Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) – OPERATION: CRITICAL DEFENSE (HULIAIPOLE AXIS)

TIME: 280630Z NOV 25

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SUBJECT: Increased Threat Level Due to Confirmed RF Deep Strike Persistence and Imminent Hybrid Strategy Activation via Orban Visit.

SUMMARY: The Russian Federation (RF) has reinforced its counter-reserve protocol, confirming the use of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) against rear-area infrastructure in Pokrovska hromada (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), adjacent to the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) movement corridor. This kinetic pressure is synchronized with the confirmed official visit of Hungarian PM Orban to Moscow today, initiating the critical phase of the RF strategic diplomatic offensive designed to weaponize Western alliance friction during the Huliaipole assault (H-Hour NLT 280730Z). UAF defensive posture remains critical; the timely and intact deployment of the QRF is non-negotiable for operational success.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1. Huliaipole Defensive Belt (Zaporizhzhia): Final preparatory fire continues, confirmed by RF open-source reports of "Scheduled FABing" and ongoing KAB strikes. The RF Vostok Group is postured for mechanized assault NLT 280730Z.
2. QRF GLOC Corridor (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast): The area remains an Active Kinetic Interdiction Zone. The confirmed KAB strike in Pokrovska hromada, resulting in civilian casualties, validates the RF intent and capability to utilize deep-strike fires to degrade or disrupt QRF movement, extending the risk zone beyond the Synelnykivskyi district.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear conditions persist, favoring RF deep strike, ISR, and UAV operations. No weather constraint on the planned mechanized thrust. Energy infrastructure (NPPs) are reported to have returned to normal generation, showing resilience against RF strategic energy strikes.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

1. UAF (Blue Force): Forward defenses are absorbing sustained kinetic impact. QRF deployment is actively underway under confirmed kinetic threat. Commanders must maintain strict adherence to dispersal and electromagnetic silence protocols.
2. RF (Red Force): Forces are in final staging for the assault. Strategic command is highly focused on synchronizing kinetic action with the diplomatic/information domains to maximize strategic shock.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

Intent: RF seeks immediate tactical success at Huliaipole while simultaneously leveraging diplomatic pressure to force a favorable ceasefire negotiation narrative.

• Continuous Counter-Reserve Execution (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The shift to using KABs (high destructive power, long-range) against rear-area targets (Pokrovska hromada) confirms RF's commitment to prioritizing the interdiction of the operational reserve over tactical fire support in certain sectors. This indicates robust intelligence targeting data.
• Strategic Distraction/Legitimization (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The Orban meeting is central to the strategy. Concurrently, RF state media (TASS) and associated propaganda channels are amplifying US domestic political polarization (Trump statements on internal security) and third-party validation (Iran) to reinforce the core hybrid narrative: "Western Disarray, Global Support for Moscow."
• Information Warfare (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF utilized direct disinformation (Kotsnews claim regarding Yermak) immediately before the planned H-Hour to generate confusion within the Ukrainian military and civilian C2 structure.

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Logistical flow for the Vostok Group assault remains unhindered. The confirmed use of KAB/FAB systems (reported by Воин DV) confirms the sustained supply of heavy aerial munitions required for saturation fires.

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 effectiveness remains assessed as HIGH. The synchronization across deep-strike assets, conventional forces, and strategic diplomatic/IO channels is effective. While Putin's geographical error regarding "Komosomolsk" (ASTRA report) suggests minor disconnects at the Presidential level, it does not impede operational effectiveness.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is high but stressed by the dual threat: immediate tactical assault and rear-area kinetic interdiction. The successful return of major NPPs to normal generation demonstrates technical and strategic resilience in the face of previous RF infrastructure attacks.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Deep Strike Impact): The confirmed civilian fatality in Pokrovska hromada due to KAB reinforces the psychological pressure on QRF personnel and increases demands on local civilian/military administrations operating in the depth.
• Constraint (Time): The time window for QRF maneuver (NLT 280730Z) is shrinking rapidly, and the necessity to deploy under active KAB threat increases the risk of critical delays.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The CRITICAL DEFICIENCY remains dedicated mobile kinetic and non-kinetic protection (EW/SHORAD) for the QRF GLOC. The enemy is actively exploiting this window of vulnerability with increasingly destructive assets (KABs).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• Targeted Disinformation: The claim that Kyiv leadership (Yermak) is withdrawing from peace negotiations is a direct attempt to preemptively nullify the Ukrainian diplomatic position ahead of the Orban meeting.
• Narrative Reinforcement: RF IO is aggressively linking US domestic instability (via TASS amplification of Trump's comments) with the lack of stable, unified Western support for Ukraine, making the argument that Kyiv is politically isolated.
• Geopolitical Alignment: Leveraging statements from non-Western partners (Iran) confirms an effort to paint the conflict as a US-driven proxy war, not one of Russian aggression.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is under pressure from the intensity of the kinetic operations (KAB strikes) and the geopolitical uncertainty created by the Orban-Putin meeting. Local response efforts (Dnipropetrovsk OVA casualty reports) must focus on transparency and resilience messaging.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

CONFIRMED CRITICAL EVENT: Orban's official visit to Moscow (Reuters confirmation) elevates the strategic risk level. This event is not merely symbolic; it provides a high-profile platform for Moscow to showcase diplomatic division within the EU/NATO and push maximalist negotiation demands.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Full Synchronization and Tactical Breach (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Huliaipole Assault: RF Vostok Group commences the mechanized assault NLT 280730Z, aiming for a 5-8 km penetration of the forward defensive belt using saturation fires and leveraging the expected delay of the QRF.
2. Kinetic Pressure: RF continues to employ deep-strike assets (KAB/Spetsnaz teams) along the QRF GLOC 280630Z - 281000Z to maximize confusion, delay, and attrition.
3. IO Deployment: RF utilizes the Orban visit outcome (joint statements/press conferences) NLT 281200Z to maximize the perception of Western abandonment, directly coinciding with the peak of the kinetic crisis in Zaporizhzhia.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Collapse of Defensive Depth and Strategic Paralysis (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves a critical 10+ km operational breach at Huliaipole, simultaneously neutralizing a significant portion of the QRF through repeat KAB/missile strikes along the GLOC. Concurrently, the Orban meeting results in a joint economic declaration or security proposal that forces an emergency, destabilizing EU summit, effectively freezing critical joint military aid decisions for 48-72 hours during the crisis apex.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. FORCE PROTECTION & COUNTER-INTERDICTION (J3/J2)

• ACTION (CRITICAL - QRF PROTECTION): Maneuver & Deception. Given the confirmed KAB capability in the QRF GLOC zone, C2 must mandate dynamic route changes and intensify tactical deception operations (dummy convoys, EW jamming) immediately. Static positions must be abandoned.
  • Confidence: HIGH
• ACTION (AD/EW Deployment): Prioritize the immediate deployment of the few available mobile SHORAD/EW platforms to establish a moving "kinetic umbrella" for the QRF, focusing EW assets on disrupting GLONASS/GPS signals critical for KAB/UAV guidance.
  • Collection Requirement: P1 (QRF Status/ETA)
• ACTION (DYNAMIC TARGETING): Increase ISR coverage (ELINT/SAR) on known RF forward air bases or launch platforms (e.g., Su-34 staging areas) assessed to be supporting the KAB strikes in Dnipropetrovsk. Designate confirmed launch zones as P1 targets for deep strike assets (ATACMS/Storm Shadow).
  • Confidence: HIGH

2. FIRE SUPPORT & TARGETING (J3/Fire Command)

• ACTION (HULIAIPOLE DISRUPTION): Maintain aggressive counter-preparation fires against Vostok Group assembly areas until H-Hour (280730Z). Prioritize C2 nodes and known Thermobaric (TOS-2) positions to maximize pre-assault friction and degrade RF synchronization.

3. STRATEGIC DIPLOMATIC & IO RESPONSE (NCA/MFA)

• ACTION (DIPLOMATIC TRIAGE - CRITICAL): Preemptive Counter-Narrative. The MFA and NCA must immediately contact key allied capitals (Berlin, Paris, London, Washington D.C.) to coordinate a joint declaration before the Orban-Putin press conference. The statement must explicitly reaffirm commitment to Ukraine's territorial integrity and reject any unilateral mediation attempts.
  • Confidence: HIGH
• ACTION (COUNTER-DISINFORMATION): Issue a public statement neutralizing the "Yermak withdrawal" disinformation (Kotsnews). The statement must clearly define the government's position on negotiations, stressing that RF's current kinetic aggression invalidates any serious peace talks.
• ACTION (IO COUNTER): Leverage the confirmation of KAB strikes against civilian infrastructure (Pokrovska hromada fatality) as immediate evidence of RF escalation and criminality, diverting attention from the RF/Orban diplomatic display.

INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS