Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) – OPERATION: CRITICAL DEFENSE (HULIAIPOLE AXIS)

TIME: 280530Z NOV 25

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SUBJECT: Confirmation of Active RF ISR Targeting QRF Movement Corridors and Heightened Pressure on Lyman Axis.

SUMMARY: The Russian Federation (RF) main assault on the Huliaipole Axis remains assessed as imminent (NLT 280730Z). Real-time kinetic intelligence confirms RF Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) presence and tracking activity directly over UAF Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) corridors near Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Synelnykivskyi district), confirming the execution phase of RF counter-reserve operations. Concurrently, RF forces are pressuring the Krasny Lyman axis, aiming to fix Northern Donbas reserves. Immediate, proactive Counter-ISR and localized SHORAD deployment along QRF movement routes are CRITICAL.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The principal axis of conflict remains the Huliaipole Defensive Belt (Zaporizhzhia Oblast). The threat to UAF operational reserves moving from Dnipropetrovsk remains the primary operational constraint.

• Zaporizhzhia Axis: RF forces are postured for the main assault. Kinetic preparation is complete.
• Dnipropetrovsk GLOCs: Now designated a High-Risk Interdiction Zone due to confirmed active RF ISR overflight.
• Krasny Lyman Axis (Secondary): RF forces are conducting limited localized offensive operations, claiming the seizure of three strongholds southeast of Lyman. This action is designed to maintain multi-axis pressure and prevent UAF reserve re-allocation.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Conditions remain conducive for mechanized maneuver and sustained UAV/ISR operations. No significant atmospheric constraints on RF air interdiction or UAF defensive fires.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

1. UAF (Blue Force): Defenses at Huliaipole are manned (Condition 1). QRF deployment from Dnipropetrovsk is underway, executing under confirmed, active enemy ISR conditions. Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration (OVA) issued an alert (04:53Z), confirming heightened threat perception in the immediate rear.
2. RF (Red Force): Vostok Group is in final assault posture. Tactical air/UAV assets are actively prosecuting ISR missions along the QRF GLOCs. RF also reports massive, likely inflated, success against UAF deep-strike UAVs (claiming 136 shot down), indicating high vigilance across RF internal AD.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

RF intent is dual-pronged: achieve a breakthrough at Huliaipole while kinetically neutralizing the primary UAF operational reserve (QRF).

• Counter-Reserve Protocol Execution (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The tracking of RF UAVs (04:41Z, 04:55Z) confirms that RF ISR is actively monitoring UAF QRF movement from Dnipropetrovsk toward Zaporizhzhia (Novomykolaivka). This ISR data provides the necessary targeting solution for precision deep strike assets (Mangas, missiles, Spetsnaz ground-based fire control).
• Lyman Axis Pressure (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF activity near Krasny Lyman (04:56Z, 04:57Z) serves the operational purpose of fixing UAF forces defending the Northern Donbas, preventing the transfer of any available reserve capacity to the critical Huliaipole sector.
• Deep Strike Capabilities: The inflated claims of 136 UAF drones shot down confirm RF commitment to layered AD and stress RF internal security C2, although the actual number of successful interceptions is likely much lower. This AD posture must be factored into future UAF asymmetric deep-strike planning.

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains focused on front-loading the Huliaipole assault. The ability to deploy tactical ISR drones in real-time along a 100+ km GLOC suggests effective internal C2 coordination and robust forward logistics support for specialized assets.

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrates high effectiveness in synchronizing Information Operations (stigmatizing QRF units), strategic positioning (Lyman axis), and active kinetic ISR prosecution (UAV tracking QRF).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Overall readiness is critical, focused on defensive integrity. The immediate requirement is to safely transit and position the QRF ahead of the expected H-Hour.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (QRF Exposure): Confirmed real-time RF ISR tracking of QRF movement corridors is a significant tactical vulnerability. This dramatically increases the Probability of Kinetic Interdiction (PKI) against QRF columns in the next two hours.
• Success (Deep Strike Confirmation): Sustained UAF deep strikes (implied by the RF claim of 136 downed UAVs) demonstrate ongoing UAF capacity to stress RF AD and target rear assets, fulfilling the operational goal of asymmetric pressure.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint is the urgent need for dedicated, mobile EW/SHORAD assets to establish a protective bubble around QRF convoys immediately. This is now a time-critical, active requirement, not merely a planning constraint.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Internal Narrative: RF IO focuses heavily on neutralizing UAF deep strikes by claiming highly successful AD operations (136 drones). This is designed to stabilize domestic perception of security.
• RF Operational Narrative: RF amplifies claims of tactical success on the Lyman axis (04:56Z, 04:57Z) to reinforce the perception of continuous, multi-front momentum following the Pokrovsk events.
• UAF Counter-Narrative: UAGS daily loss statistics (1100 occupiers) continue to serve as the primary counter-narrative to RF claims of decisive victory.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale remains focused on defense, but the confirmed tactical losses in the Lyman area (if RF claims are substantiated) and the critical pressure at Huliaipole will test resilience.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The IO stabilization following the Yermak statement (previous SITREP) must be maintained. UAF needs to anticipate and neutralize any RF attempt to link Lyman/Huliaipole tactical gains to the diplomatic pressure points.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) MLCOA: Simultaneous Huliaipole Assault and Targeted QRF Interdiction (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. H-Hour Execution: RF Vostok Group commences the full mechanized assault at Huliaipole NLT 280730Z.
2. Kinetic Interdiction: RF leverages real-time UAV ISR (confirmed active) to guide Mangas heavy drones and/or Iskander/S-300 precision strikes against QRF convoys or tertiary staging areas along the Dnipropetrovsk GLOC NLT 280700Z, aiming to delay critical reserve deployment by 8+ hours.
3. Lyman Consolidation: RF forces continue localized assaults near Krasny Lyman, solidifying minor gains to fix UAF 63rd Brigade resources.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) MDCOA: Integrated C2 Neutralization (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF utilizes the active UAV tracks near Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia not merely for QRF interdiction, but as terminal guidance for a High Value Target (HVT) strike against a critical UAF C2 node or logistics hub coincident with the Huliaipole assault, aiming for operational paralysis.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. FORCE PROTECTION & COUNTER-INTERDICTION (J3/J2)

• ACTION (CRITICAL - QRF PROTECTION): Immediate Redirection of Mobile AD/EW Assets. Divert available mobile SHORAD/EW platforms to the Synelnykivskyi/Novomykolaivka corridor (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia border) to intercept the confirmed incoming UAV track (04:55Z) and establish a kinetic exclusion zone 10 km wide along the identified QRF GLOCs.
• ACTION (QRF MOVEMENT PROTOCOL): Execute Emergency Dispersal Protocol. QRF commanders must implement immediate, irregular movement halts and dispersals off the primary road network NLT 280600Z (T-30 min) to deny the enemy kinetic targeting solutions derived from the active ISR.
• ACTION (TARGETING - COUNTER-ISR): Designate the confirmed UAV tracks (and extrapolated launch/C2 sites) as P2 dynamic targets for long-range interdiction to degrade the RF counter-reserve intelligence loop.

2. FIRE SUPPORT & TARGETING (J3/Fire Command)

• ACTION (P1 BDA REAFFIRMATION): Reaffirm the 280800Z deadline for TOS-2 BDA. This is non-negotiable for determining fire support requirements once the main assault begins.
• ACTION (Lyman Response): UAF General Staff must assess the viability of RF claims near Krasny Lyman. If confirmed, allocate limited localized counter-battery fire and reinforce holding units to prevent operational-level fixation of resources.

3. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT & COUNTER-IO (NCA/UGS)

• ACTION (IO COUNTER-PROTOCOL): Neutralize False Victory Claims. The UGS must release a statement acknowledging the RF offensive pressure on the Krasny Lyman axis but immediately detailing heavy RF losses (leveraging UAGS loss stats) to minimize the psychological impact of the claimed stronghold capture.
• ACTION (Domestic Morale): UGS/Defense Ministry should release footage or statements detailing the proactive protective measures taken for the QRF moving toward the front line to reassure the public that command is actively mitigating confirmed threats.

INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS