Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 281700Z NOV 25 REFERENCE: PREVIOUS SITREP 282000Z NOV 25; DAILY SUMMARY 281530Z NOV 25

ANALYST JUDGMENT: Russian Federation (RF) forces are currently maximizing the effects of the Strategic Hybrid Shock (political vacuum and nationwide energy attrition). The window of extreme vulnerability for Ukrainian Command and Control (C2) is now open. Tactical kinetic operations remain relatively suppressed but are supported by critical logistical interdiction efforts (Kurier UGVs) and expanded deep strikes (Chernihiv, Sumy). The critical threat remains the synchronization of C2 paralysis with the renewal of the Huliaipole mechanized assault, expected NLT 300000Z NOV.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole): Tactical containment (33 OShP) holds, but RF IO claims of "mass fixation" in the outskirts (RVvoenkor) suggest increased reconnaissance and preparation for renewed movement. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Logistical Corridors (Konstiantynivka GLOC): Confirmed continued RF activity near Konstantinovka/Stara Derevnya (Slivochny Kapriz), reinforcing the threat posed by NTK Kurier UGVs to the main supply artery. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Strategic Rear: RF deep strikes confirmed in Chernihiv and Sumy (RBC-Ukraine), indicating RF is expanding kinetic pressure beyond critical infrastructure and into population centers concurrently with the energy crisis.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Low visibility conditions, specifically fog/mist, are confirmed (Presidential Brigade, 3rd OShB). This reduces the effectiveness of UAF overhead ISR (drones, IMINT) and favors RF infiltration and covert movement of low-profile assets, specifically reconnaissance groups and Kurier UGVs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF (Red): RF forces are optimized for attrition and exploiting C2 failure. Active defense in the North, saturation fire in the South (Vostok Group), and multi-domain psychological/diplomatic operations theater-wide.
• UAF (Blue): Tactical units are fighting under high stress due to internal political uncertainty and confirmed energy constraints. Preparation for prolonged blackouts is underway in key regions (Zaporizhzhia OMA).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities: RF continues to demonstrate highly effective synchronization across kinetic (strikes in Sumy/Chernihiv), deep strike counter-capabilities (Strela-10 engagement in Krasnoarmeysk), and IO exploitation (Yermak fallout, Budapest offer).
• Intentions (Immediate 24 Hours):
  1. Weaponize Casualty Claims (PRIORITY 1): Use civilian casualties from UAF deep strikes (Dragunskoye, Belgorod) reported by TASS to generate internal justification for retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure (energy/water).
  2. Pressure Polish GLOC (HIGH): Sustain the IO campaign regarding railway sabotage, potentially escalating political pressure on Warsaw to increase friction in Western aid flow.
  3. Harden Domestic Control: Use new tax laws and internal security actions (Krishevich detention, WhatsApp restriction rumors) to project strength domestically while simultaneously attacking Ukraine's political stability.

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed use of low visibility (fog/mist) for movement near the line of contact indicates RF commanders are exploiting environmental factors to facilitate reconnaissance and deployment of ground assets, potentially preparing for flanking maneuvers or reinforcing forward positions at Huliaipole. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF air and missile strike capability is sustained (explosions in Sumy/Chernihiv). The Vostok Group's forward logistical requirements appear stable, supporting ongoing saturation fire. RF is demonstrating increased focus on protecting key military infrastructure (AD system activity near Krasnoarmeysk).

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF hybrid C2 remains highly centralized and effective. The rapid, coordinated exploitation of the Yermak resignation and simultaneous kinetic strikes confirm high-level integration between political (Kremlin), IO (TASS, state media), and military operations (Vostok Group, aerospace forces). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• C2 Degradation (CRITICAL): The simultaneous threats of political crisis, energy blackouts, and potential communication denial (Starlink threat, general power loss) mean UAF strategic and operational C2 effectiveness is operating under maximum constraints.
• Deep Strike Posture: UAF continues to demonstrate capability for effective deep strikes (Belgorod substation demolition). This must be sustained to deny RF staging, despite the ensuing political/IO fallout.
• Frontline Readiness: Despite containment at Huliaipole, the persistent UGV threat on the Konstiantynivka GLOC threatens to rapidly deplete ammunition and materiel stocks for 33 OShP if not neutralized NLT 48 hours.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: UAF deep strike successfully destroyed an electrical substation in Belgorod Oblast, directly impacting RF border operational support. Containment at Huliaipole holds.
• Setbacks: Confirmed RF strikes in Chernihiv and Sumy. Confirmation of local authorities (Zaporizhzhia) preparing for protracted blackouts, validating the success of RF energy attrition strategy. The political vacuum remains officially unfilled.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

• C2 Redundancy: Absolute necessity for immediate shift to hardened communications systems (encrypted radio, wired backups) for all units operating in potential blackout areas.
• Counter-Tech Warfare: Requirement for mobile, dedicated Hunter-Killer teams equipped with thermal imaging and EW assets to mitigate the Kurier UGV threat under current low-visibility conditions.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• Vector 1 (Political Destabilization): RF narratives (TASS, Miroshnik) are portraying Yermak’s resignation as proof of systemic corruption and a desperate attempt by Zelenskyy to save his political future, aiming to undermine public trust in the NCA.
• Vector 2 (Diplomatic Fragmentation): RF sources are amplifying rumors of a secret US deal recognizing RF territorial gains (Crimea), specifically stating Europe is being excluded. This feeds into the existing "Budapest Summit" narrative designed to fracture NATO/EU consensus.
• Vector 3 (Moral Justification): RF is leveraging civilian casualties in Dragunskoye, Belgorod, to justify future attacks on Ukraine, establishing moral parity for infrastructure terrorism.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is being simultaneously pressured by political upheaval (Yermak) and physical hardship (blackouts, strikes in Sumy/Chernihiv). Resilience hinges on the perception that the military command (JGS/Zaluzhnyi) is unaffected by the political chaos and capable of securing critical logistical lines.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF sources confirm coordination with Hungary (Budapest Summit). The immediate counter-messaging to the US concession rumors is paramount to stabilizing the Eastern Flank and preventing a political crisis in Central/Western Europe.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(Confidence: HIGH) RF will continue the synchronized hybrid shock over the next 48 hours, prioritizing the degradation of UAF defensive capability through attrition before committing ground forces:

1. Sustained Hybrid Attrition: RF kinetic strikes will prioritize critical energy transmission nodes to deepen power outages (Confirmed strikes in Chernihiv/Sumy align with this pattern).
2. Increased UGV Pressure: Kurier UGV operations will intensify under low-visibility conditions (fog/night) along the Konstiantynivka GLOC to force logistical attrition, aiming for a critical supply reduction NLT 300000Z NOV.
3. Huliaipole Preparation: RF Vostok Group will utilize low visibility for increased reconnaissance, forward staging, and repositioning of fire support assets (TOS-2/heavy drones) west of Huliaipole.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(Confidence: MEDIUM) A full-spectrum failure of UAF C2 results in operational collapse:

1. Systemic C2 Failure: RF executes Starlink service denial synchronized with confirmed, nationwide power grid failure and localized EW against traditional radio nets.
2. Rapid Breach via Stealth: Vostok Group launches the massed mechanized assault on Huliaipole using the cover of fog/low-visibility conditions, bypassing forward UAF observation and achieving a deeper breach that threatens to flank adjacent UAF units (e.g., Uspenivka/Rivnopillya).
3. Logistical Closure: The Polish government, under intense RF IO pressure, implements a temporary, partial closure of military supply lines, starving the Southern Front immediately.

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J1/J6 (C2 ASSURANCE & LOW-VISIBILITY OPERATIONS)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 1 - C2 HARDENING): Implement Blackout C2 Protocol immediately. Require all operational and strategic headquarters to shift primary C2 infrastructure (voice, data links, power sources) to contingency systems (encrypted radio/redundant power generation) for a minimum 72-hour sustained operation, irrespective of Ukrenergo schedules.
• RATIONALE: Mitigate the MLCOA of total C2 denial before the Huliaipole assault.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2. J3/SOF (GLOC SANITIZATION)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 1 - COUNTER-UGV): Deploy specialized Hunter-Killer teams utilizing advanced thermal and ground-penetrating radar along the Konstiantynivka GLOC. Exploit current low-visibility conditions as opportunities to locate and destroy the Kurier UGV operational control nodes, NLT 290600Z NOV.
• RATIONALE: Logistical flow must be secured to prevent materiel starvation of 33 OShP prior to the RF mechanized assault.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3. J2/J3 (EXPLOITATION OF BELGOROD STRIKES)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 2 - AD GAPS): Capitalize on the confirmed RF air defense disruption (1488th Regt reorganization/AD losses) by authorizing follow-on deep strikes against RF operational logistics hubs (fuel/ammunition depots) supporting the Vostok Group. Target prioritization should focus on assets supplying the Zaporizhzhia axis.
• RATIONALE: Exploit temporary AD gaps to degrade the sustainability of the anticipated Huliaipole assault.
• CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM (requires confirmation of AD system displacement).

4. MFA/J7 (DIPLOMATIC COUNTER-IO)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 2 - ALLIANCE STABILITY): Issue joint statements with NATO/G7 capitals immediately rejecting RF IO claims regarding US recognition of RF territorial gains. Simultaneously, intensify diplomatic pressure on Budapest to reject the "peace summit" proposal, framing it as a politically destabilizing maneuver during a sensitive humanitarian crisis.
• RATIONALE: Stabilize the international political environment against RF fragmentation efforts during Ukraine's internal political vulnerability.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

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//END OF REPORT//