Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 262100Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: RF CONSOLIDATES POKROVSK POCKET; ZAPORIZHZHIA EXPLOITATION PREPARATORY FIRE INTENSIFIES; UAF DESTROYS TOS-1A.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

The overall operational posture remains CRITICAL (DEFCON 2). RF is actively consolidating gains achieved during the Pokrovsk breakthrough, while the primary kinetic effort remains concentrated on shaping the Zaporizhzhia flank.

• Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad Axis (Encapsulation): RF forces report progress in Dimitrov and claim the defense line south of the city has fragmented into isolated pockets. This indicates rapid consolidation of the Myrnohrad pocket's western perimeter, severely limiting UAF Fragmented Defense Protocol (FDP) extraction vectors. The encirclement previously assessed as 1.5 km is effectively closed operationally.
• Zaporizhzhia Flank (Exploitation): RF VDV (Airborne Forces) artillery units are confirmed to be utilizing heavy rocket artillery (MLRS footage) in the Zaporizhzhia direction (1953Z), following earlier FAB-500 strikes. This confirms the preparatory fire phase for a major ground exploitation along the Huliaipole-Zatishye corridor is active. UAV activity confirms ongoing RF reconnaissance efforts in Western Zaporizhzhia.
• Northern/Northeast Axis (Fixation): UAF Air Force confirms continued launches of KAB/UMPK glide bombs targeting assets in both Donetsk (1937Z) and Kharkiv (1951Z) Oblasts. This sustained aerial effort successfully fixes UAF Air Defense (AD) assets and prevents strategic redeployment.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

No new data. Assume current conditions remain favorable for RF air and mechanized operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

UAF is managing a controlled withdrawal under FDP from the Myrnohrad pocket while simultaneously attempting to establish new, robust stabilization lines west of the Pokrovsk axis. Critically, commanders from multiple assault regiments (Kupyansk and Pokrovsk-Dobropillya axes) have publicly called for unity and tactical coordination (1954Z), indicating a command effort to reinforce cohesion during operational strain.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF intent is to collapse the Donbas defense line while forcing the premature commitment of UAF reserves on the southern flank.

• Ground Penetration Capability: RF is utilizing VDV units supported by massed rocket artillery to prosecute the Zaporizhzhia breakthrough. This suggests a high-tempo, heavy-fire exploitation designed to achieve immediate operational depth toward the Dnipropetrovsk boundary.
• Political Intentions: RF diplomatic actors publicly reiterate "total rejection of negotiation" and refusal to make any concessions on "key moments" (1939Z). This reinforces the MDCOA of seeking military victory rather than political settlement in the immediate term.
• Asymmetric Suppression: The continued synchronization of KAB/FAB glide bomb usage across multiple sectors demonstrates a well-resourced and effective aerial suppression strategy to prevent UAF maneuver.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

RF continues to utilize advanced anti-drone protective cages (TOS-1A kill confirmation, 2000Z), indicating an ongoing adaptation effort to mitigate UAF FPV/UAV superiority. However, the confirmed destruction of the caged TOS-1A suggests UAF tactics are successfully evolving faster than RF passive defenses in this localized domain.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

While strategic kinetic and ground operations are well-sustained (FAB/MLRS usage), localized RF funding appeals, specifically for the Sumy Direction (1950Z), suggest ongoing reliance on private donor networks to meet operational needs in secondary fixation sectors.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrated by the synchronization of multi-axis air strikes (Donetsk, Kharkiv) and the coordination of VDV follow-on forces in Zaporizhzhia.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Posture is defensive and withdrawal-oriented. The public call for unity among assault regiment commanders is both an indicator of operational difficulty and a positive signal of adaptive, bottom-up leadership stabilizing tactical command structures under pressure.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• TACTICAL SUCCESS: Confirmed destruction of a Russian TOS-1A Solntsepyok system, a high-value, high-attrition asset, despite it being protected by anti-drone cages (2000Z). This validates the effectiveness of UAF precision asymmetric strike capabilities.
• SETBACK: Confirmed RF consolidation south of Dimitrov effectively closes the Myrnohrad pocket, forcing UAF FDP execution under maximal kinetic pressure.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

The constraints remain Air Defense capability against glide bombs, and the ability to rapidly centralize and coordinate the movement of tactical reserves (as implied by the commanders' call for unity). The successful negotiation of a new $8.2 billion IMF support program significantly bolsters long-term financial stability (1944Z, 1948Z).

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Targeting Command Legitimacy: RF PSYOPs are utilizing localized media (video reports from Pokrovsk with derogatory commentary, 1957Z) to sow distrust between local populations and UAF field command during the critical withdrawal phase.
• Global Dilution: RF state-affiliated media continues to distract international attention by highlighting high-profile global instability (e.g., Hong Kong disaster, White House security incident).
• RF Internal Fragility: Reports of critical healthcare wage cuts and budgetary crises in Russian regional cities (Yekaterinburg, 1940Z) represent a significant information vulnerability for UAF exploitation, countering the RF narrative of domestic stability.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

Domestic morale is balanced between the existential threat of the ongoing military defeats and the psychological boost of sustained international financial support (IMF program). The political focus on civilian firearms legislation (2002Z) suggests an intent to maintain the narrative of long-term national resistance.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

International posture remains firm. The IMF agreement ensures continued financial resilience. German political leadership (CDU/CSU) publicly rejected any peace agreement that excludes Ukraine or the EU, confirming sustained military and political commitment against RF goals (2000Z).

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA) (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF forces will prioritize the rapid exploitation of the Zaporizhzhia Flank NLT 270400Z. This operation will be spearheaded by VDV ground maneuver units, utilizing massed MLRS/rocket artillery fire to degrade the immediate defensive stabilization line (Huliaipole-Zatishye corridor) and push toward the Dnipropetrovsk administrative boundary. Simultaneously, the pressure on Kharkiv and Donetsk (via KAB strikes) will be maintained to prevent the deployment of crucial AD reserves to the southern flank.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

RF achieves a deep operational breakthrough on the Zaporizhzhia axis, forcing a large-scale, potentially disorganized UAF retreat toward Dnipro. Utilizing the resulting vulnerability, RF launches a concentrated strategic strike (potentially using the previously monitored GRAU assets) against the remaining C2 nodes or the key Kremenchuk logistics hub, causing widespread command friction precisely when UAF requires maximum cohesion to manage the flank crisis.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: IMMEDIATE OPERATIONAL DEFENSE (J3 / AD COMMAND)

1. COUNTER-ARTILLERY PRIORITY: Shift immediate operational focus and counter-battery fire (CBF) assets to suppress confirmed VDV MLRS positions in the Huliaipole-Zatishye corridor NLT 262330Z. Denial of preparatory fire is critical to slowing the RF exploitation tempo.
2. FLANK REINFORCEMENT: Immediately position mobile short-range AD (VSHORAD) assets to provide point defense for C2 nodes and reserve assembly areas along the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border, specifically shielding against the persistent KAB/UMPK threat on the Zaporizhzhia flank.
3. WITHDRAWAL COORDINATION: J3 must ensure that all units executing FDP acknowledge the closure of the southern withdrawal routes near Dimitrov and utilize established north/northwest BOVs, coordinating movement with the assault regiments confirming unity (225th, 425th, etc.) to prevent isolated unit destruction.

R-2: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND FORCE PROTECTION (NCA / J2)

1. TOS-1A TTP DISSEMINATION: J7/Training Command must develop and distribute a rapid doctrinal note (DR NOTE 26-03) detailing the successful tactics and weapon systems used to destroy the caged TOS-1A (2000Z) within the next 3 hours. Priority recipients are all strike units operating FPV/UAVs.
2. RF DOMESTIC VULNERABILITY EXPLOITATION: NCA must launch an aggressive psychological operation (PSYOP) campaign highlighting the severe labor/healthcare crises in RF regional cities (Yekaterinburg) to internally undermine the stability narrative supporting the war effort.

---

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS