Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 261900Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: RF EXPANSION OF KINETIC EFFORT. NEW BREACH ATTEMPTS REPORTED ON DONBAS CENTRAL AXIS (SIVERSK). RF IO WEAPONIZES US POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational posture remains CRITICAL (DEFCON 2). The Russian Federation (RF) Main Effort remains the exploitation westward on the Southern Axis toward the Dnipropetrovsk boundary. However, intelligence now confirms RF is opening high-intensity pressure on secondary axes, increasing complexity and stressing UAF operational reserves.

• Southern Axis (Exploitation): RF mechanized forces continue high-tempo exploitation of the Pokrovsk breach through the Zatishye corridor. The Dnipropetrovsk administrative boundary remains the decisive operational decision point (R-1).
• Central Donbas Axis (New Breach): RF military sources claim penetration of the Siversk urban center and collapse of a major UAF fortified district. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). If verified, this forces UAF to rapidly commit reserves to stabilize the Lyman-Siversk line, diverting attention from the South.
• Northeast Axis (Fixation/Feint): RF sources claim tactical gains in the Burluk Direction (Kharkiv Oblast) and Volchansk-Lyman areas. This sustains the fixation threat against UAF Northern reserves.
• Infrastructure/Logistics: Localized tactical success in infrastructure defense is noted (Kyiv power schedules canceled, NLT 2100Z), indicating successful repair or localized reduction in immediate deep strike targeting on the capital. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No change from previous reporting. Conditions remain generally conducive for mechanized maneuver and sustained aviation/UAV strike operations across key axes.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF C2 is primarily managing the Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDP) on the Southern Axis. The rapid appearance of high-intensity claims on the Siversk/Burluk lines requires immediate intelligence verification and resource allocation planning to prevent RF achieving simultaneous operational breakthroughs.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent has crystallized into a strategic effort to generate simultaneous structural collapses across multiple axes: Southern exploitation, Donbas stabilization line breach, and Northern fixation.

• RF Kinetic Synchronization: The combined reporting confirms RF capability to execute multi-domain synchronization, linking the core kinetic breakthrough (South) with dedicated ground assaults on the Donbas stabilization line (Siversk) and continued deep strike/UAV attrition (Kherson confirmed casualty, Kyiv infrastructure targeting threat).
• Siversk Assault (Judgement): The claimed breach at Siversk (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) suggests RF is leveraging UAF resource concentration near the Pokrovsk pocket and the confirmed failure of CONPLAN DELTA to achieve tactical surprise and high penetration depth in a second, critical sector.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF continues to prioritize the neutralization of UAF asymmetric advantages.

• Counter-UAS Shielding: The confirmed deployment of advanced EW systems (e.g., FSTH-LD) remains the decisive tactical factor enabling the Southern exploitation.
• Targeting Priority Shift: Sustained drone attacks on civilian targets (Kherson fatality confirmed) emphasize RF intent to generate terror and degrade morale, rather than solely focusing on high-value military assets.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The high tempo of multi-axis kinetic operations (South, Siversk, Burluk, deep strikes) indicates that the previous logistics surge (GRAU spike) is successfully sustaining offensive momentum. No immediate constraints detected.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrated by the operational speed and immediate synchronization of IO with kinetic gains (e.g., rapid claims of success at Siversk/Burluk).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is CRITICALLY STRAINED by the simultaneous threat vectors. Strategic focus remains on long-term survival:

1. AD Regeneration: Prioritized domestic production startup (R-2).
2. Manpower Reform: Urgent review initiated.
3. Resilience Messaging: Successful SSO interdiction of a DRG in Donetsk, and the localized restoration of power in Kyiv, provide positive IO messaging counterbalancing battlefield setbacks.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SETBACK: Unverified, but highly concerning claims of an RF breach in the Siversk urban area threaten the stability of the entire Eastern front line.
• TACTICAL SUCCESS: Successful interdiction of an RF reconnaissance group by the 8th SSO Regiment (Donetsk). Kyiv power restoration provides a vital, immediate morale boost and demonstrates infrastructure resilience.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical constraint remains the time required to develop and deploy Counter-EW/ECCM tactics to defeat the RF FSTH-LD systems and the lag time for the domestic AD production initiative to yield deployable assets.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Operations (IO) are now heavily integrated with global political developments, seeking to undermine external support confidence.

• US Political Weaponization: RF state media (TASS) and affiliated channels are actively amplifying news of US political events (e.g., dismissal of criminal cases against former President Trump). (HIGH CONFIDENCE) The purpose is to signal to Ukraine that US political focus is shifting internally, leading to potential future support volatility.
• European Erosion Narrative: RF IO (Rybar) is pushing the narrative of collapsing European solidarity, citing changes in Germany’s policy towards Ukrainian refugees.
• UAF Proactive IO: The Presidential Office (OP) is actively engaging in damage control regarding internal political scandals (Vitkoff clarification), demonstrating an effort to maintain leadership legitimacy amidst military pressure.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is reliant on demonstrating domestic resilience. The restoration of power in Kyiv and the advancement of legislation supporting civilian firearm ownership (Draft Law №5708) are important domestic IO tools to project national resilience and preparation for long-term resistance.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The weaponization of US political events by RF IO underscores the need for Ukraine's strategic communication efforts to stabilize partner confidence, particularly in Washington D.C., as the 2026 election cycle approaches.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will prioritize consolidating the Southern exploitation toward the Dnipropetrovsk boundary (NLT 270400Z). Concurrently, RF will intensify the Siversk assault, committing local reserves to fully exploit the claimed penetration NLT 270800Z. This forces UAF to commit strategic reserves prematurely or risk a major operational collapse on the Eastern Donbas front, diverting attention from the critical Southern defense.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) A successful RF breakthrough and exploitation from Siversk leads to the subsequent collapse of the UAF defense line stretching towards the Lyman sector. Simultaneously, RF deep strike assets conduct coordinated precision strikes (using the mobilized GRAU munitions) on secondary UAF logistics/repair facilities (e.g., major rail/repair hubs near Dnipro or Kramatorsk) that are critical for sustaining the Siversk defense. This dual kinetic success achieves RF operational objectives faster than anticipated.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: OPERATIONAL STABILIZATION AND RESERVE ALLOCATION (J3 COMMAND)

1. SIVERSK PRIORITY ISR/FIRE SUPPORT: Immediately divert tactical ISR assets from stabilized Northern sectors (e.g., Sumy) to the Siversk area to verify RF penetration depth NLT 262200Z. Pre-authorize MLRS/Artillery fire missions to interdict RF reinforcement columns identified by ISR/SIGINT heading toward the claimed Siversk breach point.
2. FLANK SECURITY (DPR): Utilize the successful 8th SSO unit (confirmed in Donetsk area) to prioritize targeting RF infiltration and reconnaissance elements (DRGs) operating behind the Lyman-Siversk stabilization line to prevent deeper operational penetration.
3. RESOURCE HOLDING: Maintain strategic operational reserves for the Dnipropetrovsk boundary (Southern Axis), resisting the immediate urge to commit large formations to the Siversk sector until the penetration depth is verified (NLT 262200Z).

R-2: TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC COUNTERMEASURES (AD COMMAND/J2)

1. COUNTER-EW/ECCM ROLLOUT: J2/AD Command must urgently finalize and disseminate new Counter-EW protocols for FPV and ISR assets designed to operate under or circumvent the specific frequency spectrums identified for the RF FSTH-LD systems. Deadline for frontline unit dissemination is NLT 270000Z.
2. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS COUNTER-NARRATIVE (NCA): NCA must prepare coordinated communication packages addressing the RF weaponization of US political news, reaffirming bipartisan support for Ukraine and refuting narratives of "collapsing solidarity" NLT 270600Z.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS