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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-27 15:04:29Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-11-27 15:00:26Z)

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 271545Z NOV 25

SUBJECT: PHASE RED ACCELERATION: VDV VOSTOK GROUP CONFIRMED KINETIC SHAPING FOR HULIAIPOLE THRUST; ALLIANCE FRICTION INTENSIFIES


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational priority remains focused on the Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole-Dnipropetrovsk direction) and the final resolution of the Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk/Myrnograd encirclement).

Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole): RF Vostok Group is confirmed executing coordinated kinetic and information shaping operations directly targeting the Dnipropetrovsk direction. This confirms that the Huliaipole assault (anticipated NLT 272200Z) is supported by dedicated tactical groups utilizing FPV drones and close air support.

Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk): The status remains P1 GAP (Presumed Encirclement). RF Information Operations (IO) channels are actively promoting successes in the South Donetsk direction, likely covering the consolidation phase following the encirclement of UAF forces.

FACT: RF unit "Дальневосточные ветра" (Vostok Group element) confirms operational activity in the Dnipropetrovsk direction (06:56Z, 12:07Z) and South Donetsk direction (10:16Z), focusing on FPV drone employment. JUDGMENT: The RF assault on Huliaipole will be highly synchronized, utilizing heavy ordnance (KAB/TOS-2) for breach, followed by dedicated tactical groups supported by aggressive UAV/FPV screening. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear conditions provide optimal operational parameters for RF KAB and high-altitude ISR/UAV platforms, directly supporting the immediate Huliaipole assault timeline.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are in high alert across all threatened axes. The primary control measure is the defensive synchronization required to counter the multi-layered threat in Zaporizhzhia (KAB, TOS-2, FPV). The critical unresolved control measure remains the authorization for Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDP) for the Pokrovsk pocket (P1 GAP).


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is to achieve a decisive operational breach in Zaporizhzhia that forces Kyiv into immediate, unfavorable diplomatic concessions, leveraging the perceived Western alliance rift.

CapabilityAssessmentIntentionConfidence
Tactical UAV/FPV IntegrationHigh proficiency demonstrated by dedicated tactical units (e.g., "Far Eastern Winds") in the South Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk directions.Attrit UAF forward defenses, target high-value tactical assets, and neutralize C-UAS systems immediately prior to the armored thrust.HIGH
Command and Control (C2)Highly effective synchronization between high-level political signaling (maximalist demands, alliance exploitation) and ground operations execution (Huliaipole preparation).Maintain high tempo and pressure across kinetic and cognitive domains NLT 272200Z.HIGH
Air Defense (AD) PostureSAR score spike (13.88) for the 1488th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment indicates aggressive repositioning or heightened readiness, likely to secure RF staging areas against UAF deep strike.Prevent UAF counter-strike on RF deep assets (Airfields, C2) supporting the Huliaipole offensive.MEDIUM

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The explicit and sustained use of localized tactical groups ("Far Eastern Winds") for promotional purposes (06:56Z, 12:07Z) indicates that RF is utilizing low-level combat successes to directly reinforce strategic propaganda aims, demonstrating full integration of Information Warfare into tactical operations.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

SAR activity suggests RF is securing supply lines (AD repositioning) for the Huliaipole assault force. Localized friction points (e.g., previous quad bike fundraising) are likely compensated for by overall strategic supply sufficiency for immediate offensive action.

INTELLIGENCE GAP 1 (CRITICAL):

IMINT verification of TOS-2 Positioning west of Huliaipole remains the highest kinetic priority to enable pre-emptive counter-fire.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is elevated, but the simultaneous threats in Zaporizhzhia (imminent breach) and Pokrovsk (extraction) are placing immense strain on strategic reserve allocation and C2 decision-making capacity.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

The successful prosecution of internal collaborators (14:30Z) and continued diplomatic engagement (Shmyhal NATO visit, 14:41Z) are crucial non-kinetic successes countering RF IO efforts. The tactical setback of the presumptive Pokrovsk P1 GAP and the strategic setback of the US-EU alliance rift remain critical vulnerabilities.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most immediate constraint is the lack of saturation ISR/IMINT confirming the Pokrovsk P1 GAP status before the critical FDP authorization deadline (271700Z). Resource allocation must heavily favor SHORAD and C-UAS systems for the Zaporizhzhia axis to counter the confirmed KAB and FPV saturation.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is leveraging the kinetic high-tempo and the diplomatic rift simultaneously:

  1. Kinetic Justification: Propaganda channels directly linked to the Vostok Group ("Far Eastern Winds") amplify FPV and AD successes, presenting the offensive as overwhelmingly powerful and inevitable. This directly feeds the narrative that negotiations must proceed on Putin’s maximalist terms.
  2. Strategic Uncertainty: High-level RF messaging (15:00Z - "Старше Эдды") focuses on future uncertainty (2026), designed to induce strategic fatigue and apprehension among NATO partners about long-term commitment.
  3. Exploitation of Rift: RF continues to weaponize the US-EU peace plan leak (14:40Z), framing US actions as unilateral and unreliable, seeking to fracture the political will underpinning military support for Kyiv.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian official channels maintain counter-narratives, but the coming hours (Pokrovsk fate, Huliaipole assault) represent a major test of domestic and front-line morale. RF cultural and military propaganda remains geared toward hardening domestic support for aggressive war aims.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The alliance cohesion threat (Dempster-Shafer confirmation of US/EU disagreement) is the immediate strategic vulnerability. PM Shmyhal’s planned NATO visit is the primary vehicle for mitigating this threat. The NCA must aggressively manage the narrative around the leaked peace plan to prevent aid flow delays.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF initiates the Huliaipole ground assault with maximal preparatory fire, synchronized with a continuous, high-volume IO effort leveraging the Pokrovsk collapse.

  1. Huliaipole Breach (0-6H): RF armored forces breach the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) west of Huliaipole NLT 272200Z. Initial thrust achieves penetration depth of 5-10km toward critical GLOCs, protected by concentrated KAB and TOS-2 fire, and utilizing FPV/C-UAS countermeasures. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  2. IO/Diplomatic Coercion (0-24H): RF diplomatic channels will issue new, non-negotiable ultimatums (based on territorial gains) NLT 280600Z, specifically targeting European capitals to exploit the US-EU friction and pressure Kyiv into accepting a localized ceasefire. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

Successful operational breakthrough near Huliaipole (10+km penetration) forces UAF to commit strategic reserves prematurely. The failure to secure the Konstiantynivka GLOC (due to Spetsnaz interdiction) paralyzes reserve movement, leading to a cascading collapse of the Southern Donbas defense line. This tactical failure is immediately exploited by RF IO, causing major EU allies (Germany/France) to publicly pause aid shipments pending a diplomatic resolution, achieving RF strategic objective of isolating Kyiv. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated Timeline (NLT)ConfidenceStatus/Action Required
Verification of Pokrovsk Status (P1 GAP)271700ZHIGHCRITICAL: J2 must provide final ISR/SIGINT assessment. If unresolved, NCA must authorize FDP immediately.
Huliaipole Counter-Preparation Fire Mission271800ZHIGHCRITICAL: Fire Command must execute pre-emptive counter-battery against all known and suspected RF assembly areas and TOS-2 positions.
NCA Alliance Repair & Public Statement271900ZHIGHSTRATEGIC: NCA/MFA must release coordinated statement to neutralize the US/EU peace plan leak and reaffirm collective commitment.

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: KINETIC DEFENSE PRIORITIZATION (J3/FIRE COMMAND/AD COMMAND)

  1. Immediate Counter-Preparation Fire (Huliaipole): Execute the immediate targeting plan against RF assembly areas and confirmed/suspected TOS-2 positions west of Huliaipole NLT 271800Z. Focus on pre-empting the 2200Z ground assault launch.
  2. Integrated Air/Drone Defense: Re-task both SHORAD (for KAB defense) and high-density C-UAS assets (electronic warfare/kinetic interception) specifically to the forward defensive lines and reserve staging areas on the Zaporizhzhia axis to counter the confirmed synchronized KAB/FPV threat.
  3. GLOC Security: Initiate aggressive, round-the-clock patrol operations by QRF and SSO elements along the Konstiantynivka GLOC targeting RF Spetsnaz interdiction teams.

R-2: FORCE MANAGEMENT DECISION (NCA/J3)

  1. Authorize Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDP): If definitive ISR confirmation of the Pokrovsk P1 GAP status is not achieved by 271700Z, the NCA/J3 must authorize FDP immediately. Delaying this decision risks the total destruction and capture of combat-effective personnel, providing RF a major IO victory. Commanders must be given authority for independent breakout actions.

R-3: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND ALLIANCE REPAIR (MFA/STRATCOM)

  1. Diplomatic Counter-Offensive: Leverage PM Shmyhal's planned NATO HQ visit to issue a joint statement with key European partners (France/Germany) that: a) Explicitly validates the existing allied framework; b) Publicly rejects RF maximalist demands; and c) Reaffirms the requirement for multilateral consensus on any peace process, thereby isolating the US unilateral action and neutralizing the RF IO exploitation.

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap/RequirementConfidenceTasking Rationale
1 (CRITICAL)IMINT/GEOINT verification of UAF force status and encirclement viability in Krasnoarmiysk (Pokrovsk) and Dimitrov (Myrnograd).HIGHEssential for authorizing Extraction/Fragmented Defense Protocols (R-2.1). Must be resolved NLT 271700Z.
2 (CRITICAL)Real-time IMINT/GEOINT tracking of RF armored formations and, specifically, TOS-2 systems west of Huliaipole.HIGHRequired for immediate counter-battery targeting (R-1.1) to disrupt the planned 2200Z assault timing.
3 (HIGH)SIGINT/HUMINT on internal EU leadership reaction (Germany/France) to the US peace plan leak (14:40Z).HIGHRequired to tailor diplomatic outreach and pre-empt any decision to freeze aid (R-3.1).
4 (MEDIUM)IMINT/GEOINT confirmation of RF 1488th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment’s current operational location.MEDIUMRequired to assess depth of AD coverage supporting the Huliaipole assault and potential UAF deep strike opportunities.
Previous (2025-11-27 15:00:26Z)

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