Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 270535Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: Escalation of RF Deep Strike Targeting C2/Logistics Corridor (Vinnytsia, Lozova). CONPLAN DELTA Viability Decision Point Imminent (270600Z).

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational focus has shifted from containing the deep strike on the immediate logistical rear (Pavlohrad) to defending the strategic depth and Command and Control (C2) nodes located further west.

• Strategic Deep Strike Axis (CRITICAL): UAV activity is confirmed targeting Vinnytsia (270508Z) and the Lozova area, Kharkiv Oblast (270511Z). Vinnytsia hosts critical reserve C2 and logistics hubs, while Lozova is a major railway junction vital for Northern/Eastern Front sustainment.
• Zaporizhzhia Operational Rear: Confirmed drone impact resulting in civilian casualty in the Zaporizhzhia District (270510Z). This validates the RF intent to utilize drones for pervasive harassment and destabilization of rear area operations, concurrent with ground assault preparation.
• Kupyansk Sector: Russian Federation (RF) sources claim a successful defense against a UAF counter-attack across the Oskil River (270522Z). This suggests active, localized UAF offensive action designed to fix RF forces in the Northern sector, or is purely an IO measure.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist (HIGH CONFIDENCE), facilitating optimal ISR deployment and maintaining high-fidelity guidance for RF deep strike weapons systems across multiple domains.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The critical window for the strategic decision regarding CONPLAN DELTA viability is now less than 30 minutes (270600Z). The confirmed shift in the deep strike target set (Vinnytsia/Lozova) indicates RF is adapting rapidly to UAF Air Defense (AD) reallocation efforts previously focused on Pavlohrad/Shakhtarske. UAF AD assets are severely strained managing widely dispersed, active threats.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is confirmed: achieving operational paralysis by simultaneously degrading operational depth across multiple key nodes (C2 at Vinnytsia, logistics at Lozova, and rear-area stabilization in Zaporizhzhia).

• Deep Strike Priority Shift (FACT/JUDGMENT): The immediate threat priority has shifted from Pavlohrad/Shakhtarske to Vinnytsia (C2) and Lozova (logistics). This confirms RF flexibility and tactical intelligence superiority in tracking UAF AD movements. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Persistent Ground Fixation: RF continues to advertise UAF/NATO-supported activity near Kupyansk, aiming to justify reserve retention in the North and prevent UAF from consolidating forces toward Zaporizhzhia or the operational rear. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• Internal Security (IO): The publicized arrest of a saboteur in Sevastopol (270513Z) is a deliberate internal IO measure designed to signal RF vigilance against resistance and maintain control over annexed territory.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The RF's rapid pivot to targeting Vinnytsia and Lozova following UAF prioritization of the Dnipropetrovsk corridor demonstrates sophisticated, near-real-time sensor-to-shooter capability and effective targeting cycle management. RF is successfully diversifying its deep strike vectors to maximize the strain on UAF AD resources. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF is demonstrably capable of sustaining complex, simultaneous ground assaults (Zaporizhzhia) and strategically dispersed deep strikes (Vinnytsia, Lozova). Logistics resilience is high; munitions supply remains unconstrained for the immediate operational cycle. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective, demonstrated by the successful tactical pivot in deep strike targeting. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Units remain highly engaged. The confirmation of UAF Air Force tracking of drones toward Vinnytsia and Lozova indicates active ISR engagement, but the overall AD umbrella is now critically stressed due to the dispersed threat picture.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (CRITICAL RISK): The confirmation of UAVs targeting Vinnytsia places critical strategic C2 infrastructure in immediate danger, increasing the risk of the Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) outlined in the previous report (C2 decapitation).
• Potential Success (Unconfirmed): UAF activity claimed near Kupyansk, if verified as an organized, sustained effort, has the potential to draw RF attention away from the Zaporizhzhia axis. (LOW CONFIDENCE until verified)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Air Defense (AD) remains the overriding constraint. Immediate priority shift for mobile AD assets is required to intercept the active UAV tracks toward Vinnytsia and Lozova. The commitment of any available strategic reserve (CONPLAN DELTA) remains contingent upon the 270600Z viability assessment.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF-originating narrative regarding US security guarantees being conditional upon a peace deal (attributed to Senator Rubio) is confirmed to be actively propagating within the domestic Ukrainian information space (270519Z). This IO vector is perfectly synchronized with the active military offensive to generate maximum psychological pressure on decision-makers and the general populace. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is highly vulnerable. Successful strikes on C2 or strategic logistics (Vinnytsia/Lozova) combined with the confirmed US security guarantee disinformation could severely degrade the population's belief in the UAF leadership's long-term strategic viability. The drone strike casualty in Zaporizhzhia district heightens civilian anxiety.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The disinformation campaign requires immediate, high-level refutation to stabilize the strategic assurance dimension.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will sustain the deep strike effort targeting C2 (Vinnytsia) and logistics (Lozova) until 270700Z to generate maximum operational disruption and degrade UAF response capability. Ground forces on the Zaporizhzhia axis will utilize the deep strike distraction to intensify probing attacks and secure a local tactical breakthrough NLT 270900Z. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

Successful RF kinetic interdiction of the Vinnytsia C2 hub before 270630Z. This scenario compounds the failure risk of CONPLAN DELTA, causing significant regional C2 blackout, preventing synchronized counter-penetration efforts on the Southern Front, and potentially delaying Contingency Withdrawal Protocols (CWP) authorization. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: AIR DEFENSE PRIORITY RE-ALLOCATION (J3 / AD COMMAND)

The priority targets for RF are now Vinnytsia (C2) and Lozova (Logistics).

1. Immediate AD Re-tasking (CRITICAL): Mobile Air Defense assets previously protecting Pavlohrad must be immediately redirected to cover the active UAV tracks toward Vinnytsia (Priority 1) and Lozova (Priority 2). Fire control must be provided real-time by J2 tracking (Task R-3.1).
2. C2 Protection (Vinnytsia): Activate Passive Defense Measures (PDM) and GPS spoofing/jamming protocols for C2 infrastructure in the Vinnytsia sector until NLT 270700Z.

R-2: CRITICAL FORCE DECISION (J3)

1. Execute Decision Point 1 (270600Z): J3 must make the final decision on CONPLAN DELTA viability based on the J2 verification data (due NLT 270600Z). If viability is LOW, the force must be immediately placed under command for use in defensive, rather than offensive, counter-penetration protocols, and CWP must be primed for activation. There is no time for further delay.

R-3: ISR RE-TASKING (J2)

1. Targeted UAV Tracking (CRITICAL): Prioritize SIGINT/ELINT and Air Force tactical tracking assets to provide high-fidelity, real-time trajectory and target intention data for the confirmed UAV groups directed toward Vinnytsia (270508Z track).
2. Kupyansk Verification: Allocate specific tactical ISR (Drone/IMINT) to confirm the disposition and scale of UAF forces in the Kupyansk sector, verifying or refuting the RF claims of a major counter-attack attempt (270522Z).

R-4: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM)

1. Counter-Disinformation (URGENT): STRATCOM must issue a highly credible, coordinated governmental statement before 270700Z directly refuting the Rubio statement narrative, emphasizing the unconditional nature of long-term international security commitments to Ukraine.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS