Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 262000Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: RF COMPLETES MYRNOHRAD ENCIRCLEMENT; ZAPORIZHZHIA AXIS SHAPING INTENSIFIES (FAB-500); UAF AD PRODUCTION ACCELERATION REQUIRED.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The overall operational posture remains CRITICAL (DEFCON 2). The focus has transitioned from preventing encirclement to managing controlled withdrawal under Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDP).

• Southern Axis (Myrnohrad/Pokrovsk): Intelligence (DeepState correlation) confirms the physical encirclement of UAF forces in the Myrnohrad area is imminent, with the ring closed to 1.5 km. The T-05-15 GLOC is deemed operationally lost. This confirms the failure to stabilize the Pokrovsk pocket and necessitates immediate extraction prioritization. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Zaporizhzhia Flank (Exploitation Shaping): RF kinetic efforts on the southern flank are intensifying with high-munitions usage. Confirmed strikes utilized FAB-500 glide bombs against civilian targets in Huliaipole (1914Z). This confirms RF is using heavy aerial superiority to shape the ground battlespace, likely leveraging the unverified capture of Zatishye to prepare for a major exploitation toward the Dnipropetrovsk boundary.
• Northeast Axis (Fixation): RF continues aerial fixation efforts. Air Force reports launches of KAB/UMPK munitions directed at targets in the Sumy Direction (1910Z).
• Deep Strike/ATACMS Equivalent: UAF forces continue deep strike operations, evidenced by reports of UAV attacks on targets in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast.
• Infrastructure: Kyiv power schedules have reportedly been canceled until tomorrow, indicating successful infrastructure resilience and temporary reduction in local operational targeting threats.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No material change. Conditions remain favorable for RF air assault and mechanized maneuver.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF command priority is executing FDP for the Pokrovsk pocket and rapidly reinforcing the stabilization line immediately west of Myrnohrad, while simultaneously attempting to slow the advance on the Zaporizhzhia flank against high-intensity FAB strikes.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is to accelerate the operational collapse of the Donbas stabilization line (Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad) while simultaneously preventing UAF reserve repositioning through aggressive flanking pressure (Zaporizhzhia) and Northern fixation (Sumy).

• FAB Munitions Usage: The confirmed use of FAB-500 (with UMPK kits) in Huliaipole demonstrates RF capability to conduct high-precision, high-yield kinetic shaping on secondary axes, increasing the attrition rate on UAF forward defensive positions and pre-empting reinforcement movements. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Counter-UAS/EW: RF units (specifically Spetsnaz units like Akhmat) are reporting successful interception and neutralization of UAF UAVs in the Sumy direction, correlating with previous reporting on the deployment of sophisticated EW systems (FSTH-LD). This capability is likely deployed across all key axes to degrade UAF ISR and fire correction.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has successfully synchronized kinetic gains with immediate Information Operations (IO). The swift use of the term "Dobropillya Cauldron" (Операция Z) demonstrates a centralized effort to frame the withdrawal as a total defeat, targeting the morale of frontline troops and the domestic populace.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The ability to sustain simultaneous high-munitions usage (FABs in Zaporizhzhia, KABs in Sumy) coupled with ongoing ground assault tempo confirms RF sustainment lines are effective and unconstrained in the immediate term.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrated by the synchronization of multi-axis operations and rapid IO exploitation of tactical gains.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensive-withdrawal, characterized by extreme strain. Readiness is maintained, but manpower and materiel attrition are high. The key strategic objective confirmed by the Staff (Stavka) meeting (1919Z) is accelerated self-sufficiency in Air Defense (AD) production (short and medium range) to mitigate vulnerability to RF air superiority and deep strikes.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SETBACK: Confirmed effective encirclement of Myrnohrad pocket (NLT 2200Z) represents a major operational loss.
• TACTICAL SUCCESS: Successful long-range drone strikes on Taganrog, and the documented destruction of an RF 'Grad' MLRS, demonstrate retained capability for asymmetric response and tactical interdiction.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical constraint is the operational impact of RF air superiority (via FAB/KAB usage) and the effectiveness of EW systems. UAF forces urgently require robust ECCM systems and short-range mobile AD assets to defend against glide bombs and protect infrastructure/frontline C2.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO focuses on global distraction and internal delegation of UAF leadership:

1. Global Dilution: RF state media is highlighting unrelated, high-profile global instability (Guinea-Bissau coup, Hong Kong fire) to reduce international attention on the conflict.
2. Internal Dissolution: RF PSYOPs are actively synchronizing battlefield losses with renewed internal narratives of high-level corruption ("Mindichgate" / "ворюги"), attempting to erode trust in command authority precisely when decisive withdrawal orders are being issued.
3. Digital Threat: TASS signaling the potential blocking of WhatsApp in Russia is likely intended to disrupt digital command chains and generate friction in cross-border communication.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale remains polarized. The success in restoring Kyiv power provides necessary psychological stability, but this resilience is immediately challenged by the intense domestic political commentary regarding corruption amidst battlefield losses. Presidential messaging on domestic AD production is a vital effort to project self-reliance.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Reports of France initiating new forms of voluntary conscription (1926Z) signals a hardening of European posture toward potential long-term conflict and a commitment to military preparedness, which is a positive indicator for alliance stability.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forces will finalize the Myrnohrad encirclement NLT 262200Z. Simultaneously, RF will utilize the concentrated FAB-500 strikes to suppress and degrade the defense lines along the Zaporizhzhia flank (Huliaipole corridor), enabling rapid ground maneuver units (likely following the Zatishye axis) to exploit toward the Dnipropetrovsk administrative boundary NLT 270400Z. The Siversk pressure remains sustained to divert UAF strategic reserves.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) A successful RF exploitation from the Zaporizhzhia flank (Zatishye/Huliaipole) achieves a rapid operational breakthrough, forcing UAF to divert all remaining strategic reserves to prevent the loss of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. RF utilizes this diversion to launch a secondary, high-intensity assault on the Siversk line (critical gap), achieving simultaneous breakthroughs that render the entire Eastern front structurally unsustainable.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: OPERATIONAL STABILIZATION AND FLANK DEFENSE (J3 COMMAND)

1. ZAPORIZHZHIA COUNTER-FAB STRATEGY: Immediately deploy or reposition mobile, short-range AD assets (e.g., MANPADS teams, ZU-23-2/Gepard systems) to the Huliaipole-Zatishye corridor. Priority tasking is to target and interdict the aircraft launching UMPK glide bombs (FABs) to deny RF the ability to pre-shape the battlespace for ground exploitation.
2. FDP EXECUTION REVIEW: J3 must execute a high-frequency status check (every 30 minutes) on the withdrawal rate and extraction status of units caught east of the Myrnohrad 1.5 km ring, ensuring maximum adherence to FDP standards before complete kinetic isolation.
3. SIVERSK ISR INCREASE: Double the tactical ISR allocation (UAV/SIGINT) to the Siversk sector (as per previous R-1) with a new deadline of NLT 270200Z due to the escalating multi-front pressure.

R-2: STRATEGIC COUNTERMEASURES AND DOMESTIC RESILIENCE (NCA / J2)

1. COUNTER-CORRUPTION PSYOP: The National Communications Agency (NCA) must issue a high-level, synchronized statement addressing the "Mindichgate" and "ворюги" narratives NLT 262200Z. This statement must link the internal corruption rhetoric directly to active RF PSYOP campaigns designed to trigger distrust during critical operational withdrawals.
2. AD PRODUCTION EXPEDITING: The Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Presidential Staff must implement Level 1 Prioritization for the domestic production/integration of short and medium-range Air Defense systems (as discussed in Stavka). This mandate should ensure production deadlines supersede all non-critical procurement NLT 270600Z.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS