Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 270734Z NOV 25

SUBJECT: CRITICAL THREAT ENVIRONMENT: POKROVSK EXPLOITATION TOWARDS HRYSHYNE AND CONCURRENT GROUND ASSAULT ON HULIAIPOLE. CONPLAN DELTA RESERVE STATUS REMAINS UNACCOUNTED FOR.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational environment remains defined by RF exploitation of the tactical collapse on the Pokrovsk Axis and the opening of a high-intensity ground offensive on the Zaporizhzhia Axis, threatening the integrity of the Southern Defense Line.

• Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmiisk) Axis (CRITICAL EXPLOITATION): RF forces are confirming forward momentum following the capture of Pokrovsk Railway Station (reported 261500Z). New intelligence confirms active RF advance toward Hryshyne (Krasnoarmiisk-Hryshyne sector) and Dimitrov (or vicinity). This movement threatens the key defensive depth west of Myrnograd and confirms RF intent to capitalize immediately on the failed UAF reserve deployment (CONPLAN DELTA). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (HIGH KINETIC/GROUND PRESSURE): The RF ground operation has intensified from kinetic shaping to direct assault. RF media sources confirm the "Storming of Huliaipole has begun." This confirms the MDCOA threat of a deep penetration on the Southern Flank, building on previous claims of control over Zatishye. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Kupyansk/Kharkiv Fixation: RF continues fixation operations. Air Force reports ongoing use of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) in the Northern Kharkiv region. RF MoD claims ongoing operations against encircled UAF formations on the left bank of the Oskol River, confirming persistent multi-axis pressure aimed at fixing UAF reserves. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Deep Strike Vector (Post-KINETIC Audit): The recent mass kinetic strike (142 UAVs launched, 92 neutralized) has concluded. The need for a damage assessment audit of the 50 unaccounted-for assets remains.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear and cold conditions persist. Conditions favor ground maneuver, aerial reconnaissance, and the execution of precision strikes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are conducting Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDP) on the Pokrovsk Axis. The main priority control measure is the immediate establishment of a blocking force on the Huliaipole/Zaporizhzhia axis to prevent a cascade failure. The absence of confirmed reserve forces (CONPLAN DELTA) exacerbates the vulnerability of this flank.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is to collapse the Donbas defense line through simultaneous exploitation (Pokrovsk) and flanking maneuver (Zaporizhzhia).

• Capabilities: RF maintains high kinetic saturation capability (142 UAVs confirmed). RF ground units are adapting rapidly to UAF FPV superiority via the mass deployment of cage/screen armor on armored fighting vehicles (AFVs).
• Tactical Focus: The concurrent advance on Hryshyne (Pokrovsk exploitation) and the direct assault on Huliaipole demonstrate the ability to sustain high-tempo offensive operations across separated operational axes.
• Geopolitical Intent: Putin's proposal to equip CSTO forces with "battle-proven" Russian weaponry and establish a new CSTO anti-terrorist strategy signals a long-term goal of geopolitical consolidation and standardization of logistics systems within the Russian sphere of influence, potentially increasing future force projection capability. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF maintains the ability to mass high-cost kinetic assets (UAVs, KABs). The geopolitical signaling regarding CSTO arms sales suggests a sustained, high-level priority on military-industrial output and arms standardization. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust, demonstrated by the immediate and synchronized exploitation of the tactical success at Pokrovsk (advance toward Hryshyne/Dimitrov) simultaneous with the activation of the Huliaipole assault phase. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture is shifting toward emergency containment and defense in depth. Operational readiness is compromised by the critical absence of CONPLAN DELTA. UAF Southern Command is actively reporting its operational status.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: Confirmed successful destruction of an RF BM-21 Grad MLRS by UAF heavy strike UAVs/bombers. This confirms UAF retains lethal, high-value asset interdiction capability.
• Constraint (CRITICAL): The CONPLAN DELTA reserve force remains unaccounted for following its failure to deploy to the Pokrovsk axis (261500Z decision point). This is the single greatest operational constraint currently facing the UAF High Command and directly enables the RF MDCOA. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. URGENT Reserve Generation: Immediate requirement to identify, mobilize, and deploy a viable replacement for CONPLAN DELTA to the Zaporizhzhia axis.
2. Counter-Armor Doctrine: Rapid update and dissemination of counter-tactics against RF anti-FPV cage armor.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Operations (IO) are highly active and coordinated:

1. Diplomatic Coercion: RF sources (citing NYT/Trump administration arguments) actively push the narrative that Ukraine must accept peace terms due to RF battlefield dominance, aiming to erode domestic and international support for continued conflict (New Message 07:04:54).
2. Western Distraction/Instability: State media (TASS) amplifies reporting on the US Washington D.C. security incident, portraying Western nations as internally unstable and incapable of sustained foreign support.
3. Financial Disruption: Dissemination of reports (FT) suggesting the use of frozen Russian assets will destabilize EU finances, targeting the political will to provide essential aid (New Message 07:22:01).
4. Internal Security Projection: FSB reports of successfully preventing a "terrorist attack" in Sevastopol serve to project RF control and resilience against UAF deep strike/sabotage attempts.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF domestic messaging remains focused on maintaining morale through tactical successes (MLRS destruction) and transparent operational reporting (Defense Forces of Southern Ukraine). RF IO is attempting to create cognitive defeat through the constant linkage of battlefield losses and Western diplomatic pressure.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The internal EU debate regarding frozen assets remains a vulnerability that RF IO is actively exploiting. Russian diplomatic messaging is focused on projecting long-term strategic strength (Eurasian security, CSTO armament), insulating Moscow from immediate battlefield setbacks and framing the conflict as a struggle against NATO expansion.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will achieve a major breakthrough consolidation on the Pokrovsk/Hryshyne axis NLT 271000Z, forcing UAF defensive lines further West. Concurrently, the direct assault on Huliaipole will maintain high pressure, requiring UAF to commit limited operational reserves to prevent the town's capture, thus limiting the ability to stabilize the Pokrovsk flank. RF will likely initiate the next massed kinetic strike wave NLT 271800Z to capitalize on UAF C2 exhaustion. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

The Huliaipole defensive line collapses NLT 271200Z due to the concentration of RF armor and the failure to deploy adequate UAF reserve depth. The RF 58th Combined Arms Army (assumed primary force) exploits the gap, pushes rapidly toward the Dnipropetrovsk administrative boundary, and interdicts the primary East-West logistics corridor, threatening a widespread Southern Front retreat. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: CRITICAL FORCE REDEPLOYMENT (J3)

1. Identify and Deploy Alternative Reserve (CRITICAL): J3 must immediately activate CONPLAN OMEGA (or equivalent)—identifying the next most combat-ready, previously non-committed force structure (Brigade level minimum) and directing its rapid movement to the Zaporizhzhia/Huliaipole region. This force must be emplaced NLT 271200Z to counter the confirmed ground assault.
2. Pokrovsk Rearguard Orders: Authorize existing fragmented units in the Pokrovsk sector (Hryshyne/Dimitrov) to conduct immediate counter-mobility operations (mines, controlled demolition) to delay RF advance, prioritizing the establishment of a hard defense line 5-10 km West of the current contact line.

R-2: URGENT ISR AND COUNTER-MEASURES (J2 / J7)

1. Huliaipole Ground Truth: Priority 1 IMINT/drone surveillance must be maintained 24/7 over Huliaipole to confirm the scale and direction of the RF assault (New Message 07:13:49) and identify high-value RF C2/Logistics nodes being used for the flanking push.
2. Counter-Armor Targeting Data: J7 (Doctrine) must collaborate with tactical UAV/FPV units to rapidly collect and disseminate targeting data and engagement profiles against the widely reported RF anti-FPV cage armor to minimize FPV attrition rates during the Huliaipole assault.
3. Kinetic Strike Audit: Complete the audit of the 50 unaccounted-for RF drones NLT 271500Z to identify potential non-military targeting (e.g., civilian infrastructure, AD saturation points) that may precede the next kinetic wave.

R-3: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM / NCA)

1. Counter-Peace Narrative: STRATCOM must preemptively prepare counter-messaging to address the RF IO amplifying the "US peace pressure" narrative (New Message 07:04:54). Messaging should focus on RF escalation (massed drone strikes, Huliaipole assault) proving RF rejection of genuine peace.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS