Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 271000Z NOV 25

SUBJECT: CRITICAL THREAT ENVIRONMENT: RF DEEP PENETRATION SIGNALED ON ZAPORIZHZHIA AXIS. IMMINENT STRATEGIC STRIKE THREAT (TU-22M3).

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational situation remains defined by high kinetic intensity on the Zaporizhzhia axis and consolidation on the Pokrovsk axis. The primary center of gravity (COG) remains the Huliaipole defense line.

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (CRITICAL): RF offensive operations against Huliaipole continue, supported by heavy air-delivered ordnance (KAB/FAB). RF state media (RT correspondent) claims a successful deep penetration into Dnipropetrovsk region (270844Z). While unconfirmed by UAF BDA, this signals an aggressive RF intent to bypass the Southern Defense Line depth and exploit the operational breach towards the Dnipro River axis. (HIGH CONFIDENCE JUDGMENT)
• Pokrovsk Axis: RF forces are solidifying recent gains west of the Pokrovsk Railway Station, preparing for follow-on exploitation towards the Hryshyne-Dimitrov defensive line. Controlled UAF delay operations are in effect.
• Northern Axes (Fixation): Confirmed kinetic strikes by RF forces continue against Kharkiv Oblast (270837Z) and Sumy Region (270845Z fatality), forcing UAF AD allocation away from the critical southern sectors.
• UAF Deep Strike: UAF maintains strike tempo; Drone threat warning issued in Bryansk Oblast, RF (270900Z).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist, favoring high-altitude kinetic strikes (Tu-22M3, KAB carriers) and RF ISR capability. UAF energy resilience is locally degraded in Kharkiv (270837Z) following recent strikes, necessitating emergency power protocols.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF resources are critically constrained by the absence of a confirmed strategic reserve (CONPLAN DELTA failure). Primary focus is maintaining tactical stability at Huliaipole and preparing layered defense against the escalating deep-strike threat (Tu-22M3).

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intention is immediate operational exploitation on the Zaporizhzhia axis, supported by strategic deterrence signaling and deep strike capability.

• Deep Kinetic Strike (Imminent): The three (3) RF Tu-22M3 bombers launched from Olenya remain airborne and pose an imminent threat. The strike window is estimated NLT 271200Z. Potential target sets now include logistics/C2 nodes supporting the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border, in response to the claimed advance. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Technology & Adaptation: RF military bloggers emphasize the successful deployment of "heavy reusable drones" (270837Z), corroborating previous reporting on the jet-propelled Shahed variant and indicating a shift toward platforms requiring high-frequency EW/AD counters.
• Strategic Signaling: RF Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov issued a formal threat of "compensating military-technical measures" in response to potential US Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (RSMND) deployment (270841Z). This is a classical escalation signal intended for NATO deterrence.
• Internal Security IO: FSB reports and subsequent media coverage of terrorist arrests in Sevastopol (270841Z) and long sentences for the Crimean Bridge incident (270856Z) are designed to justify RF aggression and depict UAF as a terrorist entity.

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF continues to rely on strategic alliances (CSTO summit focus, 270900Z) and attempts to mask localized logistics strain by amplifying IO concerning sanctions failure (270850Z) and celebrating military holidays (Marine Corps Day, 270842Z).

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF maintains effective synchronization between ground maneuvers, air support (KAB saturation), and the IO domain (propaganda claims of Dnipropetrovsk penetration coinciding with kinetic strikes).

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is high in the technical countermeasure domain (EW/Counter-Intelligence). Morale is sustained by aggressive strategic communication. However, operational readiness remains critically strained by the lack of ground reserves to counter the high-tempo offensive in Zaporizhzhia.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Counter-Intelligence): SBU successfully apprehended an FSB spotter recruited via a dating site (270859Z), demonstrating adaptive and effective counter-HUMINT capabilities.
• Success (Internal Resilience): PrivatBank’s aggressive pursuit of former owners Kolomoisky and Bogolyubov ($3B+) signals high internal governance and counter-corruption resolve (270902Z), countering RF destabilization narratives.
• Setback (Humanitarian/Kinetic): Confirmed death of a 12-year-old in Ternopil (270833Z) and a civilian fatality in Sumy (270845Z) underscores the continuing cost and indiscriminate nature of RF kinetic campaigns.
• Setback (Infrastructure): Localized power failures persist in Kharkiv Oblast (270837Z).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Air Defense/EW: Immediate allocation of medium/long-range AD systems to protect C2 and logistics hubs in the broader Dnipro region is now critical, NLT 271100Z.
2. Strategic Reserves: Confirmation and deployment of an effective strategic reserve force (CONPLAN OMEGA equivalent) must be executed immediately to prevent the MDCOA realization in Zaporizhzhia.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is centered on: 1) Strategic escalation signaling (Ryabkov, RSMND threat, 270841Z). 2) Justification of the war via internal security narratives (FSB arrests, 270841Z). 3) Normalization of domestic life/deflection of war costs (CSTO focus, sports/cultural news, 270858Z). 4) Questioning the effectiveness of Western sanctions (270850Z).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is sustained by focused UAF messaging: 1) Highlighting RF atrocities (Ternopil/Sumy civilian deaths) to galvanize resolve. 2) Projecting internal governance strength (PrivatBank legal action). 3) Amplifying high-profile international support, specifically the strong pro-NATO statements by figures like Garry Kasparov (270857Z), to reinforce the belief that Ukraine is fighting for pan-European security.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Geopolitical hardening continues. European entities are reportedly reviewing active responses to RF hybrid threats (270851Z). Reports of Germany preparing a plan to transfer 800,000 NATO troops (270853Z) provide strong strategic signals to Moscow, which will be incorporated into RF threat assessments. RF diplomatic retaliation against Poland (closure of Irkutsk consulate, 270843Z) confirms persistent friction.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will achieve tactical stability on the Hryshyne-Dimitrov line (Donetsk) within the next 48 hours. The main operational effort will remain the Huliaipole breakthrough, leveraging the perceived operational collapse of UAF depth. The Tu-22M3 strike is expected to occur NLT 271200Z, likely targeting logistics or key C2 infrastructure in the Dnipro/Kremenchuk area to capitalize on the rumored deep penetration and prevent UAF force reconstitution. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

Operational collapse of the Huliaipole sector, validated by confirmed RF presence deep in Dnipropetrovsk region. If the RF IO claim (270844Z) reflects actual ground maneuver, the MDCOA will transition to the MLCOA. This scenario necessitates an immediate, large-scale tactical withdrawal or localized defeat, allowing RF forces to push north and sever critical supply lines to the Donbas front. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: IMMEDIATE AD AND FORCE PROTECTION (AD COMMAND / J3)

1. Tu-22M3 Countermeasure: Re-task all available medium-to-long-range AD systems (PATRIOT, NASAMS) to provide maximum coverage over the Dnipro, Poltava, and Kremenchuk logistics hubs, beginning 271030Z. This shifts priority from generalized C2 protection to logistics denial in the anticipated new operational depth.
2. KAB/FAB Mitigation: Implement mandatory decentralized, dispersed deployment protocols for all company-level logistics and C2 assets in the Zaporizhzhia axis to deny RF KAB strikes decisive effect.

R-2: CRITICAL FORCE MANAGEMENT AND ISR (J3 / J2)

1. Reserve Deployment (PRIORITY 1): J3 must provide immediate confirmation of the physical location and ETA of the strategic reserve (CONPLAN OMEGA or equivalent). If ETA exceeds 271100Z, authorize immediate preparatory orders for the controlled withdrawal of Huliaipole-based units to pre-surveyed defensive lines further west.
2. ISR Tasking (Dnipropetrovsk): J2 must prioritize high-resolution IMINT/SIGINT to immediately confirm or deny the RF deep penetration claim into Dnipropetrovsk region (270844Z). This verification is paramount for determining the next viable operational defense line.

R-3: INFORMATION AND GEOPOLITICAL EXPLOITATION (STRATCOM)

1. Counter-Corruption Messaging: STRATCOM must immediately amplify the PrivatBank legal action against Kolomoisky/Bogolyubov as proof of UAF institutional resilience and commitment to reform, directly countering the RF "Mindichgate" destabilization campaign.
2. Leverage Atrocity and Resilience: Consolidate messaging around the civilian casualties (Ternopil/Sumy) and the strategic support of figures like Kasparov and Western defense planning (NATO troop deployment plan) to maximize international pressure and secure immediate military aid deliveries.

---

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS