OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)
TIME: 271215Z NOV 25
SUBJECT: POST-1200Z STRIKE WINDOW ANALYSIS; ESCALATED KINETIC PRESSURE ZAPORIZHZHIA AXIS; CRITICAL PSYOP ESCALATION.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
The operational picture remains dominated by high-intensity pressure on two axes: Zaporizhzhia (Huliaipole) and the Central Donbas stabilization zone (Myrnograd/Kostiantynivka). The critical strategic strike window (NLT 1200Z) passed without confirmed massed kinetic impact, but deep reconnaissance continues.
- Zaporizhzhia Axis (HULIAIPOLE): Pressure is escalating. RF forces are confirmed operating on the borders of Huliaipole. UAF sources report RF presence near Zelenyi Hai (11:41Z), placing them at the immediate operational doorstep of the city. RF propaganda is simultaneously amplifying reports of UAF tactical flight (11:36Z), indicating a coordinated cognitive/kinetic effort to break the defensive perimeter.
- Central Donbas (KOSTIANTYNIVKA): RF claimed the capture of Vasyukivka (11:39Z, confirmed by RF sources). Vasyukivka is located north of Bakhmut, placing RF forces in a position to exert increased operational pressure toward Siversk and the northern approaches of Kostiantynivka. RF forces also report successful sniper and fire missions neutralizing UAF rotation groups near Kostiantynivka proper (11:56Z).
- Deep Rear: UAF Air Force confirms continued UAV activity (Shahed-type) moving south along the Kharkiv/Poltava boundary (11:46Z). This is a critical indicator that strategic targeting and reconnaissance have not ceased post-1200Z.
FACT: RF forces (Southern Grouping) claim capture of Vasyukivka, Donetsk Oblast. (Source: Colonelcassad, 11:39Z)
FACT: UAF Air Force tracks UAV inbound/reconnaissance over Kharkiv/Poltava border. (Source: UAF AF, 11:46Z)
JUDGMENT: RF has successfully retained initiative in the Donbas while creating an acute operational crisis at Huliaipole. The failure to execute the strategic strike at 1200Z likely indicates a tactical delay or re-tasking, not an abandonment of the capability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Clear, cold conditions persist, continuing to favor RF ISR and UAV operations, particularly the reported deep penetration drone (11:46Z).
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
UAF forces are in a maximal alert posture but must now transition from anticipating the immediate 1200Z strike to defending against a protracted, high-intensity push across two main axes. Priority control measures must shift from AD focus to ground maneuver support, particularly EW protection for the exposed Huliaipole reserves.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
RF objectives are achieving operational depth, consolidating recent gains, and maximizing cognitive destabilization.
- Kinetic Capability: RF maintains full capability for a strategic deep strike, now assessed as delayed (not canceled). They also possess the immediate capacity to launch a massed armor/infantry assault against the vulnerable Huliaipole line.
- Strategic Intentions (Immediate):
- Maximize pressure on the Huliaipole sector to force the tactical consumption of UAF strategic reserves.
- Solidify control over Myrnograd/Pokrovsk breach and extend pressure toward Kostiantynivka via new flanking maneuvers (Vasyukivka).
- Continue deep reconnaissance (Poltava/Kharkiv UAVs) to set conditions for a delayed strategic strike.
- Cognitive Intentions: RF is escalating the anti-corruption (Mindichgate) narrative by introducing highly inflammatory, anti-Semitic tropes (11:44Z), aiming to radicalize domestic political instability and completely undermine international confidence in Kyiv's institutional legitimacy. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
The confirmed RF presence at Vasyukivka suggests RF is applying flanking pressure on the Kostiantynivka defense line from the north/east, forcing UAF to commit assets intended for stabilizing the Myrnograd retreat.
2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 remains synchronized, evidenced by the coordinated release of PSYOPs (Huliaipole panic, corruption escalation) aligned precisely with kinetic advances. The reported development of advanced surveillance platforms ("neuro-drone pigeon," 11:47Z) suggests continued long-term investment in technological superiority and ISR capability.
2.4. Logistics and Sustainment Status
No indicators of logistics strain. The RF continues high-rate FAB and precision munition usage, supporting sustained pressure across multiple fronts.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Readiness level is critical. The successful tactical stabilization at Huliaipole (reported 11:35Z) is now being immediately challenged by escalating RF ground forces approaching the city limits. The successful action of the HUR MO on the Zaporizhzhia direction (11:50Z) is positive but highlights the reliance on specialized units for reconnaissance and high-value targeting.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
- Setback (Kinetic): Confirmed RF pressure near Zelenyi Hai and Huliaipole borders. RF claim of Vasyukivka capture creates a new tactical threat vector towards Kostiantynivka.
- Setback (Cognitive/Legal): Allegations of war crimes (execution of POWs near Zelenyi Hai, 11:41Z) are high-risk information that will be immediately exploited by RF IO, requiring a rapid, high-integrity UAF response.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
- Huliaipole AD/EW: The reserves committed to Huliaipole are highly exposed. They require immediate, sustained mobile AD and EW cover to prevent catastrophic attrition from precision strikes and UAV surveillance (11:46Z activity suggests C2 targeting is ongoing).
- Kostiantynivka Reinforcement: Intelligence must confirm the operational threat posed by the Vasyukivka advance. If confirmed, immediate consideration for tactical reinforcement or creation of a new defensive buffer around Kostiantynivka's northern flank is required.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF messaging is focused on shattering the UAF internal and external support pillars:
- Internal Chaos: RF has escalated "Mindichgate" PSYOPS, weaving corruption allegations with inflammatory anti-Semitic narratives (11:44Z) to discredit the entire government structure and foster internal conflict during kinetic crisis.
- Military Defeat: Using voices like the former UAF General Marchenko (11:56Z) to predict strategic loss (Kherson/Mykolaiv) is designed to erode the will to fight among frontline troops and critical population centers.
- Western Commitment: France's voluntary service announcement (11:36Z) is framed by RF as a forced measure, signaling long-term European decline.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
UAF counter-messaging (UZ rail improvements, 11:47Z; HUR MO operations video, 11:50Z) attempts to project competence and resilience. However, the simultaneous pressure from battlefield losses, POW execution allegations, and internal corruption scandals represents a massive strain on civil-military relations and future mobilization efforts.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
Turkey has clarified conditions for potential military deployment (ceasefire required, 11:52Z), reducing the immediate political flexibility of international partners. France’s move toward national voluntary service is a long-term indicator of commitment to capacity building but does not provide immediate tactical relief.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)
RF will sustain simultaneous kinetic pressure on Huliaipole and the Myrnograd/Kostiantynivka stabilization zone, leveraging the strategic strike capacity as an operational reserve.
- Huliaipole Operational Penetration (12-24H): RF forces (Vostok Grouping) initiate a full-scale assault on Huliaipole defenses, aiming to breach the perimeter NLT 272000Z NOV 25. This aims to force the irreversible commitment of UAF reserves. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Delayed Strategic Strike (24-48H): RF uses the deep reconnaissance UAV track (11:46Z) to refine C2/Logistics targets. They execute the postponed strategic strike NLT 281200Z NOV 25, when UAF AD is expected to be stood down or redeployed. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Kostiantynivka Flanking: RF exploits the Vasyukivka position to intensify stand-off fires and reconnaissance-in-force missions against the northern approaches to Kostiantynivka. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)
A rapid, successful RF breakthrough at Huliaipole coinciding with a successful, delayed strategic strike (281200Z) that degrades UAF C2 across the operational theater.
- Outcome: The MDCOA creates a decisive operational dilemma: UAF command would be simultaneously unable to coordinate the withdrawal of forces from the compromised Huliaipole sector and unable to authorize the commitment of strategic reserves to prevent the Donbas operational collapse.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
| Event | Estimated Timeline (NLT) | Confidence | Status/Action Required |
|---|
| Huliaipole Perimeter Breach | 272000Z | HIGH | CRITICAL: J3 must pre-authorize tactical withdrawal paths and establish clear fire control zones west of the city. Requires immediate verification of Zelenyi Hai RF disposition. |
| Strategic Strike Refined Targeting | 271800Z | MEDIUM | J2 must track and neutralize the deep penetration UAV threat (11:46Z). If neutralization fails, C2 nodes must maintain dispersal and emission control protocols. |
| Myrnograd/Kostiantynivka Stabilization | 280600Z | HIGH | J3 must confirm that UAF defensive lines west of Myrnograd are hardened and that the Vasyukivka threat is contained or addressed by local reserves. |
6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
R-1: C2 SURVIVAL AND AD POSTURE (J3/AD COMMAND)
- Immediate AD Re-tasking: AD units stood down from the 1200Z threat must be immediately re-tasked to high-alert status covering mobile reserve assembly areas and the exposed Huliaipole sector.
- Target UAV Neutralization: ISR/EW assets must prioritize the tracking and destruction of the UAV sighted near Poltava/Kharkiv (11:46Z) to disrupt the refinement of the delayed strategic strike targeting package. (Priority: Kill Chain disruption).
R-2: HULIAIPOLE STABILIZATION AND FORCE PROTECTION (FRONT COMMAND/EW)
- Verify Zelenyi Hai/Huliaipole Proximity: J2 must gain immediate IMINT/SIGINT confirmation of the precise location and composition of RF forces near Zelenyi Hai to inform the defensive posture and rules of engagement (ROE) for Huliaipole.
- Address War Crimes Allegations (CRITICAL): STRATCOM and Legal Counsel must issue a swift, transparent, and international statement regarding the alleged POW executions (11:41Z) in Zelenyi Hai, initiating an immediate investigation to pre-empt RF exploitation and preserve the moral high ground.
R-3: COUNTER-HYBRID OPERATIONS (STRATCOM/NCA)
- Aggressive Counter-Propaganda: NCA must utilize all channels to immediately and unequivocally condemn the escalated anti-Semitic component of the RF corruption PSYOPS (11:44Z), framing it as an act of desperation designed to fracture internal unity during a military crisis.
- Exploit Turkish Diplomacy: STRATCOM should immediately amplify the Turkish condition for a ceasefire (11:52Z) to European capitals, pressuring partners to support increased military aid as the only viable path to create a favorable negotiation/ceasefire position.
7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gap/Requirement | Confidence | Tasking Rationale |
|---|
| 1 (CRITICAL) | IMINT/SIGINT verification of RF presence and strength at Zelenyi Hai and immediate Huliaipole approaches. | HIGH | Required to determine the holding capacity of the reinforced line and inform R-2.1/R-5.1. |
| 2 (HIGH) | Confirmation of RF operational control and defensive posture in Vasyukivka. | MEDIUM | Required to assess the immediate threat to Kostiantynivka and inform reserve allocation (R-3.2). |
| 3 (HIGH) | SIGINT/ELINT tracking of RF strategic missile platforms/AD readiness (GRAU) following the 1200Z window. | HIGH | Required to predict the timing and targeting of the highly likely delayed strategic strike (R-1.2, R-5.1). |
| 4 (MEDIUM) | Verification of RF force movement (e.g., Mobile Groups) westward from Myrnograd toward secondary objectives on the administrative border. | MEDIUM | Required to provide early warning of the next phase of Donbas exploitation. |