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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-27 05:04:28Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-11-27 04:34:27Z)

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 270505Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: Confirmation of Sustained RF Deep Strike Targeting Dnipropetrovsk Corridor. Critical Decision Point (270600Z) Imminent.


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains dominated by the synchronized Russian Federation (RF) effort to achieve a tactical penetration on the Zaporizhzhia Axis while concurrently degrading Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) operational depth through deep kinetic strike.

  • Dnipropetrovsk Operational Rear (CRITICAL): UAF Air Force confirms active UAV presence in the area of Pavlohrad and Shakhtarske (0455Z). These settlements host critical logistics and C2 infrastructure necessary for reinforcing the Southern Front.
  • Zaporizhzhia FLE: High-intensity defensive engagement persists. RF intent remains penetration towards Huliaipole.
  • Krasnolymanske Direction: Confirmed active combat operations involving Russian Ground Forces (Western Military District) and claimed engagements by the RF 98th Guards Airborne Division (VDD). Assessed as a sustained fixation effort utilizing high-value units. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear conditions persist (HIGH CONFIDENCE), favoring optimal deployment of ISR assets (both RF and UAF) and continuing to enable RF close air support (CAS) and deep strike weapon guidance.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The critical window for defending the operational rear (Dnipropetrovsk corridor) is tightening. The confirmed UAV presence near Pavlohrad and Shakhtarske directly threatens potential staging areas for the strategic reserve (CONPLAN DELTA). The 270600Z decision point (CONPLAN DELTA viability) is now under immediate kinetic pressure.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is confirmed: operational paralysis of UAF counter-attack capabilities via deep strike, synchronized with a ground breakthrough attempt at Zaporizhzhia.

  • Deep Strike Targeting (FACT): UAV groups are confirmed actively targeting the Pavlohrad/Shakhtarske corridor. This validates the assessment that RF is attempting to neutralize UAF strategic reserves before they can be committed. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Propaganda Synchronization (FACT): RF IO is actively leveraging the US political narrative (Rubio statement, 0455Z) to suggest waning international support, specifically timed to occur alongside active kinetic operations.
  • Localized De-escalation Reporting (CAVEAT): A localized RF report (0438Z) claiming the end of the UAV threat is likely geographic-specific disinformation or refers only to a cleared air corridor, as UAF systems confirmed active UAVs later (0455Z).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF continues to advertise improved counter-UAV capabilities (VDD claiming engagement of UAF "Dartt" drones). This suggests they are adapting their anti-drone tactics to include light infantry/airborne assets, improving force protection against UAF ISR. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF is demonstrably sustaining complex, multi-axis operations (Zaporizhzhia, Krasnolymanske, Deep Strike). This high operational tempo suggests sufficient munitions stockpiles and logistical resilience to maintain pressure through 27 November. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust, successfully maintaining synchronization between the ground assault, deep strike targeting, and the parallel IO campaign. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Units on the Southern Front remain fully engaged in high-intensity defense. Readiness levels are high, but the resource commitment to contain the deep strike threat is severely taxing available AD assets.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • Setback (CRITICAL RISK): The continued, confirmed threat to the Pavlohrad/Shakhtarske logistics corridor significantly raises the probability of interdiction of CONPLAN DELTA and critical rear-area supply lines.
  • Success (IO Management): UAF General Staff maintains a strong morale narrative by consistently reporting high enemy attrition rates (1140 personnel reported).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Air Defense (AD) remains the overriding constraint. Immediate AD reallocation (as previously recommended) to protect Pavlohrad and Shakhtarske is mandatory, given their confirmed targeting. The decision on committing or withdrawing CONPLAN DELTA hinges on the success of these AD efforts NLT 270600Z.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is focused on undermining UAF strategic assurance:

  1. US Support Instability: Dissemination of reports (attributing to Senator Rubio) that the US may condition security guarantees on a prior peace deal with Russia. This is designed to create anxiety regarding the reliability of long-term Western support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  2. Military Commemoration: RF is amplifying nationalistic narratives (Naval Infantry Day) to bolster internal domestic support and troop morale.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is currently being supported by high RF loss claims but is vulnerable to rapid degradation if critical logistics or C2 infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast are successfully struck, or if the destabilizing US security guarantee narrative takes hold.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The disinformation concerning US security guarantees presents a strategic communication challenge that requires an immediate, coordinated governmental response to prevent operational forces from questioning future support.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will sustain the UAV saturation of the Pavlohrad/Shakhtarske logistics hubs until NLT 270700Z to maximize damage to CONPLAN DELTA staging areas. Following successful deep strike effects, the RF ground forces will increase penetration attempts on the Zaporizhzhia FLE NLT 270800Z. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

Successful RF kinetic interdiction of the Pavlohrad logistics hub or the operational destruction of the CONPLAN DELTA staging force before 270600Z. This scenario eliminates UAF counter-penetration capability on the Southern Front, necessitating a widespread, high-risk withdrawal under fire from the Zaporizhzhia axis. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated Timeline (NLT)ConfidenceStatus/Action Required
CONPLAN DELTA Viability Confirmation270600ZCRITICALDECISION POINT 1 (CRITICAL): If viability cannot be confirmed or assessed as LOW, J3 must immediately activate Contingency Withdrawal Protocols (CWP).
UAV Threat Conclusion (Pavlohrad/Shakhtarske)270700ZMEDIUMAD assets must defend GLOCs until this time. Threat is currently active.
Zaporizhzhia Tactical Breakthrough Risk270800ZHIGHReserve forces needed for counter-penetration NLT 271000Z.

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT & RESERVE TRACKING (J2 / J3)

The 270600Z decision point requires immediate and definitive information.

  1. CONPLAN DELTA Re-Verification (CRITICAL): J2 must prioritize all remaining airborne and ground ISR assets (IMINT/SIGINT) to physically verify the location, disposition, and combat viability of CONPLAN DELTA relative to the confirmed threat corridors (Pavlohrad/Shakhtarske) NLT 270600Z.
  2. UAV Active Targeting: J2 must supply real-time, high-fidelity targeting data on the confirmed UAV groups near Pavlohrad/Shakhtarske (0455Z track) to AD Command for immediate interception.

R-2: FORCE MANAGEMENT & AIR DEFENSE (J3 / AD COMMAND)

  1. Immediate AD Reallocation (CRITICAL): Prioritize deployment of mobile AD assets to establish maximum protection domes over the Pavlohrad and Shakhtarske areas by 270545Z. Defend C2 and logistics hubs against the current active threat.
  2. CWP Readiness: J3 must ensure Contingency Withdrawal Plan (CWP) activation protocols are ready for immediate execution at 270600Z if CONPLAN DELTA viability cannot be definitively confirmed. Do not delay this decision.

R-3: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM)

  1. Counter-Disinformation (URGENT): STRATCOM, in coordination with MFA, must issue an immediate, high-level public statement confirming the continued strength and reliability of US security commitments, directly addressing and refuting the Rubio statement narrative (0453Z/0455Z disinformation vector).

R-4: ISR RE-TASKING (J2)

  1. Krasnolymanske Monitoring: Elevate the Krasnolymanske direction to High ISR priority (Priority 3, previously low) to track and confirm the disposition of the identified 98th VDD elements, ensuring this fixation effort does not mask a broader secondary operational breakthrough.

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap/RequirementConfidenceTasking Rationale
1 (CRITICAL)Status and current coordinates of CONPLAN DELTA reserve force relative to Pavlohrad/Shakhtarske UAV threat.HIGHEssential for operational stability and counter-penetration planning (Decision Point 1).
2 (CRITICAL)Active track, direction, and interception data for UAV groups targeting Pavlohrad/Shakhtarske.HIGHRequired for effective AD fire control and assessment of deep strike efficacy.
3 (HIGH)Specific role and current disposition of RF 98th VDD elements confirmed active on the Krasnolymanske axis.MEDIUMRequired to assess the true threat level of this fixation effort and potential for localized offensive action.
Previous (2025-11-27 04:34:27Z)

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