Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 281700Z NOV 25 REFERENCE: PREVIOUS SITREP 281700Z NOV 25; DAILY SUMMARY 281530Z NOV 25

ANALYST JUDGMENT: The Russian Federation (RF) has immediately escalated the kinetic component of the Strategic Hybrid Shock by initiating a high-value deep strike targeting the strategic rear, specifically the Starokostiantyniv (Starokon) Air Base (Khmelnytskyi Oblast). This strategic kinetic action is synchronized with sustained Information Operations (IO) aimed at deepening political fragmentation (Yermak fallout, Polish crisis). The RF intent is assessed as neutralizing UAF air capability and strategic logistics prior to executing the previously anticipated mechanized assault on the Huliaipole Axis (NLT 300000Z NOV). C2 Hardening and immediate AD response at Starokon are critical.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Strategic Rear (CRITICAL): High-speed aerodynamic threats (Kinzhal missiles) are tracking toward the Starokostiantyniv Air Base. Confirmed successful drone strikes by UAF against three RF Air Defense (AD) systems (Buk-M1, M2, Tor-M2) potentially create localized RF AD gaps that UAF must exploit, but simultaneously necessitate urgent reinforcement of AD over key UAF assets.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole): Tactical containment by 33 OShP holds. Focus remains on the Konstiantynivka GLOC, which is under persistent threat from Kurier UGVs.
• Eastern Axis (Borova Vicinity): RF force presence and advance reported near Borova. This localized pressure likely aims to fix UAF reserves in the East, preventing reinforcement of the Southern axis. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Low visibility (fog/mist), reported in previous periods, remains a primary factor enabling low-profile RF assets (UGVs, reconnaissance) and complicating UAF Counter-UAS and ISR operations. The current Kinzhal launch occurs during a period of optimal RF strategic signaling.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF (Red): RF forces are maximizing the effects of the political vacuum by striking high-value military infrastructure (Starokon) while IO elements amplify diplomatic tensions (Tusk/Orban quotes). Logistics interdiction (UGVs) continues.
• UAF (Blue): High operational tempo across AD units responding to the Kinzhal launch. Political leadership (Zelenskyy) is attempting to re-establish cohesion and continuity through public address. Local authorities (Kryvyi Rih) confirm successful implementation of decentralized energy solutions.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities: RF demonstrates synchronized strategic strike capability (MiG-31K launch) and effective political-military coordination. The ability to target a major rear base like Starokon confirms RF persistent deep strike reach.
• Intentions (Immediate 06-12 Hours):
  1. Degrade Strategic Air Assets (PRIORITY 1): Execute destructive strikes against Starokon to remove UAF long-range air support (e.g., F-16 potential basing, strategic drone launch sites) and logistics capacity.
  2. Disrupt C2/EW Chain: Claimed liquidation of a UAF Cyber Threats Major in Sumy Oblast targets UAF technical expertise.
  3. Signal Strategic Depth: Leverage the ratification of the military agreement with India to project international strategic support, countering the image of RF isolation.

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The coordinated use of multiple Kinzhal missiles against a single, high-value target (Starokon) suggests RF is attempting a saturation strike to defeat layered UAF AD. This indicates a heightened focus on eliminating UAF ability to maneuver deep reserves or air assets.

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF deep strike capability (Kinzhal/UAVs) remains fully sustained. Logistics for RF Vostok Group appears stable enough to support continued saturation fire and prepare for the Huliaipole assault, but UAF deep strikes against Lipetsk and Yasny may begin to impact RF long-term sustainability if follow-up strikes are successful.

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF hybrid C2 remains highly effective, flawlessly integrating political signaling (TASS reports on Tusk/India) with high-stakes kinetic operations (Kinzhal launch). The immediate exploitation of the Yermak vacuum demonstrates centralized, adaptive control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• C2 Resilience: President Zelenskyy's public address attempts to counter RF IO and political paralysis. Success hinges on immediate and visible military continuity.
• AD/Deep Strike: UAF forces demonstrated excellent tactical response by destroying three RF AD systems, creating local superiority. This deep strike capability must be protected, making the defense of Starokon paramount.
• Infrastructure Adaptation: Local defenses (Kryvyi Rih) show effective, decentralized preparation for sustained energy warfare.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Confirmed destruction of 3x RF AD systems. Successful containment of the Huliaipole breach.
• Setbacks: Confirmed strategic strike threats on Kyiv (explosions in Obolon) and the Khmelnytskyi region (Kinzhal launch). The political crisis remains a primary constraint on optimal military planning.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL AD ASSETS: Immediate requirement for reallocation of mobile AD systems (e.g., PATRIOT, NASAMS) to reinforce the Starokon/Central-Western Ukraine axis for 48 hours.
• C2 Redundancy (Confirmation): Immediate confirmation that all brigade-level and higher C2 nodes are operating under the previously recommended Blackout C2 Protocol.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• Targeting Alliance Unity (HIGH): RF IO is maximizing impact by aligning the Yermak resignation with unfavorable diplomatic developments (Orban/Putin meeting, Budapest narratives). Tusk’s quoted concern is immediately exploited to suggest NATO fragmentation.
• Targeting Leadership (HIGH): RF channels continue to frame the political crisis as proof of Ukraine's status as a Western "colony" (Starshye Eddy), attempting to delegitimize the National Command Authority (NCA).

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is severely tested by simultaneous political uncertainty and direct attacks on major cities and critical infrastructure (Kyiv, Starokon). Zelenskyy’s unity message is crucial, but its efficacy depends on visible success in defending the deep rear against strategic missile attacks. Fundraising efforts (STERNENKO, Arkhangel) show strong civil society resilience.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The RF push for military cooperation with India, alongside the amplification of European political concerns (Tusk), aims to distract international attention from Ukraine and project global influence, especially to non-NATO partners. UAF counter-IO must address the fragmentation narrative immediately.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(Confidence: HIGH) RF will prioritize neutralizing UAF strategic depth before executing the ground offensive:

1. Starokon BDA and Follow-up Strikes: RF will assess Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) on Starokon (or the immediate strike target) and prepare follow-up strikes (Kh-22/KABs/drones) within the next 18 hours to fully degrade the base's operational status.
2. Logistical Strangling: Kurier UGV operations will intensify on the Konstiantynivka GLOC, seeking to fully interdict resupply NLT 291200Z NOV, forcing the 33 OShP to fight with depleted stocks.
3. Huliaipole Pre-Positioning: Vostok Group continues utilizing low visibility to move fire support and mechanized reserves into forward assembly areas west of Huliaipole, anticipating the assault launch NLT 300000Z NOV.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(Confidence: MEDIUM) RF achieves overwhelming success in the deep strike and logistical strangulation phase:

1. Successful Starokon Denial: The Kinzhal strike successfully disables key runway infrastructure, C2 nodes, or weapons depots at Starokon, severely restricting UAF air operational maneuverability for the Southern front defense.
2. Systemic C2 Failure Synchronization: Starlink denial (geopolitical or EW) is synchronized with the Starokon damage and full interdiction of the Konstiantynivka GLOC, leading to communication fragmentation and logistics failure on the Huliaipole axis.
3. Local Breach and Reserve Fixation: RF forces near Borova successfully engage and fix UAF operational reserves, preventing their necessary repositioning to defend the Starokon or Huliaipole axis.

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J7 (AIR DEFENSE AND TARGET PROTECTION)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 1 - STAROKON AD): EXECUTE EMERGENCY AD REDEPLOYMENT. Immediately shift mobile, high-tier AD assets (if available) to reinforce the Khmelnytskyi axis, specifically Starokon and associated logistics nodes. Activate maximum electronic protection measures.
• RATIONALE: Mitigate the MLCOA of successful RF strategic strikes that would severely impact UAF operational air and logistics capability ahead of the Huliaipole assault.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2. J6 (C2 ASSURANCE & STARLINK THREAT)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 1 - C2 CONFIRMATION): J6 must confirm 100% compliance with the Blackout C2 Protocol across all commands NLT 282000Z NOV. This includes testing redundant, non-Starlink communications channels for all units near the Kinzhal impact zone and the Konstiantynivka GLOC.
• RATIONALE: The targeting of a strategic hub demands assurance of fully hardened communications during the political and energy crisis.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3. J2/J3 (EXPLOITATION OF RF AD GAPS)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 2 - FOLLOW-ON STRIKES): Authorize immediate follow-on deep strikes (UAV/Missile) capitalizing on the confirmed UAF destruction of three RF AD systems and the internal 1488th Regt shuffle. Primary Targets: Logistics hubs directly supporting the Vostok Group and command nodes controlling the Kurier UGV operations (D/S HUMINT confidence supports targeting).
• RATIONALE: Exploit temporary AD superiority to degrade RF offensive preparation capability.
• CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM (Requires rapid target confirmation).

4. MFA/NCA (COUNTER-IO AND ALLIANCE UNITY)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 2 - UNITY SIGNALING): Immediately amplify President Zelenskyy's unity message and issue coordinated, high-level statements with key EU partners (especially Poland/France/Germany) to explicitly reject the RF-promoted narrative of political fragmentation (Tusk/Orban/Yermak crisis).
• RATIONALE: Counter the cognitive domain component of the hybrid shock, which is designed to prevent Western coordinated military aid flow.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

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//END OF REPORT//