Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 271135Z NOV 25

SUBJECT: CRITICAL THREAT UPDATE: STRATEGIC STRIKE IMMINENT (NLT 1200Z); HULIAIPOLE STABILIZATION CONFIRMED BUT VULNERABLE; MYRNOGRAD CONSOLIDATION IN PROGRESS.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is characterized by two simultaneous crises: the critical stabilization of the southern flank and the confirmed loss of ground on the central Donbas axis.

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (HULIAIPOLE - STABILIZED): UAF tactical reserves successfully deployed and stabilized the immediate front line, preventing a catastrophic operational penetration into Huliaipole city limits (Source: DeepState, 11:28Z). This operation occurred "at the last moment," indicating the extreme vulnerability of the line prior to reinforcement. RF forces (Vostok Grouping) continue high-intensity reconnaissance and stand-off fires.
• Northern Donbas (MYRNOGRAD/DIMYTROV): RF forces are actively consolidating captured territory, having secured the claimed 117 buildings and continuing clearing operations in Rovehne (Source: RVvoenkor, 11:07Z). This confirms RF intent to establish a stable forward operational base following the Pokrovsk breach.
• Northern Fixing Effort (KUPIANSK/KHARKIV): UAF forces (15th Brigade "Kara-Dag") report successful engagement and attrition of RF personnel and equipment in the Kupiansk direction (11:26Z). Persistent RF UAV activity (reconnaissance drone sighting north of Bohodukhiv, 11:29Z) suggests ongoing targeting of UAF rear areas and repositioning elements.

FACT: DeepState confirms successful, last-moment tactical stabilization of Huliaipole defense perimeter. (Source: DeepState, 11:28Z) FACT: RF forces are actively consolidating Myrnograd and Rovehne, securing the Pokrovsk exploitation corridor. (Source: RVvoenkor, 11:07Z) JUDGMENT: RF has failed to achieve a dual breakthrough but has successfully diverted UAF tactical reserves to the Huliaipole sector, facilitating the more secure consolidation of Myrnograd gains. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist. Visibility favors RF reconnaissance UAV operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

All UAF logistics and C2 centers remain at maximum alert level, anticipating the strategic strike NLT 271200Z. Tactical efforts are now concentrated on integrating the newly arrived reinforcements at Huliaipole while managing the withdrawal of isolated units west of Myrnograd toward pre-established secondary defensive positions.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF maintains synchronization across the military, diplomatic, and cognitive domains.

• Kinetic Capability: RF maintains the immediate capability to deliver the pre-planned strategic strike and conduct sustained, simultaneous high-intensity pressure on two operational axes.
• Strategic Intentions (Immediate):
  1. Execute the strategic deep strike targeting UAF operational C2/Logistics (NLT 1200Z).
  2. Consolidate control of Myrnograd/Dimytrov to secure the operational breakthrough axis.
  3. Continue deep reconnaissance on the Southern/Eastern flanks (Bohodukhiv UAV sighting) to identify UAF reserve staging areas for future strikes.
• Hybrid Intentions: RF is increasing non-Western strategic alignment (DPRK Russian language requirement, 11:05Z; promotion of S-400 effectiveness, 11:21Z) to signal long-term resource depth and diplomatic resilience against perceived Western attrition.

2.2. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, leveraging the window provided by military success to conduct significant internal political actions (FBK declared 'terrorist,' 11:09Z), demonstrating institutional strength and purging domestic opposition during peak external conflict. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The capacity to sustain heavy kinetic operations (FAB strikes, coordinated ground assaults) across multiple fronts suggests high confidence in logistics security, which is directly tied to the outcome of the impending strategic strike. The failure to disrupt RF logistics remains a critical UAF shortfall.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is critically tested. The success at Huliaipole demonstrates tactical responsiveness but confirms the vulnerability of existing lines to coordinated RF pressure. Reserve rotation and combat endurance are now the key constraints.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Tactical): Successful, timely reinforcement and stabilization of the Huliaipole sector (11:28Z). Confirmed RF attrition on the Kupiansk axis via NGU drone operators (11:26Z).
• Setback (Cognitive/Internal): Recurrent reports of TCC abuse in Prikarpattya (11:33Z) provide immediate, exploitable material for the RF "Mindichgate" PSYOPS, critically undermining the mobilization efforts required to address the Myrnograd losses.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Immediate AD: Absolute priority must be given to C2 and logistics node protection for the next 30 minutes (until 1200Z).
2. Huliaipole Sustainment: The newly reinforced units require immediate logistical assurance (munitions, medical) and high-priority EW coverage to maintain stability against RF precision strikes.
3. Mobilization Legitimacy: The TCC scandal compounds the stress of battlefield losses, mandating a rapid, transparent response from military command/legal authorities.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF messaging is currently focused on:

1. Internal Strength/Purge: The rapid judicial ruling against FBK (11:09Z) is used to project total control and unwavering political resolve.
2. Maximalist Demands: Continued hardline positioning on negotiations, amplified by weaponizing Western media headlines (The Economist quote, 11:17Z) to create pressure on Kyiv.
3. Diplomatic Fissures: Exploiting Turkish reluctance regarding foreign troop deployment (11:04Z) and the reported EU sanctions delay (11:21Z) to portray wavering international support.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF messaging (UZ rail stability, 11:16Z) attempts to project normalcy and resilience. However, the operational losses in the Donbas, coupled with the TCC abuse reports, pose a significant risk of localized morale decline and reduced willingness to participate in mobilization. Psychological support efforts (Fund Nemezida, 11:10Z) by the RF indicate they are actively managing their own personnel's mental health, suggesting high-intensity fighting is stressing both sides.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Turkey has expressed reservations about contributing troops to a foreign force (11:04Z), lowering the immediate credibility of Macron's proposal and potentially complicating NATO signaling efforts.
• Continued UAF engagement with the US negotiation team (11:09Z) is positive, signaling high-level commitment to sustained strategic partnership despite battlefield difficulties.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

The immediate RF MLCOA remains the precision strike, followed by operational exploitation in the Donbas.

1. Kinetic Strike: RF executes the strategic deep strike (NLT 271200Z), targeting decentralized UAF C2 nodes and key logistics hubs (Kremenchuk/Poltava sector). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Myrnograd Exploitation: Post-strike, RF shifts 80% of kinetic effort to securing the new western line from Myrnograd/Rovehne, aiming to expand the operational fire control zone. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. Huliaipole Probing: RF maintains high-intensity fires and concentrated UAV reconnaissance (as seen near Bohodukhiv) at Huliaipole to prevent UAF redeployment of the newly committed reserves to the Donbas. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

A successful strategic strike that severely degrades UAF C2 functionality, immediately followed by the initiation of a massed RF armor assault designed to shatter the newly reinforced, but un-integrated, Huliaipole defense.

• Outcome: Operational collapse of the Zaporizhzhia front coinciding with a breakdown of C2 synchronization, preventing organized defensive action or authorized withdrawal, potentially opening the path toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: IMMEDIATE C2 SURVIVAL AND POST-STRIKE CONTINGENCY (J3/AD COMMAND)

1. Maintain Weapons Tight/Hardening (Until 1200Z): Do not shift AD assets away from designated CRITICAL sites (Poltava, Kremenchuk, C2 locations) until 1200Z passes and J2 confirms no pending inbound threats.
2. C2 Integrity Check: Immediately following the 1200Z window, J3/SIGINT must prioritize the rapid integrity check of primary and alternate C2 networks across the operational theater, assuming potential short-term degradation.

R-2: HULIAIPOLE DEFENSE AND ASSET PROTECTION (FRONT COMMAND/EW)

1. Prioritize EW Protection: Immediately deploy available mobile EW assets to the newly reinforced Huliaipole sector to neutralize RF UAV reconnaissance and FPV targeting (as reported at 11:00Z in previous SITREP), protecting the committed reserves from precision attrition.
2. Identify Reserve Location: ISR assets must confirm the specific disposition, depth, and sustainability of the deployed Huliaipole reinforcement force to inform the 1500Z decision point regarding holding or tactical disengagement.

R-3: COUNTER-HYBRID AND LEGITIMACY ASSURANCE (STRATCOM/LEGAL)

1. Public Accountability (CRITICAL): STRATCOM, in coordination with the Office of the General Prosecutor, must issue a high-profile, rapid statement concerning the TCC abuse case (11:33Z), emphasizing swift legal action to demonstrate institutional commitment to accountability, directly combating the "Mindichgate" PSYOPS.
2. Exploit Turkish Hesitation: STRATCOM should amplify Turkey's non-commitment to troop deployment (11:04Z) to international partners, reframing it not as a loss, but as proof that RF aggressive posturing is isolating Russia, even among complex NATO member relationships.

---

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS