLT 290400Z NOV. Primary targets: Kyiv/Poltava/Kharkiv energy infrastructure and secondary logistics hubs (not yet sanitized by Kurier UGVs).
2. GLOC Interdiction Maxed: Kurier UGV operations achieve near-total disruption of the Konstiantynivka GLOC by 291800Z NOV, limiting effective resupply to the 33 OShP to less than 20% of required volume.
3. Huliaipole Launch: RF Vostok Group launches the massed mechanized assault on 300000Z NOV under the cover of degraded UAF C2 and depleted front-line ammunition stocks.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(Confidence: MEDIUM)

1. C2 Collapse and Breach: RF successfully coordinates the predicted strategic strike with widespread (electronic or kinetic) Starlink denial and a massive use of high-yield drones (e.g., Mangas) against the forward UAF C2. This paralyzes the 33 OShP response, allowing a deep, uncontained RF penetration (15+ km) on the Huliaipole axis.
2. Political-Kinetic Synchronization: RF IO successfully forces a full, immediate Polish border closure due to fabricated "sabotage evidence" concurrent with the strategic strike wave, achieving complete logistical isolation before the Huliaipole assault begins.

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J6 (AIR DEFENSE & C2 PROTECTION)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 1 - STRATEGIC DEFENSE): IMPLEMENT STRIKE READINESS PROTOCOL. Immediately raise air defense posture across all Central/Northern assets (Kyiv, Poltava, Cherkasy) to DEFCON 2 (High Alert). Focus AD allocation on energy infrastructure, key logistics hubs, and identified C2 centers. Mandate 100% redundancy in communication nets (VHF/UHF backup) for key CI protection crews.
• RATIONALE: Mitigate the MLCOA of a synchronized strategic strike targeting CI and C2 NLT 290400Z NOV.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2. J3/SOF (LOGISTICS SECURITY)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 1 - GLOC SANITIZATION): DEPLOY COUNTER-UGV TASK FORCE. Immediately deploy dedicated, thermally-sighted SOF Hunter-Killer teams supported by EW jammers and aerial ISR to clear the Konstiantynivka GLOC of all Kurier UGV presence by 291200Z NOV. Failure to secure this route jeopardizes the entire Southern defense.
• RATIONALE: Prevent logistical starvation of the 33 OShP before the predicted Huliaipole assault.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3. J2/J5 (INFORMATION WARFARE)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 2 - IO EXPLOITATION): PROACTIVE YASNY & CORRUPTION COUNTER-IO. Execute the planned global information campaign exploiting the Yasny strategic failure NLT 282400Z NOV. Concurrently, the NCA must launch a clear, transparent investigation into the Yermak allegations and swiftly appoint a politically stable successor to stabilize the domestic environment and blunt RF delegitimization efforts.
• RATIONALE: Exploit a critical RF failure while neutralizing the political shock aimed at the NCA.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

4. NCA/MFA (POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC SECURITY)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 2 - POLISH CRISIS): ACTIVATE JOINT RAIL SECURITY MECHANISM. Publicly and immediately propose and implement joint UAF/Polish border and railway patrols on the cross-border GLOCs. This demonstrable act of cooperation is required to preemptively negate the RF IO narrative of sabotage and ensure continuous Western aid flow.
• RATIONALE: Address the MDCOA of logistical isolation via geopolitical pressure.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

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//END OF REPORT//