Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 271545Z NOV 25

SUBJECT: PHASE RED ACCELERATION CONFIRMED: HULIAIPOLE STRIKE IMMINENT; RF MAXIMALIST DIPLOMATIC COERCION INTENSIFIES

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The focus of the operational crisis remains the simultaneous high-leverage threats on the Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole) and the unresolved status of UAF forces in the Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk/Myrnograd). No significant change in the overall geometry, but RF preparatory fires are concluding.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, dry conditions persist. Optimal parameters continue to favor RF high-altitude ISR, precision-guided munition (KAB) delivery, and observation for the imminent ground assault.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are postured defensively against the confirmed mechanized thrust near Huliaipole. The critical control measure is the immediate authorization of Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDP) for the Pokrovsk P1 GAP NLT 271700Z, which remains pending definitive ISR/GEOINT confirmation.

FACT: RF President Putin publicly issued maximalist demands, stating RF is ready to fight until "the last Ukrainian" and that Kyiv must negotiate for Ukraine to "survive in those borders it has today" (15:11Z, 15:22Z). JUDGMENT: RF political intent is synchronized with the Huliaipole assault timeline (NLT 272200Z). The military operation is explicitly designed to maximize tactical success to immediately force a strategic, unfavorable diplomatic outcome. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is solidified: achieve a rapid, decisive breach in Zaporizhzhia and exploit the Pokrovsk encirclement to coerce Kyiv and fracture the NATO sustainment coalition.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has shown a highly effective integration of tactical success (Pokrovsk P1 GAP, FPV strikes) directly into high-level strategic communication to leverage political pressure in real-time. The targeting of Sloviansk (C2 node) by drones (Previous Report) and the interdiction of the Konstiantynivka GLOC remain key adaptations designed to prevent UAF reserve commitment.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are adequately supporting the immediate high-tempo offensive. Long-term sustainment is being addressed by domestic policy changes (pension credits for volunteers, 15:20Z), signaling commitment to prolonged conflict and personnel replenishment.

INTELLIGENCE GAP 1 (CRITICAL):

IMINT verification of TOS-2 Positioning west of Huliaipole remains the highest kinetic priority. Without this, the counter-preparation fire mission (R-1.1) risks being inefficient.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is at maximum alert on the Zaporizhzhia axis. The UAF demonstrated operational capability in deep strike via the successful use of AASM HAMMER precision-guided munitions launched from a MiG-29MU1 against an RF Command Post in the Northern sector (15:01Z). This provides crucial confirmation of PGM integration effectiveness.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: Effective kinetic targeting of an RF CP (15:01Z) and continued proactive domestic stabilization (NBU currency action, Poltava corruption prosecution).
• Setback: The critical decision on the Pokrovsk pocket remains stalled, hindering C2 flexibility.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate constraint remains the 90-minute window (until 1700Z) to confirm Pokrovsk status and authorize FDP. All intelligence collection assets must prioritize this task. Kinetic resource allocation must be optimized for the 271800Z counter-preparation window.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF messaging is fully consolidated:

1. Negotiation Ultimatum: Putin’s central message dictates that Ukraine must accept the current frontline as the basis for survival (15:22Z), a powerful coercive signal aimed at European decision-makers.
2. Moral Decay/Fatigue: Disinformation efforts (e.g., "Mindichgate") persist, amplified by RF domestic stability messages (pension credits, 15:20Z).
3. Counter-Narrative Opportunity: UAF sources are leveraging Putin's factual error regarding "Komsomolsk" fighting (15:01Z) to portray RF leadership as detached from reality, a valuable morale and strategic communication vector.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is being tested by the combined kinetic threat (Huliaipole) and the maximalist diplomatic ultimatums. UAF efforts to promote long-term economic stability and reconstruction partnerships (Netherlands, 15:08Z) serve as a crucial counterweight to RF defeatism.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The internal friction caused by the US-EU rift remains the primary strategic vulnerability. The extradition of the Nord Stream suspect to Germany (15:14Z) highlights ongoing internal European security concerns that may distract from immediate aid prioritization for Kyiv. RF’s strong opposition to asset confiscation (15:32Z) is a direct pressure point against EU financial stability.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF initiates the Huliaipole ground assault at the established timeline, utilizing maximum preparatory fire from TOS and KAB systems.

1. Huliaipole Breach and Consolidation (0-12H): RF forces breach defensive lines NLT 272200Z. Penetration aims for 5-10km toward GLOCs. Success is immediately leveraged by Russian state media, showcasing captured positions and UAF equipment/POWs from the Pokrovsk P1 GAP to reinforce Putin’s negotiating ultimatum NLT 280600Z. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Fixing Northern Reserves: Continued drone harassment and Spetsnaz interdiction on the Konstiantynivka GLOC and C2 nodes (Sloviansk) will fix UAF strategic reserves, preventing effective counter-attack or exploitation of the Northern UAF PGM success (15:01Z). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

Successful operational breakthrough near Huliaipole (10+km penetration) coupled with the failure of UAF units in the Pokrovsk pocket to execute an FDP. This combined kinetic/personnel loss is immediately leveraged by RF, leading to an emergency, aid-freezing summit among key NATO/EU allies due to the perceived collapse of the Ukrainian defense, isolating Kyiv diplomatically and operationally. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: KINETIC DEFENSE PRIORITIZATION (J3/FIRE COMMAND/AD COMMAND)

1. IMMEDIATE Counter-Preparation Fire (Huliaipole): Execute the immediate targeting plan against suspected RF assembly areas and confirmed/suspected TOS-2 positions west of Huliaipole NLT 271800Z. Failure to meet this timeline dramatically increases the probability of a successful RF breach.
2. C-UAS Overmatch: Prioritize the deployment of high-power C-UAS (Electronic Warfare) systems and mobile kinetic C-UAS elements (anti-drone teams) to forward defensive sectors and logistical chokepoints on the Zaporizhzhia axis to neutralize the confirmed FPV threat.
3. AASM HAMMER Exploitation: J2/J3 must immediately analyze the successful Northern PGM strike (15:01Z) to establish operational parameters and repeatability for high-value RF C2 and deep logistics targets along the critical Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk axes.

R-2: FORCE MANAGEMENT DECISION (NCA/J3)

1. Authorize Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDP): If definitive ISR confirmation of the Pokrovsk P1 GAP status is not received by 271700Z, the NCA/J3 must authorize FDP immediately. Commanders must receive explicit guidance and authority for independent breakout actions toward Myrnograd or pre-designated rally points to save combat power.

R-3: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND ALLIANCE REPAIR (MFA/STRATCOM)

1. Direct Counter-Coercion: Utilize PM Shmyhal's NATO visit as a platform to aggressively counter Putin’s "fight until the last Ukrainian" rhetoric by emphasizing UAF resolve and the shared democratic values threatened by RF maximalist demands.
2. IO Exploitation: STRATCOM must immediately amplify the reports of Putin's geographical errors (e.g., "Komsomolsk") across Western and domestic channels to diminish RF leadership credibility and competence.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS