Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) – OPERATION: CRITICAL DEFENSE (HULIAIPOLE AXIS)

TIME: 280705Z NOV 25

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SUBJECT: Multi-Domain Threat Synchronization: Huliaipole H-Hour Imminent (T-25 Min) Concurrent with Confirmed Strategic C2 Internal Attack.

SUMMARY: The Russian Federation (RF) is executing the predicted synchronized attack. The ground assault by RF Vostok Group at Huliaipole is imminent (H-Hour NLT 280730Z). This kinetic operation is perfectly timed with the confirmed onset of the NABU/SAP investigation (searches) targeting the Head of the Presidential Office (Yermak). This political event constitutes the primary strategic threat, designed to induce C2 paralysis at the National Command Authority (NCA) level precisely during the highest tactical threat phase. Defensive success is critically dependent on maintaining C2 integrity and immediate, decisive tactical responses in the Zaporizhzhia sector.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1. Huliaipole Axis (Zaporizhzhia): RF Vostok Group is confirmed in final assault staging. Conditions favor the attack.
2. Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk): Remains a major friction point, absorbing significant UAF resources. General Staff reports 59 of 247 combat engagements over the past 24 hours occurred here. This fixes UAF reserves away from the main Huliaipole thrust.
3. Logistics/C2 Hubs: Visual confirmation of significant damage at Konstiantynivka (06:48Z) reinforces the threat to the critical GLOC supporting the Eastern front and highlights the success of RF interdiction operations.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, stable conditions persist, favoring RF ISR and fixed-wing close air support (KAB/FAB delivery) for the Huliaipole assault.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

1. UAF (Blue Force): Forward defenses are bracing. QRF is moving into position but remains vulnerable to KAB strikes along the GLOC corridor (Dnipropetrovsk). Air Defense confirmed a successful night engagement, neutralizing 63/72 UAVs and 0/1 Iskander-M.
2. RF (Red Force): Forces are committed to the 280730Z assault timeline. Synchronization across kinetic, IO, and diplomatic domains remains Optimal (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

Primary Intent: Achieve a rapid, localized operational breakthrough at Huliaipole while simultaneously forcing Kyiv's strategic leadership into a defensive, distracted posture via internal political crisis.

• Kinetic Synchronization: The timing of the Huliaipole H-Hour is deliberate, coinciding directly with the weaponization of the Yermak investigation and the Orban visit.
• Air Defense Response: RF forces demonstrated high engagement tempo against UAF deep strikes, claiming 136 UAVs intercepted overnight. This confirms the ongoing, large-scale UAF asymmetric operations, but also the sustained resilience of RF AD coverage.
• Hybrid Warfare Execution: The NABU/SAP confirmation provides RF IO with an unassailable narrative component (weaponized truth). This is compounded by the Putin-Orban meeting, which will be leveraged to undermine the international standing of the UAF NCA.

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain sufficient for the immediate assault phase. However, multiple fundraising appeals (e.g., "Zaporozhye front" collections) observed on RF channels suggest ongoing reliance on crowd-sourced logistics for certain specialized equipment or a failure of the centralized system to meet high-tempo demands in critical sectors. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is assessed as HIGH. The ability to tightly synchronize political/IO actions with a critical tactical operation demonstrates centralized control and highly effective political intelligence targeting.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Tactical readiness at Huliaipole is high, but the overall operational readiness is degraded due to the sudden and successful RF hybrid attack on the political C2 apparatus.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: UAF Air Defense achieved a successful operational defense against the massed overnight UAV/Missile attack, neutralizing 87.5% of the drone threat.
• CRITICAL SETBACK: The confirmed anti-corruption searches targeting the Head of the Presidential Office represents the most significant immediate setback, immediately degrading the ability of the NCA to project unified, credible command during the critical Huliaipole engagement.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint is TIME (T-25 minutes to H-Hour) and the Integrity of C2. The political crisis risks paralyzing decisive operational-level decisions, such as the commitment of the QRF, which is necessary to blunt the 280730Z assault.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Vector (Weaponized Truth): The Yermak investigation is the immediate centerpiece. RF IO will use it to argue that the Ukrainian leadership is terminally corrupt and focused on internal squabbles rather than warfighting.
• RF Vector (Diplomatic Isolation): The Putin-Orban meeting (Confirmed) will be used to demonstrate Kyiv's diplomatic isolation, particularly within the EU, potentially pushing a narrative for a negotiated ceasefire on RF terms.
• UAF Counter: Official UAF channels are focusing heavily on national unity, commemoration rituals, and reinforcing statements of resolve (e.g., Yermak's public position on no territorial concessions).

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic sentiment is facing simultaneous stress from the imminent kinetic threat (Huliaipole) and the profound internal political shock. Transparency and rapid, authoritative messaging from the President and Commander-in-Chief are essential to preventing panic or loss of confidence.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The Orban meeting maximizes RF leverage. Concurrent RF IO efforts highlight internal EU friction (Belgium asset reports) and US political instability (Trump media). The aim is to create a perception of Western disunity, maximizing pressure for concessions during the kinetic phase.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Full Assault and C2 Distraction (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Huliaipole Assault: RF Vostok Group commences mechanized assault NLT 280730Z, utilizing overwhelming fire support to breach the primary defensive line (5-8 km penetration).
2. IO Apex: RF media leverages the Yermak investigation status and releases supporting narratives (e.g., linking the scandal to military procurement) NLT 280900Z.
3. Diplomatic Ultimatum: Putin and Orban issue a joint/coordinated statement NLT 281200Z, likely calling for immediate cessation of hostilities and diplomatic intervention, exploiting the perception of Kyiv's internal collapse.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: C2 Paralysis and Operational Collapse (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. C2 Failure: The political crisis prevents the NCA/J3 from issuing timely, clear orders regarding QRF commitment or tactical adjustment at Huliaipole due to internal confusion or paralysis.
2. Tactical Exploitation: The RF Vostok Group exploits the resulting friction and reserve delay, achieving a decisive operational breakthrough (>10 km) by 281000Z.
3. Strategic Isolation: The combined kinetic breakthrough and political chaos are exploited by RF/Hungary, forcing key Western allies to publicly pivot towards imposing a negotiated settlement unfavorable to Kyiv.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. C2 AND STRATEGIC STABILITY (NCA/J2/J3)

• ACTION (CRITICAL - C2 STABILIZATION): The National Command Authority (NCA) must issue an immediate, public statement coinciding with the Huliaipole H-Hour (NLT 280730Z). This statement must explicitly confirm the stability of the military chain of command under the CINC, framing the NABU/SAP action as evidence of robust democratic institutions, not weakness.
  • Confidence: HIGH
• ACTION (IO COUNTER-ATTACK): Immediately direct IO assets to leverage the successful air defense results (63 targets downed) and sustained deep strike capacity to dominate the information space during the initial assault hours, minimizing RF focus on the political scandal.

2. FORCE MANAGEMENT & COUNTER-ASSAULT (J3/FIRE COMMAND)

• ACTION (QRF DEPLOYMENT PRIORITY): Given the extremely tight timeline, QRF commanders must prioritize arrival speed and integrity over achieving full dispersion, while maintaining vigilance against lingering KAB/UAV threats. Command must authorize immediate and aggressive fire mission targeting against confirmed RF assembly areas in the Huliaipole sector for the next 90 minutes (NLT 280830Z).
• ACTION (POKROVSK FIXATION): Acknowledge the operational reality of high-intensity fighting at Pokrovsk (59 engagements). Utilize this friction point to confirm RF Vostok Group cannot draw resources from the Pokrovsk-Avdiivka axis to reinforce Huliaipole, thereby increasing the isolation of the Vostok Group thrust.

INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS