Situation Report

TIME: 281800Z NOV 25

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

ANALYST JUDGMENT: The operational center of gravity has critically shifted from the physical front (Huliaipole) to the Strategic Political and Logistical Integrity of Ukraine. The confirmed resignation of Andriy Yermak creates a significant internal political vulnerability which the Russian Federation (RF) is instantly weaponizing through Information Operations (IO). RF will use this political vacuum, synchronized with the persistent GLOC interdiction (Kurier UGV) and the Polish logistics crisis, to maximize strategic friction and degrade UAF C2 effectiveness before relaunching the kinetic assault on Huliaipole NLT 300000Z NOV. The immediate tactical priority is the stabilization of political C2 structure and the security of the Konstiantynivka GLOC.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole): UAF containment remains effective. RF Vostok Group continues fire saturation via KAB (Guided Aerial Bomb) strikes (Confirmed by Air Force). RF IO claims of a breakthrough ("Russian forces already in Huliaipole") are assessed as high-impact disinformation targeting UAF cohesion. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Logistical Corridors (Konstiantynivka): Confirmed high threat status due to NTK Kurier UGV deployment. This is the current physical combat priority.
• Western Donbas (Dobropillya/Krasnolimansky): RF activity in these sectors is characterized by aggressive, localized advances (VSRF/VDV units reported). Assessed purpose is to fix UAF operational reserves away from the South. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Previous low-visibility conditions are still assessed to favor low-profile assets, specifically facilitating the covert deployment and operation of FPV drones and the persistent Kurier UGVs.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF (Red): Resources are heavily concentrated on multi-domain warfare (IO, UGV deployment, diplomatic pressure via Poland). RF is successfully exploiting the political instability in Kyiv immediately.
• UAF (Blue): Defensive posture holds kinetically, but C2 stability at the national level (Office of the President [OP]) is now transient. UAF efforts are focusing on internal political cohesion and preparation for an RF C4ISR denial phase (Operation Guardian Shield implementation ongoing).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities: RF retains global-reach IO capabilities (leveraging TASS, Colonelcassad) and demonstrated capacity for highly coordinated political-military exploitation.
• Intentions:
  1. Exploit Political Vacuum (IMMEDIATE): Maximize propaganda output targeting the Yermak resignation to portray UAF government as corrupt, fractured, and incompetent, weakening international resolve and domestic morale.
  2. Sustain Logistical Attrition: Maintain pressure on the Konstiantynivka GLOC via Kurier UGVs and sustain diplomatic pressure on Poland to restrict NATO aid flow.
  3. Validate Defensive Readiness: Promote narratives of military morale ("Multi-ethnic unity") and domestic stability (VAT changes, agribusiness investments) to counter the confirmed UAF deep strike successes (Yasny, Dragunskoye).

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Strategic Failure BDA: Multiple UAF sources confirm that the previous deep strike on the Yasny range may have resulted in the explosion of a RS-28 Sarmat ICBM during testing. This represents a significant, long-term strategic setback for RF nuclear deterrence modernization. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• IO Synchronization: The speed with which RF IO outlets integrated the Yermak resignation into existing anti-Kyiv narratives demonstrates highly effective coordination between RF political intelligence and military information warfare commands.

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF is demonstrating a sustained capacity for KAB strikes on Zaporizhzhia (Huliaipole), requiring large stockpiles of guided munitions. The high attrition rate for Russian Air Defense (AD) systems (following previous reports) is forcing a repositioning (1488th Regt activity), which exposes logistics hubs to further UAF deep strikes.

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective in the information domain. RF state media (TASS) announcing negotiations will be exclusively with the US is a deliberate attempt to politically isolate Kyiv and undermine multilateral support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Political Posture (CRITICAL): The resignation of the Head of the OP creates strategic instability. President Zelenskyy's immediate action to restructure the negotiation team (incorporating CHOD, GSC, NSDC, INTEL) is a positive, military-centric move designed to stabilize strategic diplomacy and reduce political exposure.
• Internal Military Readiness: Zelenskyy's acknowledgement of the need for a "fair distribution of personnel among brigades" confirms that RF psychological operations targeting the 125th Brigade and general troop dissatisfaction are effective and require urgent, high-level remediation (Stake meeting with Gen. Palisa scheduled for next week).

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Containment of the Huliaipole penetration holds. High-confidence BDA suggests a major strategic setback for RF ICBM program (Sarmat incident).
• Setbacks: Critical political instability at the highest level (Yermak resignation) is distracting from urgent operational threats (UGVs, C4ISR denial).

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

• POLITICAL C2 REQUIREMENT (IMMEDIATE): Urgent appointment of an Acting Head of the OP and clear delegation of strategic decision-making authority to mitigate the current vacuum.
• COLLECTION REQUIREMENT (TECHINT): Urgent BDA confirmation on the Sarmat incident (Yasny) to exploit strategic opportunities (diplomatic messaging, potential shifts in US/NATO long-term aid calculations).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• VECTOR 1: Political Fracture Exploitation. Pro-RF channels instantly characterized Yermak's resignation as capitulation, corruption, or proof of internal conflict ("Кукловод Зеленского Ермак после обысков подал в отставку").
• VECTOR 2: Domestic Messaging. RF promotes domestic financial strength (rising VAT) and military unity (WarGonzo) while suppressing internal dissent/information via targeted restrictions (WhatsApp blockade threat).
• VECTOR 3: Negotiation Undermining. RF (Peskov via TASS) asserts that negotiations are only conducted with the US, aiming to exclude Kyiv from direct control over its strategic future.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal cohesion risks are magnified by the political crisis. Zelenskyy's video address emphasizing unity and ministerial accountability is a direct and necessary attempt to regain narrative control and reassure the public and frontline units that the command structure is focusing on the war, not internal squabbles.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The focus remains on the Polish GLOC crisis. RF IO is succeeding in keeping the issue of Ukrainian "sabotage" alive, maintaining pressure on Warsaw. The appointment of a highly professional, intelligence-military-backed negotiation team (GSC, NSDC, INTEL) signals increased seriousness and reduced political maneuvering in future strategic talks with the US.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(Confidence: HIGH) RF will execute a maximized, coordinated hybrid effort over the next 48 hours to capitalize on the political instability:

1. Targeted C4ISR Degradation: Localized Starlink disruption tests commence NLT 290800Z NOV to test UAF C2 redundancy, focusing on the Zaporizhzhia axis.
2. GLOC Severance (Physical): Increased kinetic attacks by Kurier UGVs on the Konstiantynivka GLOC NLT 290600Z NOV. RF expects UAF focus to be internal and will accelerate this effort.
3. IO Saturation: Massed PSYOP campaign against Ukrainian internal figures (politicians, senior commanders, specific units) designed to overwhelm UAF IO capacity and deepen the perception of instability.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(Confidence: MEDIUM) RF achieves strategic paralysis followed by kinetic success:

1. Immediate, widespread C4ISR denial coinciding with the peak of the political leadership vacuum (due to reshuffling).
2. Polish government imposes substantial restrictions (24-72 hour halt) on military logistics transit due to RF pressure or verified security incidents, creating a strategic logistical crisis in the East.
3. RF Vostok Group launches the massed mechanized assault on Huliaipole NLT 300000Z NOV, achieving a rapid, localized operational breach due to ammunition shortages and C2 failure in the defense.

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J1/NCA (POLITICAL C2 STABILIZATION)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 1 - STRATEGIC): Immediately designate and publicly announce the Acting Head of the Office of the President (OP) with clear, temporary delegation of operational oversight powers. The political vacuum must be closed NLT 282200Z NOV.
• RATIONALE: Mitigate the immediate, exploitable political vulnerability targeted by MLCOA IO efforts.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2. J3/SOF COMMAND (COUNTER-UGV OPERATIONS)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 1 - TACTICAL): Reiterate the mandate and accelerate deployment of Kurier UGV Hunter-Killer Teams (SSO/EW) to the Konstiantynivka GLOC. Utilize available counter-battery fire to target confirmed UGV control nodes based on SIGINT and IMINT collection requirements.
• RATIONALE: Physical security of the main logistical artery must be re-established to ensure Huliaipole forces can sustain the defense into the kinetic phase (300000Z NOV).
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3. J7/IO COMMAND (COUNTER-PROPAGANDA & UNITY)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 2): Integrate the President's "Unity and Accountability" message (ministerial review, GSC-led personnel distribution review) into all domestic and frontline IO messaging immediately. Ensure the GSC/Gen. Palisa announce the timeline and scope of the personnel distribution reforms NLT 291200Z NOV to preempt further RF PSYOPs targeting unit cohesion and morale.
• RATIONALE: Counter specific RF PSYOPS aimed at exploiting military dissatisfaction (e.g., the 125th Brigade narrative) and the instability caused by the Yermak resignation.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

4. J2/J6 (STRATEGIC TECHEXPLOITATION)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 3): Launch immediate, focused TECHINT collection (ISR, HUMINT, OSINT) to achieve definitive BDA on the Sarmat ICBM incident at Yasny. If confirmed, coordinate messaging with NATO allies to highlight RF strategic failure, potentially strengthening diplomatic leverage during the ongoing Polish logistics crisis.
• RATIONALE: Exploit RF strategic weaknesses to offset domestic political vulnerabilities.
• CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

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//END OF REPORT//