Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 270900Z NOV 25

SUBJECT: CRITICAL THREAT ENVIRONMENT: RF EXPLOITATION CONTINUES POKROVSK AXIS (KHUTOR ZAPORIZHSKY CONTESTED). AIR THREAT ESCALATION (TU-22M3 DEPLOYMENT). HIGH-INTENSITY ASSAULT ON HULIAIPOLE SUSTAINED.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational geometry remains critical, defined by deep RF penetration in Donetsk Oblast and simultaneous high-tempo offensive action in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

• Pokrovsk Axis: RF maneuver units are solidifying positions west of the Pokrovsk Railway Station and pressuring blocking forces near Khutor Zaporizhsky. The next primary objective for RF exploitation is confirmed as the Hryshyne-Dimitrov defensive line. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (CRITICAL): High kinetic pressure on Huliaipole continues. RF activity is confirmed further south in the Malokaterynivka region (270901Z), indicating deep RF presence and aggressive probing of the Southern Defensive Line depth. Air alerts confirm continued saturation use of KAB/FAB strikes across the axis (270817Z, 270808Z), providing tactical air superiority to RF ground forces. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Air Domain: Three (3) RF Tu-22M3 bombers have launched from the Olenya airfield (270826Z). This platform is assessed to be preparing for a long-range kinetic strike employing Kh-22/Kh-32 cruise missiles or high-volume FAB drops, targeting strategic depth assets (Logistics/C2/Energy). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist. Favorable for high-altitude ISR and kinetic strikes (Tu-22M3 deployment). Ground conditions remain suitable for tracked and heavy mechanized maneuver across primary axes.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are executing controlled withdrawal and delay operations on the Pokrovsk axis (FDP). The focus is immediate resource mobilization to prevent the Huliaipole collapse, which is currently the center of gravity (COG) for the Southern Defense Line. The deployment of additional AD/EW assets is critical to mitigate the escalating KAB/Tu-22M3 threat.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is to collapse the defense line rapidly, utilizing overwhelming air-delivered kinetic force (KAB/FAB) supported by maneuver elements.

• Kinetic Strike Evolution (Technology Adaptation): Analysis of captured wreckage confirms the operational deployment of a jet-propelled Shahed variant (270825Z). This represents a significant capability leap, requiring specialized electronic warfare (EW) and layered air defense to counter due to increased speed and altitude, complicating previous acoustic detection and low-altitude interception methods. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Strategic Consolidation: RF MoD reports confirm Defense Minister Belousov's attendance at the CSTO meeting in Bishkek (270830Z). This sustains the strategic narrative of long-term alliance consolidation and military industrial integration, intended to maximize future RF military depth and resilience. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Ground Focus: Concentrated KAB strikes on Donetsk (270830Z) indicate the immediate RF intent to maintain pressure across multiple sectors, stretching UAF defensive resources.

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF deep strike capability continues to degrade RF regional infrastructure: Confirmation of a repeat successful kinetic engagement against the Belgorod Luch TPP (270824Z). This continuous targeting of key energy infrastructure is assessed to be imposing cumulative stress on RF local logistics and C2 resilience, necessitating adaptive RF power management doctrine. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF maintains effective operational synchronization between deep strike, air support (KAB saturation), and ground maneuver units, evidenced by the concurrent pressure on Pokrovsk and Huliaipole, and the deployment of Tu-22M3 platforms.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is currently high concerning the deep strike domain and technological countermeasures (successful EW neutralization of the jet-Shahed). However, ground maneuver forces remain critically strained by the lack of strategic reserves (CONPLAN DELTA failure replacement).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (EW/AD): Successful engagement and controlled landing of a jet-propelled Shahed drone variant (270825Z). This immediate technical exploitation provides crucial time to develop effective counter-protocols.
• Success (Deep Strike Confirmation): Second confirmed strike/BDA on Luch TPP, demonstrating sustained ability to reach and degrade critical RF infrastructure.
• Setback (Humanitarian): The confirmed death of a 12-year-old child following the 19 NOV Ternopil strike (270832Z) highlights the enduring cost of RF precision kinetic strikes on civilian areas.
• Constraint (Energy Resilience): Ukrenergo reports overall general restoration of power stability, reducing the duration of rolling blackouts (270828Z), demonstrating UAF energy sector resilience against RF kinetic campaigns.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Air Defense Priority: Urgent need for deployment of EW systems and medium-range AD assets specifically tasked to counter the high-altitude, long-range KAB carriers (Su-34/Su-35) and the newly deployed Tu-22M3 threat.
2. Reserve Commitment: The ongoing need for a committed strategic reserve force remains the primary operational constraint preventing stabilization on the Zaporizhzhia axis.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Normalization/Distraction): RF military bloggers and state media are disseminating the ISW projection (RF reaches Donetsk administrative borders in August 2027) (270813Z). This is a tactic to normalize the slow pace of current gains and manage internal expectations, framing the conflict as a long-term, successful attrition strategy. RF also promotes minor international "wins" (e.g., the disputed IJF Judo decision, 270828Z) to signal a return to international legitimacy.
• RF Strategic Signaling: Heavy focus on CSTO meetings (270806Z, 270830Z) reinforces the narrative of strategic depth and collective security unity against NATO.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF counter-IO heavily focuses on projecting resilience and documenting RF atrocities.

• Resilience: Amplification of the ISW timeline (270808Z, 270814Z) to boost domestic morale by countering the narrative of imminent defeat.
• Accountability: Heavy emphasis on the tragic increase in civilian fatalities from the Ternopil strike (270820Z, 270832Z) to maintain international support and domestic resolve.
• Logistics Resilience: Ukrenergo’s quick restoration reports (270828Z) project competence and control over critical national infrastructure.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Geopolitical Hardening: Latvia's plan to dismantle rail links to Russia (270816Z) is a significant geopolitical move, further isolating RF logistics and increasing the long-term cost of the conflict. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Sanctions Continuity: EU preparing its 20th sanctions package for early 2026 (270829Z), reinforcing the long-term Western commitment to economic pressure, countering the RF narrative of European fatigue.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF will exploit the air domain superiority achieved by KAB saturation to pressure the Huliaipole line until UAF forces are forced to withdraw or are operationally encircled. The Tu-22M3 deployment will lead to a medium-to-large-scale missile/FAB strike NLT 271200Z, likely targeting previously stressed logistics hubs or the primary forward C2 nodes supporting the Zaporizhzhia axis. RF will achieve stability along the Hryshyne-Dimitrov line in Donetsk within the next 48 hours. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

The MDCOA remains the operational collapse of the Huliaipole sector NLT 271200Z. This would allow RF units operating near Malokaterynivka to effect a deep maneuver toward the Dnipro axis, severing UAF lines of effort and potentially forcing a larger strategic withdrawal. Failure to counter the impending Tu-22M3 kinetic strike could significantly degrade C2 capacity, preventing coordinated defense/withdrawal protocols. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: AIR DEFENSE AND EW URGENCY (AD COMMAND / J7)

1. Tu-22M3 Countermeasure: Immediately task specialized ISR (SIGINT/ELINT) to monitor Tu-22M3 launch areas and flight paths. Re-task medium-to-long-range AD systems (e.g., PATRIOT, NASAMS) to cover critical logistics nodes (Kremenchuk, Dnipro) and forward operating bases from 270930Z until 271300Z.
2. Jet-Shahed Counter-Protocols: J7 (R&D) must prioritize the technical analysis of the captured jet-Shahed variant. Immediately disseminate observed effective EW frequencies and jamming techniques (used in the controlled landing) to all front-line EW units to counter future deployments.

R-2: CRITICAL FORCE ALLOCATION (J3)

1. Reserve Redirection: J3 must confirm the identified strategic reserve replacement (CONPLAN OMEGA or equivalent) and ensure its deployment vectors prioritize supporting the Huliaipole sector, not the currently contained Pokrovsk axis. The reserve must arrive NLT 271100Z to mitigate the MDCOA collapse risk.
2. KAB Mitigation: Order the immediate relocation and hardening (dispersal, camouflage) of all forward logistics and C2 assets in the Zaporizhzhia sector to mitigate the decisive effect of RF KAB saturation.

R-3: INFORMATION & GEOPOLITICAL EXPLOITATION (STRATCOM / MFA)

1. Amplify CSTO Friction: STRATCOM should leverage the CSTO meeting to highlight the potential friction points (economic cost, non-participation in Ukraine) and counter the RF narrative of unified strategic depth.
2. Leverage Atrocity Messaging: Utilize the confirmed civilian fatality in Ternopil (R-3.1) and the long ISW timeline (R-3.2) in international media to secure sustained political and military aid, framing the RF offensive as slow, costly, and inherently criminal.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS