Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 281800Z NOV 25 REFERENCE: PREVIOUS SITREP 281700Z NOV 25; DAILY SUMMARY 281530Z NOV 25

ANALYST JUDGMENT: The immediate kinetic threat on the strategic rear (Starokostiantyniv Air Base) has subsided, but the overarching Strategic Hybrid Shock continues, defined by synchronized political destabilization, C4ISR threat, and logistical strangulation. Significant confirmation of a catastrophic RF strategic missile test failure (Sarmat/ICBM) at the Yasny range provides a critical window for UAF counter-IO and deep strike exploitation. Tactical focus remains on securing the Konstiantynivka GLOC against Kurier UGVs and maintaining containment against the RF Vostok Group advance (Huliaipole).

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Strategic Rear (WEST/CENTRAL): Air raid alerts for Kinzhal-capable MiG-31K sorties targeting Kyiv/Zhytomyr were lifted rapidly (281720Z NOV). Starokostiantyniv (Starokon) Air Base remains the primary strategic target, but the immediate threat is mitigated. UAF must assume the RF attempted a decoy strike pattern.
• Black Sea/Maritime: A commercial tanker (Kairos, flagged Gambia) heading to Novorossiysk experienced a fire near the Bosphorus due to "external influence." This indicates successful UAF long-range maritime disruption operations targeting RF fuel/logistics supply chains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Donbas (Seversk Axis): Intense, localized grinding combat confirmed near Seversk, specifically around Platonovka and Dronovka, where RF forces are conducting repeated, costly assaults to gain high ground. This pressure fixes UAF reserves in the East. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole): Tactical containment by 33 OShP holds. GLOC interdiction by Kurier UGVs remains the critical tactical obstacle.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Previous low visibility is clearing across key axes, potentially benefiting UAF ISR and counter-UGV operations. RF deep strike failure at Yasny involved a visible "black mushroom cloud," indicating catastrophic damage and potential environmental contamination at a strategic testing site.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF (Red): RF forces are maximizing IO and political pressure while recovering from strategic infrastructure setbacks (Yasny failure). Kinetic efforts focus on localized attrition (Seversk) and persistent logistical strangulation (Kurier UGVs).
• UAF (Blue): UAF AD response was rapid during the Kinzhal alert, validating readiness. Tactical effectiveness demonstrated in drone destruction of RF assault groups (Kharkiv) and containment (Huliaipole). Diplomatic/C2 apparatus remains under acute strain due to the Yermak resignation.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities: RF demonstrates high capacity for synchronized multi-domain operations (IO/Kinetic/Political). However, the confirmed failure of the Sarmat/ICBM test at Yasny (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) highlights critical technical and strategic vulnerabilities in their deep strike and strategic deterrence capability.
• Intentions (Immediate 12-24 Hours):
  1. Maintain Logistical Strangulation (PRIORITY 1): Intensify Kurier UGV operations and amplify the Polish railway sabotage narrative to fully interdict the Konstiantynivka GLOC and Western aid flow.
  2. Amplify Political Fragmentation: Aggressively use the Yermak resignation and new IO narratives (e.g., the "KaKaL" unit) to delegitimize the NCA and sow internal discord among EU allies.
  3. Contain Strategic Failure: Use state media to suppress or reframe the catastrophic missile failure at Yasny.

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF tactical operations are highly opportunistic:

1. Shift to Attrition: Increased confirmation of heavy, costly ground assaults in fixed-position sectors (Seversk) to generate attrition and pin UAF reserves, rather than attempting major maneuver breakthroughs outside Huliaipole.
2. Increased Maritime Hardening: The Black Sea tanker fire near the Bosphorus will likely trigger increased RF maritime asset protection, complicating future UAF naval drone operations.

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF Vostok Group sustainment remains predicated on securing the Huliaipole assault window (NLT 300000Z NOV). The loss of a tanker near Novorossiysk, if confirmed as a successful strike, negatively impacts RF fuel logistics. The strategic loss of the Yasny facility impacts RF long-term R&D/testing but not immediate front-line logistics.

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF hybrid C2 successfully integrated the Starokon decoy/threat with immediate IO exploitation of the Yermak resignation. However, the catastrophic failure at the Yasny site suggests either C2 failure or critical technical oversight within the strategic forces domain. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are successfully operating in distributed denial/defense across critical axes:

• Air Defense: Rapid response to the Kinzhal threat indicates high readiness, though the extent of damage from the previous Starokon strike window remains critical to determine.
• Deep Strike/Naval: Confirmed successful operational attack on the Novorossiysk supply chain (tanker fire) and confirmed destruction of RF assault groups (Kharkiv). This offensive pressure must be maintained.
• C2 Resilience: The ruling party's quick reaction to the Yermak fallout is a positive indicator of attempts to stabilize the NCA, but the political crisis is not fully resolved.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Catastrophic RF strategic missile failure confirmed at Yasny. Successful maritime disruption targeting Novorossiysk supply. Successful destruction of RF AD systems (previous report) and Kharkiv assault group (new report).
• Setbacks: The continued intensity of RF attrition attacks (Seversk) is taxing UAF personnel and ammunition reserves in that area. Persistent threat to the Konstiantynivka GLOC.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

• IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT: Counter-UGV Capabilities. Specialized EW, thermal/IR surveillance assets, and SOF personnel are required immediately on the Konstiantynivka GLOC to neutralize Kurier UGV threats and prevent logistical starvation before the Huliaipole assault.
• AD BDA: Detailed, urgent BDA of Starokon infrastructure (especially runways and C2 bunkers) is required to determine if additional AD relocation is still warranted post-threat mitigation.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• Targeting NCA (CRITICAL): RF state media (TASS) and affiliates continue aggressive, personalized attacks on the remaining Ukrainian leadership post-Yermak (e.g., "Ali-Baba" commentary).
• Targeting EU Unity (NEW VECTOR): The introduction of the satirical "KaKaL" metric (Kotsnews) explicitly targets key EU figures (Berbok, Von der Leyen) while simultaneously promoting RF-friendly dissenters (Orbán, Fico). This is a focused effort to neutralize pro-Ukrainian sentiment in preparation for the Polish logistics crisis amplification.
• Countering Defeat: RF channels are actively minimizing or ignoring the Yasny strategic failure to maintain the narrative of technological superiority.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF success in tactical engagements (Kharkiv drone strikes) and RF strategic failures (Yasny) provide crucial positive counter-narratives necessary to stabilize domestic morale following the political turbulence. The successful protection of Kyiv from the recent Kinzhal threat also aids stabilization.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The Polish logistics crisis threat remains the primary geopolitical obstacle. The success of UAF deep strike and naval operations (Yasny, Novorossiysk tanker) must be leveraged internationally to demonstrate continued operational capability and justify sustained military aid.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(Confidence: HIGH) RF will continue to prioritize logistical and C2 degradation while grinding down UAF defenses on secondary axes:

1. Concentrated GLOC Interdiction: Kurier UGV operations will achieve 50% interdiction of the Konstiantynivka GLOC by 291200Z NOV, forcing UAF supply convoys to take extremely high risk or circuitous routes.
2. Sustained Attrition: RF will maintain high-intensity ground assaults in the Seversk-Lysychansk salient over the next 48 hours to fix UAF reserves and prevent their redeployment south.
3. Huliaipole Preparation: RF Vostok Group will maintain preparatory fires (KABs, heavy drone drops) but delay the full mechanized assault launch until the logistical strangulation effects are maximized, NLT 300000Z NOV.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(Confidence: MEDIUM)

1. Full Starlink Denial & Huliaipole Breakthrough: RF executes synchronized, widespread Starlink denial (electronic or geopolitical) NLT 290800Z NOV. Under this cover of C2 confusion, the Vostok Group launches a massed assault on Huliaipole, utilizing the already degraded logistics state to achieve a deep penetration (5-10km).
2. Strategic Strike Success: Following BDA, RF launches a highly effective follow-up strategic strike (e.g., using Kalibr cruise missiles or high-yield UAVs) that successfully detonates key infrastructure or weapons depots at Starokon, severely restricting UAF air operational maneuverability.

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J7 (COUNTER-TECHNOLOGY & GLOC SECURITY)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 1 - CONSTIANTYNIVKA): IMMEDIATE COUNTER-UGV OPERATION. Fully authorize and commit Hunter-Killer Teams (SSO/EW) supported by airborne ISR (drones/helicopters) to sanitize the Konstiantynivka GLOC from Kurier UGV activity NLT 282400Z NOV. The success of the Huliaipole defense depends entirely on this route.
• RATIONALE: Mitigate the MLCOA of logistical strangulation leading directly to battlefield starvation for the 33 OShP.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2. J2/J5 (EXPLOITATION OF STRATEGIC FAILURE)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 1 - YASNY EXPLOITATION): GLOBAL PUBLIC RELATIONS AND IO BLITZ. Release confirmed evidence (IMINT, Video BDA) of the catastrophic RF strategic missile failure at Yasny, highlighting the technical incompetence and strategic fragility of RF nuclear/long-range forces. Synchronize this release with diplomatic partners NLT 282400Z NOV.
• RATIONALE: Counter the strategic narrative of RF strength and technical superiority; provide a morale boost domestically and internationally.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3. J3/J1 (FORCE MANAGEMENT - SEVERSK)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 2 - SEVERSK): SUSTAIN ATTACKING FIREPOWER. Increase ammunition and fire support allocation to UAF units operating in the Seversk vicinity (Platonovka/Dronovka) for the next 72 hours, focusing on counter-battery fire.
• RATIONALE: Prevent RF forces from achieving a positional breakthrough that could free up reserves currently fixed by the attrition fight.
• CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.

4. NCA/MFA (MARITIME AND POLITICAL SECURITY)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 2 - BLACK SEA): LEVERAGE MARITIME SUCCESS. Officially acknowledge the successful disruption of Russian maritime logistics via the tanker incident (without claiming responsibility) to reinforce the security risk for ships accessing RF ports. Use this incident to pressure Turkey into enforcing stricter Bosphorus controls on RF-bound shipping.
• RATIONALE: Sustain offensive pressure on RF war economy and logistics without tactical attribution.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

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//END OF REPORT//