Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 271035Z NOV 25

SUBJECT: CRITICAL THREAT ENVIRONMENT: FOCUSED ATTACK ON SOUTHERN FLANK AND LOGISTICS NODES. RF PSYOP TARGETING UAF FAMILIES.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains dominated by high-intensity RF kinetic and hybrid pressure across three primary axes (Pokrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Strategic Rear).

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (CRITICAL): GSZSU confirms intense fighting near Zatyshshya and Huliaipole (09:43Z). This confirms the criticality of the southern flank breach identified in previous reporting and reinforces the threat to the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border.
• Pokrovsk Axis (HIGH INTENSITY): RF MoD claims capture of Vasyukovka (previously reported), and GSZSU confirms active clashes along the Pokrovsk perimeter (Volodymyrivka, Rodynske) (09:42Z). Confirmed FPV drone strike near Novopavlivka (10:00Z) indicates RF is systematically targeting UAF logistics and rotation efforts west of the main line of contact.
• Strategic Depth (ACTIVE KINETICS): UAV activity confirmed in Eastern Dnipropetrovsk, tracking toward Donetsk (09:48Z). This trajectory places key logistics nodes near Poltava/Kremenchuk at continued risk in conjunction with the existing Tu-22M3 threat (NLT 271200Z). Widespread power outages (Sumy, Poltava, Kharkiv) remain critical constraints.

FACT: GSZSU reports intense fighting near Zatyshshya and Huliaipole (Zaporizhzhia Oblast). (Source: GSZSU, 09:43Z) FACT: FPV drone strike confirmed against UAF logistics near Novopavlivka (Pokrovsk direction). (Source: DPR Militia/Visual, 10:00Z) JUDGMENT: RF ground forces are successfully isolating UAF units near the Pokrovsk-Dimitrov line while exploiting the Huliaipole area to force UAF reserve commitment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist. The combination of confirmed widespread power outages and active UAV/strategic missile warnings creates a complex, high-risk operational environment for C2, necessitating maximum generator uptime and hardened satellite communications.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are stabilizing the Northern border, successfully repelling two RF assaults in the Sumy direction (09:43Z), demonstrating strong local defensive readiness. However, AD prioritization remains heavily focused on neutralizing the imminent deep strike threat, drawing resources away from tactical drone defense and logistics protection in the operational rear.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is clear: synchronize strategic decapitation strikes with tactical breakthroughs to force UAF strategic disarray.

• Air/Drone Warfare: RF demonstrates a high tempo of FAB strikes across the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk forward areas. The successful FPV strike near Novopavlivka indicates highly localized, effective targeting of small-scale UAF logistics and rotation, aimed at causing operational friction.
• Strategic Messaging: RF continues to signal unwavering national capacity (Soyuz launch, MS-21 aircraft testing) while Belarus applies intense psychological pressure, specifically threatening the loss of Odesa and Mykolaiv to force negotiations (Lukashenko, 09:47Z).
• Logistics and Sustainment: While logistics appear robust enough to support multiple offensive axes, internal morale issues regarding personnel losses (09:42Z, personal testimony) persist and represent a vulnerability if exploited by UAF StratCom.

2.2. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF maintains effective synchronization between political pressure (Lukashenko), strategic IO (targeting UAF families), and kinetic activity (FAB strikes, Tu-22M3 threat). This multi-domain coordination is designed to overload UAF C2 capacity during this critical defensive phase.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are defensively committed along the Eastern contact line, executing successful delay and containment operations (Sumy, Lyman, Kupyansk). Readiness is high, but the overall strategic defense remains fragile due to the critical exposure of the Huliaipole flank and the strain on strategic AD resources.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Institutional Resilience): The Prosecutor General's announcement of a major anti-corruption case completion (10:00Z) effectively counters RF IO (e.g., "Mindichgate") aimed at delegitimizing UAF leadership.
• Setback (Logistics Exposure): The confirmed FPV drone strike near Novopavlivka highlights the critical vulnerability of light logistics and rotation movements to RF short-range drone assets on the Pokrovsk axis.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Tactical Logistics Protection: Immediate need for short-range anti-drone/EW defense assets to protect logistics convoys and rotation points in the Pokrovsk operational area.
2. C2 Resilience: Generator deployment to Poltava/Sumy remains the top priority (R-1 in previous report).
3. Strategic Reserves: Absence remains the principal constraint against the Huliaipole MDCOA.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF hybrid operations are escalating in specificity:

1. Negotiation Ultimatum: Lukashenko's public threat to Odesa/Mykolaiv is designed to force immediate, desperate negotiations by Ukraine, undermining long-term US/UA diplomatic planning (Sybiha statement).
2. Internal Dissolution (Psychological Warfare): RF channels are explicitly targeting the relatives of UAF servicemen (09:04Z), attempting to generate anxiety, distrust, and internal pressure on soldiers to desert or question orders.
3. Western Friction: Hungarian statements criticizing EU energy policy are amplified by TASS (09:34Z) to signal fracturing Western unity ahead of key military support decisions.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF StratCom has achieved a success by counter-programming RF corruption narratives with real anti-corruption action (Prosecutor General). Morale is sustained by evidence of continued defensive struggle and documenting RF atrocities (Ternopil casualty, 09:35Z).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Ukrainian officials confirm planned discussions with the US regarding steps toward a "just peace" (09:45Z). This suggests ongoing commitment but may be viewed by RF as a weakness to exploit via the Lukashenko ultimatum.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF will attempt to capitalize on the existing power outages and the active strike window (NLT 271200Z).

• Kinetics (Immediate): The Tu-22M3 sortie will launch its strike, highly likely targeting a primary Poltava/Kremenchuk logistics hub to exploit the existing power crisis. This will be preceded or accompanied by the confirmed UAV movement (Eastern Dnipropetrovsk) as a suppression or decoy effort. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Ground (Tactical Consolidation): RF forces will increase FPV drone surveillance and strikes against UAF rotation and supply lines near Novopavlivka and Pokrovsk to complete the encirclement/expulsion of forward UAF units. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• IO (Coercion): RF channels will amplify the Lukashenko threats and continue the psychological operation targeting UAF families until the strike window closes.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

Successful kinetic strike on the logistics hub resulting in C2 blackout, coupled with an operational breakthrough on the Zaporizhzhia axis.

• Breakthrough: RF ground units, leveraging air support (FABs) and the lack of UAF reserves, execute a successful exploitation maneuver past Zatyshshya (Huliaipole area) into the operational depth of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. This forces a rapid, disorganized UAF retreat across the southern sector. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Logistics Collapse: Simultaneous loss of the primary logistics node (Poltava/Kremenchuk) due to the Tu-22M3 strike paralyzes resupply, making continued defense impossible across the entire Eastern operational sector.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: IMMEDIATE AD AND LOGISTICS PROTECTION (AD/LOG COMMAND)

1. Counter-UAV Tasking (IMMEDIATE): Re-task mobile EW and short-range VSHORAD assets (e.g., Manpads, Drones catchers) to cover known logistics routes and battalion rotation points west of Pokrovsk (specifically near Novopavlivka and Dimitrov) NLT 271130Z to mitigate the confirmed FPV threat.
2. C2 Hardening: Ensure all tactical C2 nodes in Poltava and Sumy are running off generator power and utilizing redundant satellite communication lines to weather the expected strategic strike and power disruption.

R-2: FORCE POSTURE AND RESERVE DECISION (J3)

1. Zaporizhzhia Flank: Prioritize movement of available light reconnaissance and anti-tank assets to the Zatyshshya-Huliaipole area to prevent further RF exploitation and buy time for a potential FDP activation (R-2.2).
2. Controlled Withdrawal Confirmation: If the strategic reserve cannot be physically confirmed en route by 271130Z, execute Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDP) at Huliaipole to prevent a catastrophic loss of forces and secure the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border.

R-3: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND COUNTER-HYBRID (STRATCOM)

1. Counter-PsyOp (CRITICAL): STRATCOM must immediately generate and disseminate counter-messaging to UAF families and servicemen addressing the RF "Voín DV" psychological operation. Reinforce confidence in command and legal support for service members.
2. Legitimacy Messaging: Amplify the successful completion of the high-profile anti-corruption case (10:00Z) through international and domestic channels to aggressively counter RF narratives of government collapse and corruption.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS