Sitrep 2025-11-27 19:04:30

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 271900Z NOV 25 OPERATION: STABILIZATION AND COUNTER-EXPLOITATION (ZAPORIZHZHIA CRITICAL AXIS)

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity remains the uncontained breach in the Zaporizhzhia (Huliaipole) axis. The expected mechanized assault is confirmed imminent, following the use of heavy thermobaric shaping fires (Confirmed TOS-1A). The vulnerability of the Konstiantynivka GLOC continues to restrict the timely deployment of UAF operational reserves.

Axis	Status/Focus	Assessment	Confidence
Zaporizhzhia (Huliaipole)	IMMINENT MECHANIZED ASSAULT / CRITICAL	RF ground forces are now deploying heavy thermobaric systems (TOS-1A) to destroy prepared UAF strongpoints, signaling the final preparation phase.	HIGH
Konstiantynivka GLOC	C2 INTERDICTION / CRITICAL	Security of this logistics and maneuver corridor remains compromised by confirmed RF SOF activity.	HIGH
Odesa/Mykolaiv Rear	AERIAL THREAT RESUMPTION	Ballistic threat abatement is over. Low-observable (Shahed-type) UAVs are tracking toward Ochakiv, signaling the resumption of phase two kinetic activity.	HIGH
Pokrovsk Sector	FRAGMENTED DEFENSE/CONTAINMENT	Localized UAF counter-attacks (SKELYA Reg.) confirmed within the perimeter, indicating active resistance and limited pocket viability.	MEDIUM

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors

No significant changes. Ground mobility remains conducive to RF heavy mechanized maneuver in the Zaporizhzhia sector.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF posture remains reactive in the South. Successful deployment of the NGU "Khartiya" brigade's ground robotics system ("Tarqan-3K") for forward logistics north of Kharkiv is noted. This demonstrates a successful tactical adaptation to RF drone threats in localized logistics, contrasting sharply with systemic operational supply constraints.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is to maximize the kinetic advantage gained by thermobaric preparation fires and secure the key high ground in the Huliaipole breach zone NLT 280600Z. The resumption of KAB strikes on Sumy and UAV activity in Mykolaiv confirms RF intent to tie down and disrupt AD and QRF assets across multiple axes simultaneously.

Capability	Detail	Confidence
Thermobaric Assault Capability	RF MoD confirmed the use of TOS-1A (Solntsepyok) in Zaporizhzhia. This greatly increases the tactical lethality against fixed UAF defensive positions.	HIGH
Multi-Axis Kinetic Disruption	RF has resumed long-range kinetic strikes earlier than the previous 2300Z prediction, using KABs (Sumy) and UAVs (Ochakiv) to test UAF AD and fix resources away from the Huliaipole crisis.	HIGH
Strategic IO Alignment	The propagation of the RF Presidential Decree on State National Policy (ethnic Russian prioritization) signifies a major strategic IO effort to normalize annexation narratives and frame the conflict as existential for RF, bolstering domestic morale and preparing the ground for maximalist demands.	HIGH

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF is prioritizing the use of extremely heavy but short-range thermobaric systems (TOS-1A) to clear the immediate defense belts, suggesting a focus on speed over deep operational maneuver in the initial phase of the breakthrough.

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics supporting heavy thermobaric systems and KAB/FAB saturation remain robust. The simultaneous deployment of TOS-1A in Zaporizhzhia and continued KAB launches in Sumy demonstrates sufficient ammunition throughput to sustain high-volume preparatory fires.

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 retains the capacity for synchronized multi-domain operations (ground assault, deep kinetic strikes, and simultaneous strategic IO output).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture remains critical in Zaporizhzhia. The successful localization of fighting and continued resistance by SKELYA Regiment in the highly contested Pokrovsk area suggests higher combat morale than anticipated, but these tactical successes do not alleviate the strategic necessity for reserve deployment. Readiness requires immediate augmentation in counter-battery and SEAD capabilities in the Southern axis.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Domain	Success/Setback	Impact	Confidence
Setback (Zaporizhzhia Defense)	Confirmation of RF TOS-1A use against UAF strongholds.	Massive localized lethality and likely loss of key forward positions, requiring immediate withdrawal or high casualties.	HIGH
Success (Localized Resistance)	SKELYA Regiment combat footage confirming localized assault success in Pokrovsk.	Maintains tactical pressure on RF flank and delays full RF consolidation of the Pocket.	MEDIUM
Success (Technological Adaptation)	Deployment of "Tarqan-3K" UGV for frontline logistics (Khartiya Brigade).	Mitigates infantry logistical vulnerability to RF C-UAS/EW in specific sectors (North/Kharkiv).	HIGH

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most critical resource requirement has shifted to high-priority counter-battery fires capable of neutralizing TOS-1A/TOS-2 systems before they can be deployed in their effective 3-6 km range window. The constraints on reserve deployment via the compromised Konstiantynivka GLOC remain paramount.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is maintaining maximum pressure across two vectors:

Military Victory: Asserting rapid success and inevitability (Pokrovsk "liberation"/Myrnohrad optimism).
Strategic Isolation: Weaponizing the US-EU "peace plan" rift and deploying the new ethnic policy decree to signal non-negotiable maximalist war aims, attempting to delegitimize Kyiv’s sovereignty.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

President Zelenskyy’s public message emphasizing the synchronized nature of defense, resistance, and diplomatic work is critical for maintaining domestic and international coherence against RF IO. The confirmed deployment of crowdfunded UGV logistics (Khartiya) is a positive morale boost but underscores the persistent systemic logistics gap.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Estonian PM Kallas's strong statement regarding Russian aggression (18:50Z) provides political cover and reinforces the European narrative of sustained defense. UAF diplomacy must capitalize on these strong European signals to counteract the perceived US drift and ensure the EU asset seizure initiative translates into immediate military aid velocity.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 24 HOURS)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF Vostok Group executes the main mechanized assault on the Huliaipole axis NLT 272200Z, leveraging the kinetic shaping achieved by TOS-1A fires. The immediate goal remains securing high ground 10-15 km deep NLT 280600Z. The resumed long-range kinetic activity (KAB/UAV) will be sustained to prevent UAF AD assets from redeploying to protect the critical Konstiantynivka GLOC.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF forces achieve rapid, localized operational rupture at Huliaipole, simultaneously suppressing UAF C2/ISR capabilities via combined EW and deep drone/loitering munition strikes. The inability of UAF reserves to traverse the interdicted Konstiantynivka GLOC NLT 280200Z leads to the collapse of the immediate UAF blocking positions, forcing a large-scale, costly operational withdrawal across the entire Southern Donbas Front.

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

Timeframe (ZULU)	Event/Condition	Required UAF Decision Point
NLT 272100Z	Confirmation of successful counter-battery strike/SEAD operation against confirmed/suspected TOS-1A/TOS-2 positions (Rec A.1).	Decision Point 1.6 (IMMEDIATE): If counter-battery fails, initiate pre-planned tactical withdrawal (Phased) from the immediate Huliaipole defense belt to avoid mass casualties from Thermobaric effects.
NLT 272200Z	RF initiates main mechanized assault in Zaporizhzhia axis.	Decision Point 2: Release the primary maneuver reserve via the Konstiantynivka GLOC. If SOF escort is not ready, substitute with organic mechanized security assets. Risk tolerance for GLOC interdiction must be high.
NLT 280200Z	Confirmation of status of Pokrovsk FDP/Breakout operations.	Decision Point 3: If breakout fails or is determined unviable, shift all remaining supporting fire/ISR assets previously dedicated to Pokrovsk to reinforce the stabilization effort in Huliaipole.

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

A. TACTICAL EMERGENCY (HULIAIPOLE STABILIZATION)

COUNTER-BATTERY (J3 / FIRE COMMAND): IMMEDIATE TARGETING OF THERMOBARIC SYSTEMS. All available long-range precision assets (HIMARS, heavy caliber artillery) must prioritize Suppression of Enemy Air Defense/Counter-Battery (SEAD/CB) against confirmed or suspected TOS-1A/TOS-2 deployment zones west of Huliaipole NLT 272100Z. This is the highest kinetic priority to mitigate catastrophic losses in the forward defense. (Confidence: HIGH)
AIRSPACE DENIAL (J6 / J3): EW SHIFT. Execute the planned EW detachment deployment (e.g., Bukovel-AD) to the Huliaipole flank immediately, with a mandate to specifically disrupt RF reconnaissance UAVs guiding TOS-1A/artillery fire.
FORCE DISPERSION (J3): Direct all UAF units in the expected path of the assault to maximize dispersion and utilize non-linear defensive positions (e.g., decentralized tree line strongpoints) to mitigate the concentrated effects of thermobaric weapons.

B. OPERATIONAL (REAR AREA SECURITY AND LOGISTICS)

AD RE-TASKING (J3 / AIR COMMAND): HARDEN CRITICAL NODES. Due to confirmed resumption of aerial activity (KAB Sumy, UAV Ochakiv), finalize and execute the AD repositioning plan (Ref: Prev. ISR Rec B.4) focusing specifically on protecting the Konstiantynivka GLOC and the Kramatorsk CP approach vectors from both cruise missile and UAV saturation, NLT 272030Z.
GLOC ESCORT (J3): RESERVE DEPLOYMENT SECURITY. Mandate the immediate release of the primary maneuver reserve regardless of the outcome of the SOF hunt operation on the Konstiantynivka GLOC, provided the convoy is augmented with armored counter-ambush/sniper teams (minimum two mechanized platoons per maneuver group). Delaying deployment now is a greater risk than interdiction.

C. STRATEGIC/INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (C4/IE)

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (NCA / MFA): PREEMPT RF ETHNIC IO. Kyiv must issue a statement immediately rejecting the RF "ethnic prioritization" decree as a foundation for genocide and forced assimilation, using the strong public support from European leaders (Kallas) to frame Russia's long-term intentions internationally.

CONFIDENCE ASSESSMENT SUMMARY (UPDATED):

RF use of TOS-1A (Solntsepyok) systems in Zaporizhzhia: HIGH
RF resumption of aerial kinetic strikes (KAB/UAV): HIGH
RF intent to execute Huliaipole mechanized assault NLT 272200Z: HIGH
Successful deployment of UAF logistical UGVs (Tarqan-3K): HIGH

INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CRITICAL SHIFT):

PRIORITY 1 (KINETIC - IMMEDIATE): TOS-1A/TOS-2 GRID LOCATIONS. IMINT/SOF reporting required NLT 272000Z to pinpoint precise firing positions or staging areas for thermobaric systems to support Rec A.1.
PRIORITY 2 (FORCE STATUS): EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNTER-INTERDICTION. IMINT/SOF reporting required NLT 272100Z to confirm route clearance status along the Konstiantynivka GLOC.
PRIORITY 3 (TECHNOLOGY): RF EW/C-UAS LOCATIONS. SIGNINT/IMINT required NLT 272000Z to geo-locate RF EW/C-UAS emitters in the Orikhiv sector to inform UAF Fire Command for immediate SEAD targeting.

Situation Report