INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) – OPERATION: CRITICAL DEFENSE (UPDATE 2)
TIME: 280815Z NOV 25
SUBJECT: Multi-Domain Assessment: IO Apex Confirmed and Sustained (Yermak Crisis). Tactical Focus Shifts to Attrition Defense (Zaporizhzhia) and Localized Northern Pressure (Sumy/Rubtsovsk).
SUMMARY: The successful defensive action at Huliaipole (Zaporizhzhia Axis) achieved stabilization as of 07:28Z. However, the predicted strategic information operation (IO) targeting National Command Authority (NCA) C2 integrity has reached and sustained its peak intensity (IO Apex). The Head of the Presidential Office (Yermak) publicly confirmed the searches (07:47Z). Russian Federation (RF) IO is immediately leveraging this to aggressively frame the event as "US retaliation" (07:48Z, 08:01Z), directly aiming to fracture the UAF-Western partner relationship and delay critical aid decisions. Kinetic operations confirm the Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): transition to an attrition phase in Zaporizhzhia, coupled with diversionary pressure in Northern sectors (Sumy, Rubtsovsk).
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)
A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
- Huliaipole Axis (Zaporizhzhia): Defensive lines remain consolidated. A critical, positive engineering development is confirmed: The Zaporizhzhia regional military administration reports the successful deployment and testing of multi-kilometer anti-drone tunnels/barriers along frontline Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs) (07:57Z). This enhances the resilience of resupply routes against RF FPV drone interdiction.
- Sumy Region (North-East): Air Force reports a new UAV contact moving southwest in the Sumy region (08:00Z). This confirms ongoing RF reconnaissance/strike capability deployment in the North, sustaining the diversionary threat identified earlier.
- Rubtsovsk Direction (Lyman/Kupiansk Axis): RF state media claims localized success via drone operations by the "Rubicon" unit (07:34Z). This confirms that RF Vostok Group is maintaining localized pressure and propaganda output in the Northern Donbas while the focus remains Southern.
B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Clear and stable conditions persist, continuing to favor RF ISR and fixed-wing strike platforms (KAB delivery) and high-altitude UAV reconnaissance.
C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
- UAF (Blue Force): Currently executing defensive consolidation and integrating new, adaptive force protection measures (anti-drone tunnels) in the high-threat AOR. The primary control measure is the ongoing attempt by military C2 (J3) to operate independently of the acute NCA political friction.
- RF (Red Force): RF forces are executing the predicted transition to the attrition phase, leveraging IO for strategic effects and maintaining localized kinetic pressure in secondary sectors to fix UAF reserves.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)
A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)
Primary Intent Update: Achieve strategic paralysis in Kyiv and political isolation from Western partners while maintaining maximal attrition against UAF defensive positions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Hybrid Warfare/C2 Targeting (CRITICAL): The IO synchronization is near-perfect. RF assets (Podduvny, TASS) rapidly pivoted from general corruption claims to the high-impact narrative: The US initiated "Operation Midas" (energy corruption) as "retaliation" against Yermak for rejecting US peace terms (07:48Z, 07:56Z, 08:01Z). This narrative directly attacks the war consensus and UAF independence.
- Kinetic Attrition: RF reconnaissance units confirm active FPV drone operations (DNR Militia, 07:59Z), indicating persistent interdiction efforts against UAF logistics and localized tactical strikes (Rubtsovsk).
B. Logistics and Sustainment Status
Logistics remain adequate for the current attrition phase. RF focus remains on counter-logistics: targeting UAF resupply via drones and preventing reinforcement of the stabilized Huliaipole line. The UAF anti-drone barrier deployment is a direct counter to this primary RF tactical method.
C. Command and Control Effectiveness (RF)
RF strategic C2 (IO/Political warfare) effectiveness is HIGH. They successfully exploited a predictable internal vulnerability (anti-corruption investigation) with pre-staged narratives designed to create strategic confusion and diplomatic rifts. Tactical C2 continues localized operations effectively.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)
A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Tactical readiness at Huliaipole is stabilizing, augmented by engineering defense. Strategic readiness is under SEVERE STRAIN due to the political/IO crisis. The confirmed involvement of NABU/SAP (as per Yermak's confirmation) underscores the operational necessity of framing this as an institutional success rather than a sign of political fracture.
B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
- Success (Force Protection): Successful implementation and testing of anti-drone barriers in Zaporizhzhia GLOCs (07:57Z). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Setback (Strategic): The IO crisis has deepened following the confirmation of the searches and the aggressive, unified RF framing of the event as external coercion.
C. Resource Requirements and Constraints
The immediate constraint remains the political bottleneck. However, the successful anti-drone barrier deployment suggests that QRF and reinforcement convoys moving to Huliaipole have a slightly decreased probability of tactical loss due to FPV drone attack, potentially accelerating resupply.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)
A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
CRITICAL THREAT: RF IO PIVOT. The RF narrative is now crystallized and heavily saturated across all channels: The NCA is corrupt and controlled by foreign interests (US/FBI/CIA) who are retaliating against Ukraine’s national interests (rejecting the "Trump Plan").
- Collection Requirement Fulfilled (Yermak Confirmation): Yermak confirmed the search, which TASS immediately linked to "Operation Midas" and the energy sector.
- Required Blue Force Response (URGENT): The military must bypass any remaining political delay and immediately release statements confirming the Huliaipole success in conjunction with the NCA’s statement on the anti-corruption action.
B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
The Dempster-Shafer beliefs confirm high concern regarding Domestic Legal Challenge (0.126) and Internal Power Struggle (0.050). Failure to counter the RF narrative rapidly will erode public trust in the NCA and increase internal political instability, potentially spilling over into decreased combat effectiveness.
C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
RF IO is successfully sowing discord by highlighting internal EU issues (Belgium/frozen assets) and promoting its own diplomatic relevance (Afghanistan labor deal). The key risk is that Western partners view the Yermak crisis as a proxy conflict or a sign of systemic instability, justifying a pause or reduction in aid delivery (Belief Mass: 0.023).
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)
A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)
MLCOA: Sustained Attrition and C2 Paralysis (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Huliaipole Attrition: RF Vostok Group utilizes heavy indirect fire, potentially paired with reconnaissance attacks (UAVs/small teams), against the stabilized UAF lines to maximize casualties and force depletion of UAF heavy artillery response.
- IO Sustainment: RF holds the "US Retaliation / Operation Midas" narrative at peak intensity for the next 48-72 hours, pressuring Western decision-makers (NLT 281600Z).
- Northern Diversion: RF increases fixed-wing (KAB) and UAV strikes against C2/logistic nodes in the Sumy/Kharkiv axis, forcing the reallocation of limited UAF Air Defense resources.
B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)
MDCOA: Flanking Exploitation & Strategic Political Fracture (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
- Vostok Group Re-Attack: RF Vostok Group exploits the NCA C2 distraction (280800Z-1200Z window) to execute a swift, coordinated mechanized flanking maneuver, bypassing the primary stabilized front.
- Strategic Isolation: The political crisis forces the President to respond defensively, undermining his authority. Western partners, citing instability, announce a 'review' of military aid packages, leading to an effective, temporary strategic aid freeze NLT 282000Z.
C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
| Event | Timeline (NLT) | Decision Point | Required Action |
|---|
| NCA Unified IO Response | 280900Z | Failure to issue a unified statement that reframes the anti-corruption action as institutional strength while confirming Huliaipole success. | CRITICAL: J2/J3 must release a vetted, military-only statement confirming stabilization and defensive success immediately. |
| Huliaipole Heavy Reinforcement | 281200Z | Failure to commit heavy artillery or QRF elements to reinforce the 33rd Assault Regiment's depth defense. | Utilize the improved GLOC security (anti-drone tunnels) to accelerate the repositioning of PzH 2000/HIMARS batteries to preempt RF attrition fires. |
| Sumy AD Mitigation | 281400Z | Confirmation of sustained or high-value UAV/KAB strikes (e.g., successful strike on a regional power or command node). | Initiate deployment procedures for low-level mobile AD asset (e.g., Gepard/Avenger) to the Sumy AOR. |
ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS
1. C2 AND STRATEGIC STABILITY (NCA/J2/J3)
- ACTION (CRITICAL - IO COUNTER-ATTACK): The NCA must issue the unified statement NLT 280900Z. This statement must aggressively lead with the Huliaipole victory as proof of military operational continuity and national resilience, explicitly reframing the anti-corruption investigation as evidence of democratic institutional strength that holds power accountable, regardless of the political climate.
- ACTION (IO DECEPTION): J2 IO assets must execute denial campaigns regarding the alleged "Operation Midas" energy sector focus, labeling the FT report as RF-sourced strategic misinformation designed to target key infrastructure security.
2. FORCE MANAGEMENT & DEFENSIVE CONSOLIDATION (J3/FIRE COMMAND)
- ACTION (ZAPORIZHZHIA RESILIENCE): J4/Engineers must immediately prioritize the replication of the anti-drone tunnel system to other critical frontline GLOCs and potential QRF staging areas, recognizing FPV interdiction as a long-term critical threat vector.
- ACTION (COUNTER-ATTRITION FIRE): Direct pre-planned, timed counter-battery salvos against confirmed and suspected RF artillery positions (including TOS systems if confirmed) NLT 280930Z. Utilize HIMARS against known assembly areas to disrupt the predicted pace of the attrition phase.
- ACTION (NORTHERN RESPONSE): J3 must monitor the Sumy UAV vector closely. Direct tactical AD to prioritize interception, especially if the flight path tracks toward the Sloviansk/Kramatorsk logistics hub.
INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Confidence Impact |
|---|
| P1 (CRITICAL - Political C2) | Confirmation of the functional primary NCA decision-making mechanism (e.g., who is authorized to issue strategic military orders during the political crisis). | HUMINT/Liaison reporting from vetted CINC Staff/J3 NLT 281000Z to confirm command chain integrity and speed of response to operational changes. | Essential for guaranteeing command authority during the critical 1200Z reinforcement window. |
| P1 (CRITICAL - Kinetic) | Detailed assessment of RF Vostok Group heavy artillery/TOS-2 readiness and relocation following the failed assault and predicted attrition transition. | Persistent IMINT/SAR focused on RF depth (10-30 km) in the Huliaipole AOR (Continuous, 24/7 requirement). | Required to target the source of the RF attrition fire and preempt a renewed mechanized thrust (MDCOA). |
| P2 (OPERATIONAL - North) | Identification of specific targets (military/critical infrastructure) of the UAV confirmed in the Sumy region (08:00Z). | Immediate RECCE/local reporting/AD radar tracking to establish intent and target prioritization NLT 281100Z. | Necessary for allocating Northern AD assets efficiently against the diversionary threat. |