Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 271030Z NOV 25

SUBJECT: CRITICAL THREAT ENVIRONMENT: RF STRATEGIC STRIKE IMMINENT (TU-22M3). WIDESPREAD ENERGY GRID DEGRADATION IN SUPPORT REAR AREAS.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is characterized by RF kinetic pressure across three key axes: Zaporizhzhia (Main Effort), Pokrovsk (Exploitation), and the strategic depth (AD/Logistics nodes).

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (CRITICAL): RF offensive operations against Huliaipole continue. Pro-RF fundraising appeals centered on the Orekhovo sector (2709:11Z) corroborate previous reporting of intense kinetic activity aiming to secure the southern flank. The unconfirmed RF deep penetration claim into Dnipropetrovsk region (270844Z) remains the most critical intelligence gap (See Section 7).
• Pokrovsk Axis (HIGH INTENSITY): RF MoD claims the capture of Vasyukovka (2709:12Z) and 117 buildings in Dimitrov (2709:15Z). These claims suggest that following the Pokrovsk encirclement (Previous Report), RF forces are consolidating tactical gains and pushing westward against UAF delay positions. Dimitrov is a critical point on the Hryshyne-Dimitrov defensive line.
• Strategic Depth (CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE): Confirmed emergency power outages now affect Sumy, Poltava, and Kharkiv Oblasts (2709:04Z, 2709:27Z), attributed to the cumulative effect of previous RF missile and drone strikes (2709:32Z). This widespread degradation directly impacts C2 redundancy and logistics support flow to the Donbas front.

FACT: Emergency power outages confirmed in Sumy, Poltava, and Kharkiv Oblasts. (Source: Ukrenergo/Local authorities, 2709:32Z) JUDGMENT: RF aims to systematically degrade C2 and logistics resilience in the operational rear to support ground advances on the Pokrovsk and Zaporizhzhia axes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist, enabling high-altitude kinetic strikes. The confirmed energy disruption introduces significant operational friction across the command chain in Eastern and Central Ukraine.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are focused on containment at Huliaipole and implementing Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDP) west of Pokrovsk. AD prioritization is strained by the need to cover both the immediate strategic strike threat (Tu-22M3) and the expanded area of infrastructure vulnerability (Sumy/Poltava).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent remains the operational exploitation of the Zaporizhzhia breach, buttressed by strategic messaging and deep kinetic strikes designed to induce C2 paralysis.

• Deep Kinetic Strike (CRITICAL/ACTIVE): The three (3) RF Tu-22M3 bombers remain airborne (NLT 271200Z strike window). Target sets now include logistics/C2 nodes specifically vulnerable due to the recent power outages in Poltava and Sumy.
• Ground Consolidation: RF units are leveraging Spetsnaz activity (Kupyansk axis, 2709:11Z) and MoD claims (Vasyukovka/Dimitrov) to signal irreversible tactical momentum in the Donbas. The capture of Dimitrov buildings is likely a preparatory move to assault the wider Hryshyne-Dimitrov defense line.
• Strategic Capacity Signaling: Official RF and CSTO statements (2709:05Z, 2709:30Z) emphasize long-term military strengthening and improved command and control within the CSTO bloc. This is a clear signal of continued strategic intent beyond the current phase of the war.

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics demonstrate resilience, supported by continued strategic alliances (CSTO meeting). However, internal strain is visible: a pro-Russian serviceman complaint regarding wounded personnel being charged with AWOL (2709:08Z) indicates persistent systemic failure in rear area personnel management and support. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE JUDGMENT)

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF maintains effective synchronization of operations: ground advances (Dimitrov, Vasyukovka) are covered by coordinated IO campaigns, and deep strikes (Tu-22M3, infrastructure attacks) are designed to preempt UAF C2 response.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

AD readiness remains high, as evidenced by the UAF Air Force warning (2709:06Z). However, C2 redundancy in the operational rear (Poltava/Sumy) is temporarily degraded by the confirmed power outages. Force posture on the Zaporizhzhia axis is critically exposed due to the lack of a confirmed strategic reserve force.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Infrastructure): Confirmed emergency power outages across three Oblasts (Sumy, Poltava, Kharkiv) constitute a critical functional setback, demanding immediate resource reallocation for power generation and C2 node resilience.
• Success (Internal Resilience): Continued promotion of state recovery programs ("єВідновлення" in Kharkiv, "National Cashback" in Zaporizhzhia) demonstrates commitment to civil governance and counter-disinformation efforts in high-risk zones.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. C2 Power Generation: Immediate deployment of industrial-scale generators to key C2 and logistics nodes in Poltava and Sumy Oblasts (NLT 271130Z).
2. Strategic Reserves: The absence of a confirmed strategic reserve force to mitigate the Huliaipole MDCOA remains the single greatest operational constraint.
3. AD Prioritization: AD resources must prioritize Poltava—a critical logistics hub—during the Tu-22M3 strike window.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is centered on three themes: 1) Strategic Intimidation: Amplifying fears of RF missile production tempo and hinting at aggressive European cyber operations/drills (2709:04Z, 2709:06Z). 2) Normalization/De-escalation Narrative: Lukashenko’s claim that the conflict is near an end (2709:28Z) attempts to reduce Western resolve and suggest negotiation is imminent, coinciding with battlefield gains. 3) Alliance Strength: Highlighting CSTO military cohesion (2709:30Z) and cultural alignment (DPRK language program, 2709:26Z).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF StratCom is effectively utilizing documentation of RF war crimes (Kharkiv Prosecutor's Office, 2709:26Z) to maintain domestic resolve. Public sentiment is generally sustained by resilience messaging and continued citizen fundraising, but the widespread power outages may introduce localized friction points.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Geopolitical signals indicate increased Western consideration of proactive measures against RF hybrid operations (cyber, border drills). The economic support provided by the EC to Baltic states (2709:06Z) confirms continued Western commitment to resisting RF destabilization, even if sanctions carry a cost.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF will execute the deep kinetic strike NLT 271200Z, specifically targeting logistics and energy transmission infrastructure in the Poltava/Kremenchuk area to maximize the effect of current power failures. On the ground, RF forces will continue local tactical consolidation around Dimitrov and maintain high-tempo pressure on Huliaipole to force the deployment of remaining UAF reserves. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

The strategic AD net fails to neutralize the Tu-22M3 strike, resulting in a successful kinetic impact on a critical Poltava/Dnipro logistics or C2 hub, compounded by the existing power failures. Simultaneously, the lack of strategic reserves allows RF forces to achieve a confirmed operational breakthrough and exploitation maneuver past Huliaipole into the Dnipropetrovsk region, forcing a strategic retreat across the entire southern front. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: IMMEDIATE C2 AND LOGISTICS RESILIENCE (J3 / LOG COMMAND)

1. Power Redundancy: Prioritize the deployment of high-capacity mobile power units and emergency satellite communications systems to all C2 nodes (Brigade and above) and critical logistics hubs in Poltava and Sumy Oblasts NLT 271130Z to mitigate the confirmed infrastructure damage.
2. AD Over Poltava: Focus AD resources (PATRIOT/NASAMS) over Poltava and Kremenchuk to ensure protection of key logistics chokepoints during the active Tu-22M3 window. Deploy short-range systems to defend generator sites against secondary drone strikes.

R-2: CRITICAL FORCE MANAGEMENT (J3)

1. Huliaipole Withdrawal Protocol: If J3 cannot physically confirm the ETA of the strategic reserve force (CONPLAN OMEGA equivalent) NLT 271100Z, activate the controlled withdrawal (FDP) of Huliaipole forward elements to previously surveyed defensive lines to prevent encirclement and operational collapse.
2. Dimitrov Assessment: Deploy high-rate ISR assets (UAV/SATCOM) to assess the extent of RF gains in Dimitrov and Vasyukovka immediately to determine the required adjustment of the Hryshyne-Dimitrov defense perimeter.

R-3: COUNTER-IO AND GEOPOLITICAL RESPONSE (STRATCOM)

1. Expose RF IO Synchronization: STRATCOM must immediately issue messaging highlighting the deliberate synchronization between RF ground claims (Dimitrov/Vasyukovka) and strategic strikes (power outages/Tu-22M3 threat) to portray RF action as systematic warfare against civilians and infrastructure.
2. Amplify Resilience: Utilize the confirmed successful operation of 'eRecovery' and 'National Cashback' programs in war-affected regions (Kharkiv/Zaporizhzhia) to counter RF IO narratives promoting government collapse or internal chaos.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS