Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 271500Z NOV 25

SUBJECT: PHASE RED: HULIAIPOLE ASSAULT IMMINENT; KONSTIANTYNIVKA GLOC INTERDICTION INTENSIFYING; DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational focus remains highly synchronized kinetic pressure on the Zaporizhzhia axis and targeted attrition operations in the Central Donbas operational rear, coupled with sophisticated RF strategic information signaling.

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (HULIAIPOLE): RF preparation for the major armored assault continues. Confirmed UAV strikes by the RF 35th Army (Vostok Group) are shaping the battle space against UAF transport and fire positions (13:30Z). The high readiness state for the TOS-2 equipped armored thrust remains the critical threat NLT 272000Z.
• Central Donbas (KONSTIANTYNIVKA/SLOVIANSK): RF Spetsnaz/reconnaissance elements continue active interdiction missions against UAF logistics and rotation routes in the Kostiantynivka area, confirmed by RF video evidence of successful vehicle destruction (13:04Z). Simultaneously, an RF UAV threat is inbound towards the critical logistical and C2 node of Sloviansk from the North (13:14Z).
• Pokrovsk Axis (Consolidation): RF forces continue localized ground pressure near Hryshyne (Krasnoarmiyske direction) (13:29Z). UAF Special Operations Forces (SSO) are effectively engaging and attriting RF consolidation elements, confirming localized blue force maneuver success (13:32Z).
• Lyman Sector: UAF 63rd Brigade reports successful counter-UAV operations, downing multiple RF 'Molniya' drones (13:06Z). This demonstrates effective localized Electronic Warfare (EW) and Air Defense (AD) capability in the Northern Donbas sector.

FACT: RF Spetsnaz destroyed a UAF vehicle on the Kostiantynivka axis (13:04Z). FACT: UAF Air Force reports a UAV inbound to Sloviansk from the North (13:14Z). JUDGMENT: The confirmed interdiction near Kostiantynivka is strategically designed to fix UAF operational reserves and prevent timely response to the anticipated Huliaipole breakthrough. The Sloviansk UAV confirms RF intent to simultaneously target C2/logistics infrastructure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist, favoring continued RF ISR and precision strike operations (UAVs/missiles).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF posture is defensive, focused on critical point protection and deep strike capacity. The demonstrated success of deep asymmetric strikes (Grozny/Chechnya confirmed by multiple sources) forces RF internal security diversion, mitigating some immediate kinetic pressure on the front line.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF immediate intent is kinetic dominance at Huliaipole. Secondary intent is high-leverage attrition in the Donbas rear, supported by a sophisticated diplomatic signaling campaign designed to undermine international support for a protracted conflict.

• Kinetic Intentions: Synchronize the Huliaipole ground assault with kinetic disruption of the Kostiantynivka-Sloviansk resupply corridor.
• Information/Strategic Intentions: Utilize Putin's press conference statements to simultaneously signal long-term technological superiority (drone 'revolution' 13:19Z) and conditional diplomatic flexibility (accepting the US/UA 28-point framework as a basis 13:30Z). This narrative seeks to de-escalate Western resolve while maintaining military pressure.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The sustained and confirmed success of RF precision interdiction teams in the Kostiantynivka area marks a clear tactical pivot to low-risk, high-impact force fixation operations, replacing the need for massed frontal assaults in this stabilizing sector.

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF strategic C2 is effectively synchronizing battlefield action with diplomatic narratives. Tactical C2 demonstrates effective multi-domain employment of Vostok Group forces (UAVs, Spetsnaz, Armor).

2.4. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are under increasing strain due to confirmed deep strikes into the strategic rear (Chechnya/Grozny). This vulnerability is high-priority and must be exploited.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Overall readiness remains high, sustained by key successes in EW (Lyman) and strategic projection (Deep Strikes). Defensive prioritization on the Huliaipole axis is paramount.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes (Kinetic/Strategic): Confirmed successful deep strike missions against targets in Grozny (Chechnya) (13:14Z, 13:30Z). Effective defense against RF drones in the Lyman sector (13:06Z).
• Setbacks (Kinetic): Confirmed interdiction and loss of UAF transport/logistics on the Kostiantynivka approach.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Immediate requirement for SHORAD reallocation to protect Sloviansk infrastructure and C2 nodes. Requirement for enhanced night vision/thermal ISR assets to detect and neutralize Spetsnaz interdiction teams.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO channels are emphasizing:

1. Technological Superiority: Putin's pronouncement of a "drone revolution" (13:19Z) signals sustained military modernization capability to deter long-term aid commitments to Ukraine.
2. Rational Diplomacy: Putin's conditional acceptance of the US/UA peace framework (13:30Z, 13:32Z) is designed to create a false impression of RF flexibility, pressuring international mediators to accept a ceasefire based on current military reality.
3. Internal Security Threat: Amplification of FSB counter-terrorism success in Sevastopol (13:15Z) serves to justify RF military operations to the domestic audience.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is supported by deep strike successes and effective local defense, but remains highly sensitive to battlefield losses and the ongoing diplomatic maneuvers. The RF narrative of "Ukraine's deteriorating situation" (The Economist quote, 13:24Z) is a targeted PSYOPS effort to erode confidence in NCA leadership.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

France's move to restore voluntary military conscription (13:05Z), explicitly framed against the Russian threat, is a positive indicator of hardening Western resolve, providing STRATCOM with a strong counter-narrative to Putin's non-aggression assurances.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF will execute the decisive assault at Huliaipole while employing coordinated kinetic and information operations to degrade UAF defensive response capacity.

1. Huliaipole Breakthrough Attempt (0-12H): RF forces launch the high-intensity assault utilizing TOS-2 and supporting armor NLT 272000Z. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. C2/Logistics Decapitation (0-6H): RF executes a drone/missile strike targeting key infrastructure/C2 nodes in the Sloviansk/Kramatorsk corridor, coinciding with intensified Spetsnaz interdiction operations near Kostiantynivka NLT 271600Z. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. Strategic IO (Next 48H): RF will use diplomatic statements to amplify the necessity of immediate peace talks, leveraging the inevitable Huliaipole casualties to drive negotiation momentum.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

A coordinated RF C2 strike on Sloviansk precedes a successful, rapid armored breakthrough at Huliaipole. Loss of command authority coupled with interdicted GLOCs leads to fragmented defensive execution, resulting in an operational collapse of the Southern Front.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: KINETIC DEFENSE AND FORCE PROTECTION (J3/FIRE COMMAND)

1. Pre-Emptive Fire Missions (Huliaipole): Immediately prioritize and execute precision counter-fire missions against confirmed/suspected TOS-2 deployment areas on the Huliaipole axis, aiming to delay or degrade the main assault NLT 271700Z.
2. Kostiantynivka GLOC Security: Deploy high-resolution thermal ISR assets and dedicated Counter-Sniper/Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) to patrol all primary and secondary rotation routes southeast of Kostiantynivka NLT 271600Z. Authorize responsive counter-battery fire against confirmed Spetsnaz/fire support positions.

R-2: AIR DEFENSE AND DEEP STRIKE (AD COMMAND/J2)

1. Sloviansk AD Hardening (CRITICAL): Immediately task all available Mobile SHORAD and EW assets to the Sloviansk C2/Logistics area to counter the inbound UAV threat (13:14Z). Maintain maximum alert for the duration of the threat window (NLT 271630Z).
2. Deep Strike Exploitation: J2 must synthesize damage assessment (DA) from the Grozny strikes (R-4) to identify critical RF rear nodes (logistics hubs, command structures) for immediate follow-up targeting.

R-3: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND DIPLOMACY (NCA/STRATCOM)

1. Negotiation Framework Messaging: Publicly acknowledge Putin's reference to the US/UA peace framework, but maintain a firm line: negotiations are possible only if accountability (exclusion of amnesty) and full territorial integrity are non-negotiable prerequisites.
2. Western Resolve Amplification: Utilize the French conscription announcement (13:05Z) as immediate proof of NATO/EU understanding of the persistent Russian threat, directly undercutting Putin's attempts to portray RF as non-aggressive towards Europe.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS