Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 271300Z NOV 25

SUBJECT: PHASE II ESCALATION: INFRASTRUCTURE TARGETING CONFIRMED (ZHYTOMYR AXIS); CONTINUED EXPLOITATION OF LEGITIMACY NARRATIVE.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is characterized by sustained, high-pressure kinetic activity across three domains: ground offensive in the Donbas/Zaporizhzhia sectors, systemic infrastructure targeting deep in the rear, and persistent high-volume Psychological Operations (PSYOP).

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (HULIAIPOLE): RF pressure remains critical. RF information sources confirm the deployment of heavy thermobaric systems (TOS-2, 1206Z) designed to create "fire breakthroughs" for accompanying assault units. This system deployment strongly indicates an imminent, high-casualty armored assault intended to breach the Huliaipole perimeter (R-5.1 validation).
• Central Donbas (POKROVSK/KOSTIANTYNIVKA): RF sources confirm ongoing advances and operations in Krasnoarmiysk (1216Z, Russian designation for Pokrovsk area), suggesting they are consolidating control over the Myrnograd corridor and preparing the push toward the defensive buffer near Kostiantynivka.
• Deep Rear Targeting: Confirmed RF drone strike on a high-voltage power line near Rodomyshl, Zhytomyr Oblast (1224Z). This validates the previous MLCOA of using the delayed strategic strike to target critical infrastructure, potentially aiming to degrade regional power supply and C2 resilience.
• Counter-Offensive Capability: Confirmed successful UAF UAV strike against the RF 'Akhmat-Sever' regiment base in Grozny, Chechnya (1222Z, 1233Z). This demonstrates continued asymmetric deep strike capability and operational reach.

FACT: RF forces deploy TOS-2 system, claiming the creation of operational breaches (WarGonzo, 1206Z). FACT: High-voltage power line in Rodomyshl, Zhytomyr Oblast, struck by 24 drones (НгП раZVедка, 1224Z). JUDGMENT: RF has initiated Phase II of the kinetic plan, shifting from anticipated massed missile strikes (1200Z window) to geographically dispersed, infrastructure-focused UAV attacks to achieve paralyzing effects on regional C2 and logistics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist, favoring sustained UAV and ISR operations by both sides, as evidenced by the successful deep strikes into Zhytomyr and Grozny.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are successfully tracking and destroying Shahed-type UAVs (1000+ milestone, 1202Z) but the successful Zhytomyr strike highlights persistent vulnerability of distributed critical infrastructure. Defensive lines near Huliaipole are under immediate threat of massed ground assault utilizing high-power kinetic tools (TOS-2).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is to collapse the operational front (Huliaipole) while simultaneously undermining the National Command Authority (NCA) through cognitive warfare.

• Kinetic Capability: The confirmed operational deployment of the TOS-2 system provides RF with devastating, immediate fire superiority capable of rapidly clearing fortified defensive positions and inflicting massive casualties on exposed reserves.
• Strategic Intentions (Immediate):
  1. Achieve rapid operational breakthrough at Huliaipole using decisive fire support (TOS-2) NLT 272000Z.
  2. Maintain relentless, dispersed kinetic pressure on critical infrastructure (Zhytomyr power grid model) to create regional paralysis and complicate C2 during the ground offensive.
• Cognitive Intentions: RF is hardening its negotiation preconditions, asserting the non-legitimacy of current European participation and focusing critically on the "legitimacy of the Ukrainian signatory" (Gorshko, 1208Z). This weaponizes domestic stability issues (Mindichgate) to paralyze the NCA during the kinetic crisis. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift to large, multi-drone wave attacks targeting specific electrical infrastructure (24 drones on one LEO) demonstrates refinement in RF operational targeting packages, moving beyond simple attrition to systematic energy grid degradation.

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

Highly synchronized. The ground pressure (TOS-2 deployment) is perfectly paired with diplomatic signaling intended to pressure Kyiv's leadership integrity.

2.4. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain robust, supporting high-rate TOS-2 munition usage, precision drone strikes deep into Ukraine, and sustained volunteer support (1203Z).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is high but severely taxed by the multi-domain threat. The successful deep strike into Grozny (1222Z) demonstrates strategic offensive capability that must be sustained to impose cost on RF C2/logistics.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes (AD/IO): UAF Air Defense reaches 1000+ Shahed interdictions milestone (1202Z). UAF Railways (UZ) highlights resilience and development (1202Z), projecting competence.
• Setbacks (Kinetic/Infrastructure): Confirmed high-voltage line damage in Zhytomyr region (Rodomyshl). Imminent threat posed by confirmed TOS-2 deployment on the Zaporizhzhia axis.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Counter-TOS capability: Immediate fire support must be allocated to neutralize the TOS-2 threat before it can be effectively employed (R-3.1).
2. Infrastructure Resilience: Requires immediate coordination between J3/EW and energy operators to secure or provide independent power generation for C2 nodes located near potential infrastructure targets (Zhytomyr model).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is operating a complex strategic narrative:

1. Delegitimization: RF officials explicitly question the legitimacy of any future Ukrainian signatory (1208Z), creating a political time bomb for the NCA.
2. Attrition/Surrender PSYOPS: The sustained, high-volume 'Vernis Zhivym' (Return Alive) campaign (multiple 11/07-11/18 messages) reinforces demoralization by presenting surrender as the only rational choice, specifically targeting units under pressure (e.g., 102nd TDF Brigade).
3. Diplomatic Isolation: RF rejects EU participation in peace talks (1205Z), attempting to fracture Western unity.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal UAF messaging (AD milestones, HUR operations in previous report) is crucial for maintaining morale against overwhelming RF ground pressure and the psychological stress induced by deep strikes (Zhytomyr) and persistent surrender appeals. The resilience of civilian logistics (railways) is a vital counter-narrative.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Diplomatic maneuvering continues around negotiation terms. The perceived friction regarding US peace proposals (1220Z) is immediately exploited by RF IO (1212Z). The RF focus on Ukrainian signatory legitimacy (1208Z) necessitates a robust diplomatic counter-response from Kyiv's allies.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF will attempt to capitalize on the kinetic advantage (TOS-2) to achieve a decisive breakthrough in the Zaporizhzhia sector while continuing to degrade critical infrastructure outside the combat zone.

1. Huliaipole Decisive Assault (12-24H): RF forces launch the high-intensity assault utilizing TOS-2 and supporting armor NLT 272000Z. The objective is a tactical penetration that forces the commitment of UAF operational reserves intended for Donbas stabilization. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Infrastructure Degradation (24-48H): RF continues dispersed UAV strikes (Zhytomyr model) targeting high-voltage substations and transmission lines across Central and Western Ukraine, aiming to cause cascading blackouts and disrupt national logistics/mobilization efforts NLT 281200Z. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

A successful RF breakthrough at Huliaipole coinciding with a large-scale power outage across key regions (Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia) that affects regional C2 nodes, preventing timely and coordinated command direction for reserve deployment or withdrawal.

• Outcome: Operational paralysis in the face of a decisive kinetic attack, leading to the rapid loss of the Zaporizhzhia defensive line and exposure of the eastern Dnipropetrovsk administrative boundary.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: COUNTER-FIRE AND RESERVE PROTECTION (J3/FIRE COMMAND)

1. TOS-2 Neutralization (CRITICAL PRIORITY): Immediately task long-range precision fires (e.g., HIMARS, guided artillery) against suspected or confirmed TOS-2 fire positions on the Huliaipole axis. Fire missions must be executed NLT 271600Z to degrade the pre-assault kinetic shaping.
2. Huliaipole Defense Reinforcement: Deploy mobile EW platforms (P-1 EW asset type) to the Huliaipole perimeter to counter RF target acquisition drones and reduce the effectiveness of precision guided munitions preceding the armored assault.

R-2: INFRASTRUCTURE DEFENSE AND RESILIENCE (AD COMMAND/J4)

1. Prioritize Grid Protection: Re-task regional AD assets (especially SHORAD/Mobile SAMs) to prioritize the immediate defense of key high-voltage substations and energy distribution nodes near Poltava, Kharkiv, and Dnipro, utilizing the intelligence gained from the Zhytomyr target profile (24 drone wave).
2. C2 Hardening: Mandate that all operational C2 nodes switch to independent power generation (or ensure three redundant sources) immediately, moving away from reliance on regional grids until the infrastructure threat subsides.

R-3: COUNTER-HYBRID AND LEGITIMACY DEFENSE (NCA/STRATCOM)

1. Legitimacy Counter-Strike: NCA, supported by the MFA, must issue a high-level statement NLT 271500Z affirming the constitutional legitimacy and non-negotiable sovereign authority of the current government, explicitly framing the RF "signatory" demands (1208Z) as a desperate attempt to interfere in Ukraine's internal political affairs during a kinetic crisis.
2. Counter-PSYOPS: STRATCOM must launch targeted counter-messaging (e.g., UAF deep strike on Grozny, AD milestone) on frontline channels to negate the effect of the ongoing "Vernis Zhivym" campaign and reinforce internal confidence.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS