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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-26 22:04:26Z
3 months ago
Previous (2025-11-26 21:34:30Z)

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 262300Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: ZAPORIZHZHIA AXIS: FINAL SHAPING CONFIRMED. RF INFORMATION OPERATIONS REACH PEAK DISTRACTION LEVERAGING US INTERNAL INCIDENT AS COVER FOR PREDICTED MDCOA STRIKE.


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

The operational theater is characterized by an imminent high-intensity RF thrust on the Southern Axis, masked by a sustained RF IO campaign focused on US instability.

  • Zaporizhzhia Axis (Critical): Continues kinetic shaping ahead of the predicted 270400Z mechanized exploitation. No new kinetic data contradicting the KAAB BDA from 262230Z SITREP.
  • Pokrovsk Axis (Collapse/Denial): UAF units are executing denial operations and localized engagements (remote mining confirmed, 21:46Z) consistent with the previously ordered Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDP) following the tactical collapse and encirclement near Myrnograd.
  • Black Sea/Odesa: Unconfirmed single-asset UAV detection (21:44Z) moving toward Chornomorsk. JUDGMENT: This is assessed as a minor reconnaissance or psychological fixation vector, requiring local AD/EW response only.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Conditions remain optimal for high-altitude strike assets and mechanized movement.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

UAF remains at DEFCON 2, with C2 elements maintaining high readiness for missile defense. Operational focus is split between managing the Pokrovsk withdrawal and solidifying depth defenses in Zaporizhzhia.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF intent is to achieve synchronized operational penetration in Zaporizhzhia while neutralizing UAF strategic C2 capability and Western political response via cognitive disruption.

  • MDCOA Synchronization: The critical threat is the predicted strategic strike on Poltava/Vinnytsia C2 nodes (NLT 270130Z). RF IO is maximizing distraction noise via the Washington D.C. security incident (21:37Z, 22:00Z), confirming the use of this high-profile US event as cognitive cover for the kinetic MDCOA execution.
  • Propaganda Reinforcement: RF channels continue to generate and amplify defeatist narratives ("Canada next," 21:43Z) and tactical successes (Voin DV, Colonelcassad, 21:50Z, 22:03Z) to undermine UAF morale and Western resolve simultaneously with the kinetic buildup.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

The speed and persistence of RF Information Operations (IO) targeting the US domestic crisis demonstrate highly effective, rapid tactical adaptation. RF moved swiftly from conflicting reports to solidifying the narrative of severely wounded US National Guard members (FBI via TASS, 22:00Z), ensuring the story dominates Western news cycles during the critical pre-strike window.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF ground forces are prepared for the 270400Z exploitation. Sustainment requires continued UAF deep strike pressure against infrastructure (R-3 from 262230Z SITREP).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF C2 remains effective, evidenced by the tight integration of kinetic shaping, tactical success amplification, and the rapid, sustained exploitation of the US domestic crisis as strategic cover.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

UAF posture is generally prepared, but resources are stretched by the necessity to maintain denial operations in Pokrovsk while reinforcing Zaporizhzhia.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

  • TACTICAL SUCCESS: Confirmed successful remote mining operations (Operatyvnyy ZSU, 21:46Z) in the Pokrovsk sector. This confirms that FDPs are being executed effectively to inflict attrition during withdrawal.
  • STRATEGIC SETBACK MITIGATION: The massive strategic financial success (EU €140B) is still being defended against the RF financial counter-narrative.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

The primary constraint is time (approx. 5 hours until breakthrough) and the urgent need to confirm the location and readiness of mobile counter-battery assets along the Zaporizhzhia line following the intense KAAB shaping strikes.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

The IO environment is saturated by RF narratives designed to paralyze Western decision-making.

RF VectorTarget AudienceContent FocusConfidence
US InstabilityWestern PolicymakersSustained reporting on the severity of the Washington shooting incident (TASS, 22:00Z).HIGH
Defeatism/AttritionUkrainian and Western PublicOvertly defeatist messaging ("Canada next," 21:43Z) and tactical humiliation (Colonelcassad POW narrative, 22:03Z).HIGH
Alliance DistrustNATO/EUUnchanged from previous SITREP—sowing division between US/EU/Kyiv.HIGH

ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT: The highest Dempster-Shafer belief (0.444) centering on the US internal security event validates the RF IO strategy of generating high-volume noise to cover the imminent MDCOA strike on UAF C2.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

Domestic morale is under stress due to the Pokrovsk withdrawal but is buoyed by documented UAF resistance (21:46Z) and the strategic EU financial victory. Sustained IO counter-messaging (R-2) is critical to prevent the defeatist narratives from taking hold.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

International support remains robust, but diplomatic attention is fragmented by the US security crisis. Priority must be maintaining communication channels to ensure rapid aid response following the Zaporizhzhia penetration.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA) (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF utilizes the period until 270400Z for maximum kinetic preparation (Zaporizhzhia) while simultaneously sustaining the high-intensity IO effort focused on US instability and financial fatigue. The mechanized VDV exploitation will proceed on schedule NLT 270400Z.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA) (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF executes the predicted strategic high-precision missile strike wave targeting the C2 complex in Poltava/Vinnytsia (and likely Kremenchuk) within the window 270000Z - 270130Z. Success of the strike, combined with the maximal IO distraction, will prevent coordinated reserve deployment to counter the 270400Z breakthrough.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated Timeline (NLT)ConfidenceStatus/Action Required
MDCOA Strike Execution Window270000Z - 270130ZHIGHCRITICAL DECISION POINT: Initiate C2 shift/dispersal protocols.
Zaporizhzhia Ground Breakthrough270400ZHIGHJ3 must authorize counter-mobility/fire missions based on BDA.
Odesa UAV Engagement262330ZMEDIUMLocal VSHORAD must track and neutralize the Black Sea UAV.

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: IMMEDIATE OPERATIONAL DEFENSE – AIR DEFENSE AND C2 (J3 / AD COMMAND)

  1. C2 Protection (REITERATED): MAINTAIN AD READINESS AT BLACK (MAXIMUM) over Poltava, Vinnytsia, and Kremenchuk until 270130Z. Confirm C2 elements are operating under dispersal protocols.
  2. Northern/Southern Deception: Utilize only local, mobile VSHORAD/EW for the confirmed Black Sea UAV (21:44Z) and the Sumy/Chernihiv UAV fixation. ABSOLUTELY NO COMMITMENT of strategic AD assets to these secondary fixation axes.

R-2: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION WARFARE (NCA / J2)

  1. Counter Defeatism: NCA must issue immediate messaging countering the highly manipulative "surrender/Canada next" narrative (21:43Z). Re-emphasize the strategic nature of the EU financial victory and the resilience demonstrated by UAF forces during the Pokrovsk withdrawal.
  2. Mitigate US Distraction: While respecting the severity of the US security incident, UAF strategic communications must subtly pivot attention back to the critical kinetic situation in Zaporizhzhia, highlighting that RF is exploiting US vulnerability to conduct mass aggression.

R-3: OPERATIONAL FORCE MANAGEMENT (J3)

  1. Zaporizhzhia Reserve Positioning: Prioritize immediate allocation of mobile CBF (Counter-Battery Fire) assets and pre-sited anti-tank reserves to the Huliaipole-Zatishye corridor, leveraging the final pre-breakthrough hours to compensate for expected KAAB damage to fixed defenses.
  2. Pokrovsk Denial: Ensure all withdrawing units are fully resourced for sustained remote mining and denial operations to degrade RF exploitation momentum and protect the westward movement of logistics/refugees.

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap/RequirementConfidenceTasking Rationale
1 (CRITICAL)SIGINT/ELINT: Confirmation of pre-launch or flight vectors for strategic missiles from GRAU arsenals NLT 270030Z to confirm MDCOA execution trajectory.HIGHNecessary for final AD preparation decisions.
2 (CRITICAL)IMINT/SAR: Real-time tracking of RF VDV exploitation rate of advance (ROA) along the Huliaipole-Zatishye corridor starting NLT 270400Z.HIGHEssential for directing fire support and authorizing reserve commitment.
3 (HIGH)IMINT/UAV: Verification of the nature and intent of the UAV detected near Chornomorsk (21:44Z).MEDIUMNecessary to confirm if this is mere reconnaissance or a precursor to localized targeting (e.g., port infrastructure).
Previous (2025-11-26 21:34:30Z)

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