Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) – OPERATION: CRITICAL DEFENSE (HULIAIPOLE AXIS)

TIME: 280600Z NOV 25

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SUBJECT: Confirmation of Kinetic Interdiction Attempt on QRF GLOC and CRITICAL Strategic Diplomatic Risk Due to Orban-Putin Meeting.

SUMMARY: The Russian Federation (RF) has executed a kinetic strike in the Synelnykivskyi district (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), confirming the intent and capability of their Counter-Reserve Protocol targeting the Ukrainian Quick Reaction Force (QRF) movement corridor. The Huliaipole main assault remains scheduled NLT 280730Z (T-90 minutes). Concurrently, the confirmed meeting between RF President Putin and Hungarian Prime Minister Orban in Moscow today presents a grave strategic threat, designed to weaponize the existing Western alliance fracture and degrade UAF long-term support. Immediate UAF force protection measures and high-level diplomatic counter-IO actions are critical to mitigate synchronized tactical and strategic setbacks.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is defined by three interconnected zones:

1. Huliaipole Defensive Belt (Zaporizhzhia): Remains the primary kinetic focus. The area is under extreme preparatory fire (460 strikes across 20 settlements in 24 hours), indicating final readiness for the mechanized thrust NLT 280730Z.
2. QRF GLOC Corridor (Synelnykivskyi District): This area, spanning the Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia border, has transitioned from a High-Risk ISR zone to an Active Kinetic Interdiction Zone. Confirmed RF UAV strike (05:30Z) hit civilian infrastructure, validating RF targeting data derived from prior ISR.
3. Lyman Axis: Sustained RF pressure (FPV use confirmed by 238th Brigade near Krasnoarmiysk direction) continues to fix UAF northern reserves, preventing transfer to Huliaipole.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Conditions remain clear and conducive to deep strike, precision guidance, and UAV/ISR operations. No significant constraints on planned mechanized assault or defensive fire missions.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

1. UAF (Blue Force): Defenses at Huliaipole are postured for immediate attack. QRF deployment is underway, now operating under confirmed kinetic threat. Local C2 hubs (e.g., Kryvyi Rih) report controlled status, but the Synelnykivskyi strike introduces immediate rear-area instability.
2. RF (Red Force): Vostok Group is in final staging. RF tactical assets have executed the first phase of the counter-reserve operation (targeting QRF movement infrastructure). RF Information Operations (IO) are actively synchronizing tactical operations with strategic diplomatic moves (Orban meeting).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

Intent: RF intent is to achieve a critical tactical breach at Huliaipole while simultaneously neutralizing UAF operational maneuver capacity and fracturing NATO cohesion.

• Counter-Reserve Execution (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The UAV strike in Synelnykivskyi confirms RF's ability to transition from passive ISR tracking to kinetic execution along QRF movement routes. The intent is to delay, degrade, or eliminate the UAF operational reserve ahead of H-Hour.
• Diplomatic Warfare Synchronization (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The scheduling of the Orban-Putin meeting on 28 NOV provides the enemy a powerful CROPINT tool. This action is designed to maximize the political impact of a Huliaipole breakthrough by demonstrating international support for Moscow and exploiting the existing US/EU rift (Dempster-Shafer belief mass for Alliance Dissolution: 0.280147).
• Tactical Exploitation: RF units continue effective use of cheap, responsive FPV drone capabilities (238th Brigade reports), indicating tactical flexibility in localized combat zones (Krasnoarmiysk/Rayko).

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF front-loading for the Huliaipole assault is complete. The synchronized execution of the kinetic counter-reserve plan demonstrates robust, real-time C2 and dedicated logistical support for specialized deep-strike assets (UAV/missile systems) in the Dnipropetrovsk direction.

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 effectiveness is assessed as HIGH. The enemy is demonstrating synchronization across three domains: tactical kinetic (Huliaipole preparation), operational kinetic (QRF interdiction), and strategic cognitive (Orban meeting).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness level is critical, with all forward defenses engaged in sustained counter-fire. The safety and timely arrival of the QRF is the single most critical operational requirement in the next two hours.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (QRF Interdiction): The confirmed RF strike in the Synelnykivskyi district validates the vulnerability warning from the 05:30Z SITREP. This necessitates confirming the QRF columns were dispersed and undamaged.
• Setback (Information Environment): The Orban-Putin meeting creates an immediate requirement for diplomatic triage, diverting NCA focus during the most critical tactical phase.
• Success (Attrition): UAF General Staff reports an additional 1,100 RF personnel losses, maintaining pressure on the RF human resource base.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

PRIMARY CONSTRAINT: Urgent and immediate deployment of mobile EW/SHORAD capabilities to establish kinetic protection for QRF columns along the high-risk GLOC. This is a deficiency that has been kinetically exploited by the enemy.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• Strategic Wedge: RF IO (TASS, Basurin) is utilizing the Orban meeting to push maximalist narratives: NATO is "dying," and allied support is merely symbolic ("troops only after conflict ends"). This aims to undermine the will to fight ahead of the Huliaipole assault.
• Internal RF Narrative: RF state media continues to focus on historical successes (Rybar/Novopavlivka) and tactical FPV drone footage to project dominance and distract from ongoing operational attrition.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF domestic morale is being tested by the high-intensity barrage (Zaporizhzhia 460 strikes) and the geopolitical uncertainty created by the Orban meeting. Local authorities are focusing on reassuring the population (Kryvyi Rih status report).

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

CRITICAL THREAT: The Orban-Putin meeting (28 NOV) threatens to amplify the existing alliance friction caused by the US peace plan leak. This provides RF an explicit vector to challenge the unified front, potentially impacting future aid packages or accelerating diplomatic pressure for premature negotiations.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Simultaneous Huliaipole Breakthrough, Continuous QRF Attrition, and Strategic Isolation (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. H-Hour Execution: RF Vostok Group commences the full mechanized assault at Huliaipole NLT 280730Z, leveraging KAB/TOS-2 saturation to breach the Forward Defensive Positions (FDPs).
2. Continuous Interdiction: RF employs follow-on Mangas/Mangal strikes or specialized assets (Spetsnaz/missiles) against QRF secondary staging areas or dispersion points along the Dnipropetrovsk GLOC between 280630Z and 280800Z, maximizing delay and operational friction.
3. Diplomatic Weaponization: RF utilizes the Orban meeting outcome (press conferences, joint statements) NLT 281200Z to generate international headlines regarding the lack of consensus on the war's objectives and future.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Operational Collapse & Alliance Paralysis (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves a successful 10-15 km breakthrough at Huliaipole, rapidly linking up with exploitation forces from the Pokrovsk sector. Concurrently, the outcome of the Orban meeting leads a critical NATO ally (e.g., Hungary) to veto EU military aid or support measures, causing a demonstrable paralysis in Western logistical support during the height of the crisis.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. FORCE PROTECTION & COUNTER-INTERDICTION (J3/J2)

• ACTION (CRITICAL - QRF PROTECTION): EW/AD Priority Shift. All available mobile SHORAD and Electronic Warfare (EW) assets must establish a persistent, moving protective corridor along the confirmed kinetic attack zone (Synelnykivskyi district, particularly near Petro-Pavlivska/Slovianka communities). Prioritize jamming the Orlan-10/Mangas C2 frequencies.
  • Confidence: HIGH
• ACTION (DAMAGE ASSESSMENT): Immediate low-altitude UAV reconnaissance or SSO assessment of the Synelnykivskyi strike site to determine if the attack successfully degraded essential infrastructure required for QRF transit (e.g., major bridge, key road junction, primary comms).
  • Collection Requirement: P1
• ACTION (DYNAMIC TARGETING): Designate the estimated RF UAV launch/C2 sites responsible for the Synelnykivskyi strike as P1 Dynamic Targets for immediate deep strike engagement (HIMARS/ATACMS), specifically to degrade the enemy's ability to execute repeat counter-reserve operations.
  • Confidence: HIGH

2. FIRE SUPPORT & TARGETING (J3/Fire Command)

• ACTION (PRE-EMPTIVE COUNTER-PREPARATION): Maintain saturation fires against suspected RF Vostok Group assembly areas and known TOS-2 positions ahead of the 280730Z H-Hour. Shift from interdiction focus to maximum concentration fires.

3. STRATEGIC DIPLOMATIC & IO RESPONSE (NCA/MFA)

• ACTION (DIPLOMATIC TRIAGE - CRITICAL): Neutralize the Orban Narrative. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) must coordinate with key European allies (Poland, Czech Republic, Germany) immediately to issue a joint, strongly worded statement reaffirming NATO unity and rejecting any unilateral diplomatic moves or perceived compromise with the RF. This statement must be released NLT 281000Z to preempt the full psychological impact of the Orban meeting outcome.
  • Confidence: HIGH
• ACTION (COUNTER-PROPAGANDA): UGS/NCA should utilize the confirmed high RF loss figures (+1100) and the strategic messaging regarding RF exploitation of toxic water in Donbas (CNS report) to maintain the narrative of costly, criminal Russian aggression, countering RF claims of decisive victory.

INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS