Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP) - ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT PHASE

TIME: 270445Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: Update on Synchronized RF MDO. Kinetic Threat Confirmed Active in Dnipropetrovsk Corridor. Ground Pressure Sustained on Zaporizhzhia Axis.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The primary operational engagement remains concentrated on the Zaporizhzhia Axis, where RF ground forces continue the 0400Z combined arms assault. Secondary kinetic shaping fires are confirmed active in the rear operational area (Dnipropetrovsk/Donetsk) corridor.

• Zaporizhzhia FLE: Active contact persists. RF intent is to achieve penetration toward Huliaipole.
• Dnipropetrovsk / Donetsk Corridor (CRITICAL): UAF Air Force confirms active movement of UAV groups originating from the Kharkiv region, directed toward the C2 and logistics hubs within Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk Oblasts. This validates the previous assessment that the deep strike targeting CONPLAN DELTA and supply GLOCs is ongoing, not concluded.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear conditions persist across the Eastern and Southern fronts, enabling optimal utilization of both RF and UAF ISR assets (drones) and facilitating RF close air support (CAS). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The necessity for rapid AD reallocation to the Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava corridor is now critically confirmed by UAF internal reporting. The focus must shift immediately from BDA on past strikes to active counter-AD engagement and protection of the surviving reserve force (assuming survival).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is to execute parallel tactical breakthrough at Zaporizhzhia and operational paralysis in the rear.

• Kinetic Synchronization (FACT): The ground assault (Zaporizhzhia) is being actively supported by sustained multi-domain efforts aimed at interdicting UAF reinforcement/supply chains (Dnipropetrovsk UAV movement).
• Adaptations (JUDGMENT): The confirmed movement of UAV groups toward Dnipropetrovsk suggests RF forces are exploiting known gaps in UAF AD coverage or using saturated drone waves to exhaust limited UAF interceptor stockpiles. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Strategic Technology (FACT): RF announced the development of "Rassvet," a proprietary LEO satellite constellation analogous to Starlink. This indicates RF dedication to achieving long-term strategic C2 and ISR parity, decreasing reliance on vulnerable terrestrial systems. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE on immediate impact, HIGH on long-term intent)
• Fixation Efforts (FACT): RF continues to use IO and kinetic effects to fix UAF attention and resources away from the main effort (e.g., TASS claiming only 10% UAF control of Vovchansk; reports of shelling in Belgorod forcing RF internal focus).

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The RF is sustaining simultaneous pressure across multiple operational axes (Zaporizhzhia ground push, Dnipropetrovsk deep strike). This requires robust forward logistics and high consumption of precision/stand-off munitions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, capable of adjusting kinetic strike vectors in real-time (confirming UAV path toward Dnipropetrovsk) and synchronizing IO campaigns with battlefield developments. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Units on the Zaporizhzhia FLE are engaged in a high-intensity defensive battle. Readiness is high, but the cognitive burden of fighting while the rear area is under active threat (Dnipropetrovsk) is severely degrading unit effectiveness.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (CRITICAL RISK): The continued, active threat confirmed by UAF Air Force targeting the Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava corridor greatly increases the risk of successful interdiction of CONPLAN DELTA and critical C2/logistics infrastructure. The operational clock is running down on the reserve force's viability.
• Success (Fixation): Confirmed overnight shelling in Belgorod requires RF security forces to remain deployed on the border, fixing RF assets that might otherwise reinforce the Zaporizhzhia axis.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate, overriding constraint is AD coverage in the Dnipropetrovsk operational rear. The ability to defend the surviving logistics/reserve corridor dictates the long-term viability of the Southern Front defense.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO strategy is multi-faceted:

1. Military Victory Narrative: Asserting high UAF losses and territorial control (Vovchansk 90% RF control).
2. Leadership Destabilization: The 'Solodaev removal' and 'Mindichgate' narratives aim to undermine operational decision-making during the current critical phase.
3. Global Legitimacy: Small diplomatic wins (Nicaragua trade) are amplified to counter the effect of international sanctions and isolation.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal sentiment is currently dictated by the uncertainty surrounding the deep strike effects. UAF Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) requires immediate, strong messaging to counter the psychological impact of synchronized IO and kinetic effects.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO utilizes reports of US internal political volatility (Trump/immigration statement) to frame Western support as unreliable or distracted, aiming to demoralize UAF forces reliant on continued foreign aid. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces maintain the current synchronized strategy: achieving a tactical penetration (5-10 km) on the Zaporizhzhia FLE NLT 270800Z while sustaining the UAV/missile saturation of the Dnipropetrovsk corridor until 270700Z to neutralize the potential counter-attack capability of CONPLAN DELTA. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

Successful RF interdiction of the Dnipropetrovsk C2 hub or the operational destruction of CONPLAN DELTA by sustained UAV/missile strikes before 270600Z. This forces the UAF to execute a rapid, widespread withdrawal from the Zaporizhzhia axis under heavy pressure, risking systemic loss of heavy equipment and organizational cohesion. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT & RESERVE TRACKING (J2 / J3)

The decision point remains 270600Z. All available ISR must be focused on the safety and viability of the strategic reserve.

1. CONPLAN DELTA Re-Verification (CRITICAL): J2 must utilize all available IMINT/SIGINT to physically locate CONPLAN DELTA and confirm its combat viability now. Do not rely on assumptions of defeat; confirm survival or destruction NLT 270600Z.
2. Active Threat Targeting (AD): J2 must provide immediate, high-fidelity tracking data on the confirmed UAV groups moving toward Dnipropetrovsk (270413Z) to AD Command for active engagement.

R-2: FORCE MANAGEMENT & AIR DEFENSE (J3 / AD COMMAND)

1. Immediate AD Reallocation (CRITICAL): All mobile AD assets previously defending Kyiv/Western Ukraine must be rerouted and placed on highest alert to protect C2 and logistics hubs within the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast by 270530Z. Prioritize defending the approach routes identified by the 0413Z UAV message.
2. Contingency Execution: J3 must have the Contingency Withdrawal Plan (CWP) ready for execution at 270600Z if CONPLAN DELTA viability cannot be confirmed or is assessed as LOW. Delaying this decision risks operational collapse.

R-3: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM)

1. Counter-Disinformation (URGENT): STRATCOM must immediately issue statements countering the TASS 'Solodaev' claims and the 'Vovchansk' territorial claims (10% control). Focus messaging on the desperation of RF forces resorting to IO while failing to achieve decisive kinetic victory in the rear (Dnipropetrovsk).

R-4: LONG-TERM CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT (J8)

1. LEO Threat Assessment: J8 (Future Capabilities) must initiate a dedicated working group to assess the threat profile, launch timeline, and required countermeasures for the newly announced RF "Rassvet" LEO satellite constellation. This represents a significant long-term threat to UAF battlefield communications superiority.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS