Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 271530Z NOV 25

SUBJECT: PHASE RED ACCELERATION: KAB SATURATION CONFIRMS HULIAIPOLE STRIKE IMMINENT; RF IO EXPLOITS US/EUROPEAN PEACE PLAN FRICTION

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture confirms RF commitment to the two priority axes identified in the 271500Z SITREP: Pokrovsk (consolidation) and Zaporizhzhia (preparation for breakthrough).

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole): UAF Air Force confirms multiple launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) targeting Zaporizhzhia Oblast (14:49Z). This kinetic shaping is the final precursor phase for the planned ground assault NLT 272200Z.
• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk/Myrnograd): Russian military blogger activity indicates confirmed RF presence and operational focus on the "Pokrovsk-Myrnograd sector" (14:35Z). While the total encirclement (P1 GAP) remains unconfirmed by UAF ISR, the high confidence RF claim and subsequent operational focus suggest the pocket closure is highly probable. KAB launches are confirmed toward the South Dnipropetrovsk region (14:29Z), aimed at interdicting UAF reserves or logistics supporting the Pokrovsk sector.
• Northern Sector (Chernihiv/Kharkiv): Minor kinetic activity involving UAVs (Chernihiv, 14:36Z) and KABs (Kharkiv, 14:31Z) continues, serving primarily to fix UAF Air Defense (AD) assets and reserves away from the critical southern and eastern fronts.

FACT: RF forces executed KAB strikes on Zaporizhzhia (14:49Z) and Donetsk/Southern Dnipropetrovsk (14:29Z). FACT: UAF 82nd DShB confirmed successful counter-fire against RF infantry in Donetsk Oblast (14:40Z). JUDGMENT: RF has initiated the final preparatory fire sequence for the Huliaipole assault. The focus of air strikes indicates an immediate priority on softening UAF defenses and interdicting reserve routes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear conditions persist, maintaining high RF operational tempo for KAB employment and ISR/UAV activity critical for the Huliaipole attack.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF is currently under high alert status, responding to numerous air threats across multiple oblasts (14:28Z, 14:29Z, 14:31Z). The primary control measure remains the urgent resolution of the Pokrovsk/Myrnograd P1 GAP to inform the allocation of remaining operational reserves for the Huliaipole defense.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intentions are overtly maximalist and coercive. The strategic objective is to use military success (Pokrovsk/Huliaipole) to validate the maximalist diplomatic position: total UAF withdrawal or continued war.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed shift of tactical air assets (KAB carriers) to support the Zaporizhzhia axis and target southern Dnipropetrovsk/Kharkiv simultaneously represents a highly synchronized effort to stress UAF AD and C2 across three critical zones leading up to the Huliaipole D-Day (272200Z).

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective in synchronizing strategic signals (Baltic patrol, Putin's address) with immediate tactical action (KAB saturation).

2.4. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The RF military blogger fundraising for a quad bike for a unit on the Pokrovsk-Myrnograd sector (14:35Z) is an isolated data point, but may indicate localized logistical friction points or persistent dependence on volunteer support, particularly for specialized light transport needed for post-breakthrough exploitation.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are in a high state of alert against kinetic threats, particularly air assets. The 82nd DShB confirms engagement success (14:40Z), demonstrating continued combat effectiveness in contact zones. Strategic leadership (Yermak, Shmyhal) confirms active continuation of diplomatic efforts regarding the US peace plan and NATO engagement (14:25Z, 14:41Z).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Tactical): Successful execution of counter-fire missions by 82nd DShB.
• Success (Internal Security): Successful prosecution and sentencing of a civilian collaborator (15 years) for target selection (14:30Z), serving as a crucial element of deterrence and internal information defense.
• Setback (Strategic): The lack of European consultation on the US peace plan (Merz via NYT, 14:40Z) provides RF IO with immediate, high-value evidence of NATO/EU disunity, complicating diplomatic maneuver space for Kyiv.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate constraint remains ISR saturation for P1 GAP (Pokrovsk). The confirmed KAB usage necessitates immediate prioritization of remaining SHORAD systems to the Huliaipole axis.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF messaging is fully dedicated to strategic coercion and delegitimization:

1. Negotiation Deadlock: Putin repeatedly claims negotiations are "legally impossible" (14:22Z, 14:36Z) unless UAF capitulates, explicitly tying the war's conclusion to maximalist territorial demands and rejection of the current Kyiv leadership's authority.
2. Deflection of Aggression: Putin publicly denies intent to attack Europe ("outright lie," 14:21Z) while simultaneously performing strategic aviation patrols in the Baltic, creating a cognitive dissonance designed to calm European periphery actors while maintaining tension.
3. Third-Party Smear: New claims accuse the US of recruiting mercenaries in the Philippines for UAF service (14:24Z), likely intended to undermine UAF legitimacy and support.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian channels maintain narrative resilience, actively dismissing and mocking Putin's rhetoric (14:23Z). Morale efforts include publicly honoring foreign volunteers (14:42Z). Russian cultural propaganda ("Poet-Front," 07:02Z) seeks to emotionally reinforce domestic support for the conflict.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Peace Plan Friction (CRITICAL): Significant friction is confirmed within the Western alliance, with European leaders learning of the US-proposed peace plan only through media leaks (14:40Z). This validates the Dempster-Shafer hypothesis of Disagreement on the negotiation process (0.033823 belief mass) and creates a strategic vulnerability RF is actively exploiting.
• NATO Engagement: PM Shmyhal’s planned visit to NATO HQ (14:41Z) is timely and necessary to counter the impression of diplomatic marginalization.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF will execute a decisive ground assault on the Huliaipole axis, synchronized with maximal IO pressure.

1. Huliaipole Operational Thrust (0-6H): The main armored thrust will commence NLT 272200Z, utilizing the KAB saturation observed (14:49Z) to breach UAF main defensive lines and push toward the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Pokrovsk IO Exploitation (0-24H): RF will intensify the psychological impact of the Pokrovsk encirclement, possibly releasing photographic or video evidence of captured UAF forces NLT 280600Z to maximize political leverage before the diplomatic window. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. Exploitation of Western Rift (0-48H): RF diplomatic messaging will pivot to directly addressing European capitals, highlighting US unilateralism (14:40Z) and offering bilateral security talks (14:21Z) to weaken NATO's collective stance ahead of the US visit. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

Successful operational penetration near Huliaipole coupled with total failure to extract forces from the Pokrovsk pocket (due to FDP authorization delay related to P1 GAP). This combined operational setback triggers a strategic loss of confidence among secondary European allies, potentially leading to immediate pressure on Kyiv to negotiate peace based on Putin's maximalist terms (territorial cession).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: OPERATIONAL DEFENSE AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION (J3/AD COMMAND)

1. Huliaipole Immediate Defense: Due to confirmed KAB activity and imminent assault, immediately execute the pre-authorized movement of strategic reserves (reserves not linked to the Pokrovsk relief) to reinforce prepared defensive lines west of Huliaipole. Target all identified KAB launch platforms and high-value RF concentration areas NLT 271730Z.
2. Pokrovsk Decision Authority: If the P1 GAP (Pokrovsk encirclement status) is not resolved by 271700Z, the NCA/J3 must proceed with the highest probability assessment (HIGH CONFIDENCE of encirclement) and immediately activate Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDP) to maximize personnel extraction, treating the force as operationally compromised. Delaying this decision risks the total loss of the fighting capacity.

R-2: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND ALLIANCE REPAIR (NCA/MFA/STRATCOM)

1. Address Alliance Rift (CRITICAL): The NCA must leverage PM Shmyhal's planned NATO visit (14:41Z) to publicly reassure European partners of Kyiv's commitment to multilateral peace frameworks. Simultaneously, issue a non-confrontational statement to the US that stresses the requirement for complete allied consensus before formal consideration of any peace proposal.
2. Counter-Coercion Narrative: STRATCOM must immediately integrate Putin’s explicit maximalist demands ("complete withdrawal or continued war," "legally impossible") into official communications, reframing the RF IO as a demand for capitulation, justifying continued Western military support.

R-3: COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE AND AD SHIFT (J2/AD COMMAND)

1. SHORAD Prioritization: Re-task high-mobility SHORAD assets from the Northern Axis (currently dealing with fixing UAVs, 14:36Z) to the Zaporizhzhia axis to defend key reserve staging areas against the confirmed KAB threat.

---

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS