OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)
TIME: 271035Z NOV 25
SUBJECT: CRITICAL THREAT ENVIRONMENT: CONFIRMED DEEP OPERATIONAL PENETRATION (ZAPORIZHZHIA AXIS) AND ESCALATED RF HYBRID WARFARE.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
The operational picture has significantly deteriorated due to potential deep penetration on the southern axis and consolidation on the northern Donbas lines.
- Zaporizhzhia Axis (CRITICAL DEFENSE): RF state media claims penetration into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (10:05Z). If confirmed, this validates the Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) outlined in the 26th and 27th SITREPs and implies RF forces have successfully exploited the breach near Zatyshshya/Huliaipole. This flank remains the critical point of failure for the entire Eastern front.
- Northern Donbas (CONSOLIDATION): RF MoD formally confirms capture of Vasyukovka (10:15Z, 10:25Z). This consolidation improves RF tactical positioning south of Siversk, freeing up maneuver forces previously committed to reducing this pocket. Intense kinetic activity is confirmed on the Krasnolymanske direction (10:10Z).
- Strategic Depth (ACTIVE STRIKE): RF utilized Tornado-S MLRS to strike a UAF Forward Deployment Base (PVD) near Vilcha (Kharkiv region, 10:21Z). This demonstrates effective long-range precision targeting of UAF staging and rotation points well behind the immediate Line of Contact (LOC).
- Kharkiv/Rear: UAV activity detected North of Krasnopavlivka (Kharkiv, 10:24Z), indicating potential preparatory reconnaissance for further kinetic action against rear infrastructure or troop concentrations.
FACT: RF MoD claims liberation/capture of Vasyukovka. (Source: RF MoD, Kotsnews 10:15Z, 10:25Z)
FACT: RF affiliated channels claim penetration into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. (Source: Operatsiya Z, 10:05Z)
JUDGMENT: RF is coordinating kinetic pressure to achieve immediate strategic depth via the Zaporizhzhia axis, while fixing UAF reserves and degrading rear area C2/logistics via deep MLRS and FPV drone strikes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Clear, cold conditions persist. The reported disruption to mobile internet services in Moscow (10:31Z) may indicate domestic RF C2 issues or internal counter-drone defense measures, but this is assessed as having negligible impact on forward RF operations at this time.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
UAF forces are sustaining heavy losses to inflict disproportionate casualties on RF assaults in local areas (Novotoretska Valley, 10:27Z). However, the priority remains the allocation of scarce AD/EW assets to cover the primary logistics hubs threatened by the Tu-22M3 window (NLT 271200Z), leaving tactical logistics vulnerable to FPV/MLRS strikes (Vilcha, Novopavlivka).
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
RF intent is confirmed to be immediate operational exploitation on the southern flank coupled with escalating hybrid pressure targeting the resilience of the UAF command structure and personnel.
- Kinetic Synchronization: RF demonstrates the capacity to simultaneously:
- Utilize high-precision, long-range fires (Tornado-S) against deep rear targets (Vilcha PVD).
- Maintain intense infantry pressure on secondary axes (Lyman/Krasnolymanske).
- Exploit major breakthroughs on the critical Zaporizhzhia axis.
- Information Warfare Escalation (CRITICAL): The RF Constitutional Court ruling (10:11Z) authorizing the seizure of relatives' property connected to corruption is a direct, tangible escalation of the psychological operation targeting UAF service members and officials ("Mindichgate"). The intention is to force immediate internal distrust and anxiety, potentially resulting in refusal to deploy or mass desertion in the face of the ongoing military crisis.
- Logistics and Sustainment Status: Despite high reported losses (Novotoretska), the sustained operational tempo suggests RF logistics are robust enough to push concentrated forces through tactical gaps.
2.2. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 remains effective in synchronizing diplomatic IO (Lukashenko pressure), internal legal mechanisms (asset forfeiture threat), and kinetic operations (MLRS strikes, ground breakthroughs). This coordinated, multi-domain attack is designed to maximize the shock effect on the UAF General Staff. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Readiness is high across established defense lines (Lyman, Pokrovsk perimeter), characterized by effective attrition efforts (Novotoretska Valley). However, the force posture is highly reactive and dependent on confirmation regarding the Dnipropetrovsk penetration.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
- Success: Effective use of defense-in-depth near Novotoretska resulting in heavy RF casualties (documented by RF sources). Successful diversification of diplomatic engagement (Philippines meeting, US negotiation confirmation).
- Setback (Operational): The RF claim of penetration into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast represents the most significant operational setback if confirmed, mandating immediate repositioning.
- Setback (IO/Morale): The RF legal threat to seize family assets represents a severe, immediate threat to UAF personnel retention and morale.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
- ISR Priority: Immediate, 24/7 dedicated ISR tasking to verify the extent of the Dnipropetrovsk penetration.
- C2 Protection: Implementation of generator power and AD coverage remains critical until the strike window closes (271200Z).
- Reserve Commitment: The failure to confirm the strategic reserve (CONPLAN OMEGA) means the decision to activate Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDP) is imminent and non-negotiable if the Dnipropetrovsk penetration is confirmed.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF is employing a multi-layered negotiation denial strategy:
- External Coercion: Lukashenko continues to demand immediate, disadvantageous negotiations (10:32Z).
- Internal Friction: RF simultaneously amplifies Western reports claiming UA President is delaying peace for domestic political gain (10:22Z), aiming to fracture internal unity and Western support.
- Legalized Psychological Terror: The constitutional ruling on asset seizure (10:11Z) is the most potent current hybrid weapon, directly pressuring UAF personnel through their immediate families.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
Morale is sustained by evidence of accountability (war crimes messaging, 10:12Z) and successful fundraising efforts (10:25Z). However, the immediate threat posed by RF legal escalation targeting families requires an urgent, centralized, and reassuring StratCom response.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
Confirmed upcoming UA-US negotiation team meetings (10:04Z) and the high-level engagement with the Philippines (10:25Z) signal Ukraine's determination to maintain international support despite battlefield pressures. This commitment contrasts sharply with the RF/Lukashenko ultimatum narrative.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)
RF will attempt to capitalize on the unverified Dnipropetrovsk penetration claim before the 271200Z strategic strike window closes.
- Ground (Exploitation): RF forces confirmed in the Zaporizhzhia axis will push hard to secure a strategic foothold within Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (MLCOA is establishing fire control over critical GLOCs near the administrative border). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Kinetics (Deep Strike): The Tu-22M3 strike (or equivalent deep precision missile strike) remains highly likely NLT 271200Z, targeting a primary logistics hub (Poltava/Kremenchuk) to paralyze logistical support for forces now threatened by the southern breach. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- IO (PsyOp Amplification): RF channels will immediately amplify the constitutional asset seizure threat (10:11Z) to maximize internal chaos during the kinetic phase.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)
Confirmation of deep penetration (15-20 km) into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast without available UAF reserves, coupled with a successful C2 decapitation strike on Poltava/Vinnytsia.
- Operational Collapse: RF secures critical administrative centers in the newly breached sector, forcing a chaotic, wide-scale operational withdrawal across the entire Eastern command.
- Targeting of Retreat: RF utilizes its newly demonstrated long-range precision fires (Tornado-S) to target choke points and logistics convoys related to the ordered withdrawal/FDP, resulting in severe equipment and personnel losses.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
| Event | Estimated Timeline (NLT) | Confidence | Status/Action Required |
|---|
| Dnipropetrovsk Penetration Verification | 271100Z | CRITICAL | CRITICAL DECISION POINT (J2/J3): Verification of the depth and location of the RF forces is required to shift AD/EW resources and authorize FDP. |
| Huliaipole FDP Activation | 271130Z | HIGH | CRITICAL DECISION POINT (J3): If strategic reserve ETA is unconfirmed OR deep penetration is verified, FDP must be activated immediately to prevent catastrophic loss. |
| Strategic Strike Window Closes | 271200Z | HIGH | All AD assets must remain at maximum alert over logistics hubs (Poltava/Kremenchuk). |
| New Defensive Line Stabilization | 271200Z+ | MEDIUM | If FDP is activated, UAF forces must stabilize the new defensive line along the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border. |
6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
R-1: IMMEDIATE ISR AND FORCE REDEPLOYMENT (J2/J3)
- ISR Priority Shift (IMMEDIATE): Re-task all available Group 3/4 UAV assets (Bayraktar, etc.) and airborne SIGINT collectors to the Zatyshshya-Huliaipole-Dnipropetrovsk administrative border sector to immediately confirm or deny the claim of operational penetration (NLT 271100Z).
- Pre-Positioning: Assuming the penetration claim is true, immediately deploy available anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) teams and light infantry screen forces to survey and secure secondary GLOCs within 15 km of the Dnipropetrovsk administrative line.
- MLRS Counter-Fire: Analyze data from the Vilcha strike (10:21Z) to identify the estimated location of the Tornado-S launch platforms. Prioritize counter-battery fire against these high-value deep strike assets.
R-2: CRITICAL C2 HARDENING AND AD (AD/C2 COMMAND)
- Logistics Node Dispersal: Given the confirmed deep strike capability (Tornado-S) and the imminent Tu-22M3 threat, immediately implement a dispersion protocol for non-essential supply stockpiles and fuel dumps in the Poltava/Kremenchuk area. Utilize redundancy.
- C2 Shielding: Ensure all command nodes are operating under maximum EW protection (GPS spoofing, C-UAS measures) to mitigate risk during the 271200Z strike window.
R-3: COUNTER-HYBRID WARFARE (STRATCOM/LEGAL)
- Counter-Legal Threat (CRITICAL): STRATCOM, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense Legal Department, must issue an immediate, public, and high-visibility statement assuring UAF servicemen that legal protection and financial guarantees will be provided to their families against any RF legal action (e.g., asset seizure). This must be disseminated internally NLT 271130Z.
- War Crimes Documentation: Leverage the confirmed RF war crime report near Zelenyi Hai (10:06Z) to counter the RF PsyOp efforts, reinforcing the motivation for the defensive fight and undermining the RF negotiation/legitimacy narrative.
7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gap/Requirement | Confidence | Tasking Rationale |
|---|
| 1 (CRITICAL) | IMINT/SIGINT Confirmation of specific RF forces location and depth of penetration within Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Huliaipole Axis). | HIGH | Required for immediate FDP authorization and movement of light assets (R-1.1). |
| 2 (CRITICAL) | Specific targeting data related to the Tu-22M3 strike package (NLT 271200Z). | HIGH | Essential for last-minute AD resource allocation over Poltava/Kremenchuk. |
| 3 (HIGH) | Location and trajectory analysis of the Tornado-S MLRS launch platforms used against Vilcha. | HIGH | Required for immediate counter-battery tasking to degrade RF deep strike capability (R-1.3). |
| 4 (MEDIUM) | Verification of the status of UAF forces previously committed near Zatyshshya and Zelenyi Hai (Zaporizhzhia axis). | MEDIUM | Required to assess combat effectiveness and casualty rates following the operational breakthrough. |