Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 271400Z NOV 25

SUBJECT: HIGH-INTENSITY KINETIC PHASE (HULIAIPOLE AXIS); CONSOLIDATION PUSH (KONSTIANTYNIVKA); AMNESTY CLAUSE WEAPONIZED.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture confirms RF intent to execute a synchronized ground breakthrough in Zaporizhzhia while maintaining critical attrition pressure in the Donbas operational rear, coupled with continued deep kinetic/cognitive targeting.

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (HULIAIPOLE): Pressure remains critical. RF sources actively promote success in the sector, claiming the destruction of UAF armor and providing partisan updates on advances (1242Z, 1259Z). This reinforces the previous assessment of an imminent, high-casualty armored assault, likely leveraging the confirmed TOS-2 systems (R-5.1 validation). Allegations of RF execution of UAF POWs in this sector (DeepState, 1242Z) are critically noted, potentially functioning as a deliberate PSYOPS tool against frontline resistance.
• Central Donbas (KONSTIANTYNIVKA): RF forces, specifically Vostok Grouping, confirm active sniper and fire support operations targeting UAF rotation groups and logistics on the southeastern outskirts of Kostiantynivka (1303Z). This is a strong indicator that RF is shifting immediately from Pokrovsk exploitation (Myrnograd corridor consolidation) to shaping the battle space for a deeper penetration towards Kostiantynivka.
• Deep Rear Targeting: An RF UAV was tracked over Kharkiv Oblast near Krasnopavlivka, tracking south-east (1248Z). This suggests continued ISR preparation for infrastructure strikes following the Zhytomyr model (R-5.1 validation).
• Counter-Offensive Capability: Confirmed successful UAF border guard (DPDU) strike targeting three shelters and a logistics vehicle in Kursk Oblast (1251Z). This demonstrates continued cross-border interdiction capability, forcing RF to commit security assets to logistics defense.

FACT: RF forces conduct sniper/fire missions to interdict UAF rotation/resupply near Kostiantynivka (1303Z). FACT: UAF forces executed a counter-logistics strike in Kursk Oblast (1251Z). JUDGMENT: RF has initiated Phase II of the Donbas stabilization effort, using specialized fire teams to fix and attrit UAF stabilizing reserves around Kostiantynivka while the decisive kinetic effort remains focused on Huliaipole. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions continue to favor precision fire missions, ISR, and UAV operations across all axes.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are under intense multi-domain pressure. The success in the diplomatic arena (amnesty exclusion, 1237Z) provides a strategic boost, but ground units face immediate, localized threats from high-power kinetic systems (TOS-2) and targeted suppression (Kostiantynivka snipers).

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is to capitalize on the Pokrovsk success by immediately destabilizing the Kostiantynivka defense line while focusing overwhelming firepower on the Huliaipole axis.

• Tactical Capabilities: RF demonstrates enhanced capacity for localized, precision suppression using sniper and fire support groups in urban/semi-urban environments (Kostiantynivka), specifically targeting high-value assets (rotation units, logistics).
• Strategic Intentions (Immediate):
  1. Execute the armored breakthrough at Huliaipole NLT 272000Z.
  2. Prevent timely UAF force stabilization or rotation west of Myrnograd by fixing reserve forces near Kostiantynivka (12-24H).
• Cognitive Intentions: RF IO is actively trying to weaponize the exclusion of the general amnesty clause from the US peace proposal, framing Kyiv as an obstacle to peace and humanitarian compromise (1301Z). This narrative is designed to pressure international partners and UAF NCA. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed use of precision sniper/suppression groups to target rotation routes near Kostiantynivka (1303Z) indicates a low-cost, high-leverage tactical adaptation aimed at slowing UAF reinforcement efforts without requiring a massed frontal assault in this sector yet.

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, synchronizing ground maneuver propaganda (Huliaipole success claims), IO campaigns (Amnesty framing), and internal morale boosting (awards, veteran profiles).

2.4. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are supported by significant civil society mobilization (Charity Raffles, 1236Z). However, UAF confirmed strikes in Kursk (1251Z) demonstrate that RF cross-border GLOCs remain vulnerable.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness remains high, focused on defense and deep strike execution. The OGP's successful counter-corruption operation in Zaporizhzhia (1300Z, aid embezzlement) provides a crucial counter-narrative to RF attempts to weaponize the "Mindichgate" legitimacy attacks.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes (Diplomatic/Kinetic): UAF successfully excluded a blanket amnesty clause from the US-backed peace framework (1237Z), preserving the capacity for war crimes accountability. Successful interdiction strike against RF logistics in Kursk (1251Z).
• Setbacks (Kinetic/Information): Confirmed interdiction of rotation assets near Kostiantynivka (1303Z). Allegations of RF execution of POWs in Zaporizhzhia (1242Z) require immediate J2/GUR investigation and coordinated STRATCOM response.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Counter-Suppression Assets: Immediate requirement for counter-battery and counter-sniper teams (thermal/EW support) to protect key rotation routes and holding positions around Kostiantynivka (R-1.2).
2. POW/War Crimes Response: Need dedicated legal and intelligence resources to rapidly investigate and authenticate alleged war crimes to support the diplomatic stance on accountability.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO channels (TASS, Alex Parker) are actively framing the potential US shift on sanctions (1245Z) and the exclusion of amnesty (1301Z) as proof that Kyiv is unwilling to negotiate rationally, seeking perpetual conflict and undermining justice.

• RF Internal Focus: Strong emphasis on glorifying Spetsnaz/Vostok forces (1300Z, 1242Z) and leveraging domestic veteran support groups (1236Z) to drive morale and recruitment.
• UAF Narrative Opportunity: The exclusion of the amnesty clause is a significant diplomatic and moral victory. STRATCOM must pivot immediately to frame this as non-negotiable adherence to international law and accountability for alleged war crimes (e.g., Zaporizhzhia POW execution allegations).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is stressed by simultaneous kinetic defeat narratives (Pokrovsk consolidation) and infrastructure attacks (Zhytomyr), compounded by the psychological impact of reported POW executions (Zaporizhzhia) and the need for POW coordination meetings (36th OBrMP families, 1242Z).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Positive: Confirmation of US support for justice (amnesty exclusion) (1237Z).
• Negative: RF amplification of potential shifts in US policy regarding sanctions (Trump reference, 1245Z) aims to signal waning international commitment to Kyiv's maximalist goals. The coordinated RF effort to politicize the amnesty exclusion necessitates immediate diplomatic counter-action.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF will execute the decisive assault at Huliaipole while employing high-attrition, low-risk tactics to prevent UAF force generation in the Donbas operational rear.

1. Huliaipole Decisive Assault (12-24H): RF forces launch the high-intensity assault utilizing TOS-2 and supporting armor NLT 272000Z. The objective remains forcing a premature commitment of UAF operational reserves. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Kostiantynivka Attrition/Suppression (24-48H): RF will continue using sniper/precision fire groups to interdict all UAF rotations (personnel and light logistics) along approaches to Kostiantynivka, aiming to degrade defense quality NLT 281200Z. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. IO Surge (Amnesty/Legitimacy): RF IO escalates the cognitive campaign, using the amnesty exclusion and alleged war crimes (Zaporizhzhia POWs) to challenge Kyiv’s moral authority and willingness to end the conflict.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

A successful RF breakthrough at Huliaipole coincides with effective RF sniper interdiction, preventing the rapid deployment of stabilizing reserves to the Kostiantynivka sector. This results in the loss of both key operational positions and the exposure of the Dnipropetrovsk administrative boundary.

• Outcome: A loss of control over the military situation in the Southeast, leading to the collapse of the entire Southern operational front structure.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: KINETIC DEFENSE AND COUNTER-SUPPRESSION (J3/FIRE COMMAND)

1. TOS-2 Neutralization (CRITICAL PRIORITY): Immediately task precision fires against confirmed or suspected TOS-2 deployment locations on the Huliaipole axis. Reinforce ISR coverage in that sector to confirm RF fire mission readiness.
2. Kostiantynivka Counter-Suppression: J3 must deploy high-resolution ISR (thermal/drone) and dedicated counter-sniper teams to rotation corridors south and southeast of Kostiantynivka. Authorize responsive counter-battery fire against confirmed sniper/heavy weapon positions NLT 271600Z.

R-2: INFRASTRUCTURE AND ISR DEFENSE (AD COMMAND/J2)

1. Kharkiv/Eastern AD Posture: Re-task regional AD assets (SHORAD/Mobile SAMs) to prioritize defense of critical infrastructure nodes around Kharkiv and Poltava due to confirmed UAV activity in the region (1248Z). Assume the threat profile is a Zhytomyr-model (massed drone wave).
2. Logistics Protection (Kursk Model): Increase ISR and fire mission readiness along border GLOCs (Sumy/Kharkiv sectors) to capitalize on the demonstrated success of counter-logistics strikes (Kursk, 1251Z).

R-3: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND LEGITIMACY (NCA/STRATCOM/OGP)

1. Amnesty Counter-Narrative (CRITICAL): NCA/MFA must immediately issue a robust statement framing the exclusion of blanket amnesty as a non-negotiable commitment to justice, accountability, and international law, directly countering RF attempts to portray Kyiv as anti-peace (1301Z). Use the OGP’s counter-corruption success (1300Z) as proof of domestic commitment to good governance and rule of law.
2. War Crimes Documentation: STRATCOM must coordinate with the OGP and DeepState to rapidly gather and release authenticated information regarding the alleged execution of Zaporizhzhia POWs (1242Z), tying this atrocity directly to the necessity of excluding amnesty.

---

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS