Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 261835Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: RF EXPLOITATION ACCELERATES ON SOUTHERN AXIS. POKROVSK SECTOR NOW UNDER RF KINETIC/IO CONTROL. UAF HIGH COMMAND PRIORITIZES STRATEGIC DOMESTIC AD REGENERATION.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational posture remains CRITICAL (DEFCON 2). The RF Main Effort continues to capitalize on the Pokrovsk collapse, transitioning immediately into operational consolidation and flank exploitation.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Consolidation): RF forces are confirmed to have established operational control over Pokrovsk (implied by immediate initiation of IO campaigns within the city center). The T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) remains severed. UAF units are executing Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDP) westward toward the Myrnograd line.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Exploitation): Exploitation is accelerating following the likely capture of Zatishye (previous reports). The immediate RF objective is assessed to be the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border.
• Central/Northern Fixation Axes: RF maintains synchronized aerial pressure. Confirmed UAV (Shahed type, implied) groups are tracking:
  1. Kharkiv/Dnipropetrovsk Direction (18:10Z): Threatening deep logistics and energy infrastructure near the primary defensive line.
  2. Sumy/Chernihiv Direction (18:22Z): Sustaining the fixation threat on Northern AD assets, distracting from the kinetic breakthrough in the South.
• Key Terrain: The Dnipropetrovsk administrative boundary is the critical operational decision point. Loss of control here forces a strategic retreat across the entire southern sector.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

The Kharkiv RMA issued an advisory regarding adverse weather, suggesting minor degradation risk for UAV/aviation operations in the Northeast, but overall conditions remain generally conducive for mechanized maneuver and deep strikes across the primary axes.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF C2, acknowledging the tactical setbacks (Pokrovsk loss, CONPLAN DELTA failure), has shifted focus to high-level strategic survival:

1. AD Regeneration: Prioritizing rapid scaling of domestic, short- and medium-range Air Defense production (Confirmed by Stavka).
2. Force Restructuring: Urgent review of the manpower replenishment system (Confirmed by Stavka). Forward units are implementing FDP to minimize losses and delay RF advance toward the Dnipropetrovsk border.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is to achieve a decisive operational breakthrough on the Southern Axis and structurally degrade Ukraine's ability to resist long-term through C2 attacks and resource depletion.

• Adaptation (Confirmed): The synchronization of advanced EW/Counter-UAS systems (e.g., Chinese FSTH-LD radars) with mechanized columns is the decisive tactical adaptation, effectively neutralizing UAF FPV/ISR drone superiority in the breach zone. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Kinetic Synchronization: RF is successfully synchronizing deep strike fixation (Poltava/Sumy/Chernihiv UAVs) with the kinetic exploitation effort (Pokrovsk/Zaporizhzhia).
• Information Warfare Integration: Immediate deployment of Information Operations (IO) targeting local population centers (Pokrovsk) suggests a high level of C2 planning for consolidation and stabilization of newly captured territory.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF forces have transitioned from solely destroying UAF logistics nodes to actively neutralizing UAF's primary asymmetric weapon (FPV drones) using dedicated Counter-UAS shields, indicating a maturity in combined arms integration.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics surge capacity remains high (GRAU activity spike noted previously), supporting an active MDCOA deep strike threat and the sustained high tempo of the ground offensive.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective, demonstrated by the synchronization of EW deployment, kinetic exploitation, and IO efforts.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture is CRITICALLY STRAINED, moving from immediate tactical defense toward strategic operational stability. Stavka decisions reflect the acknowledgment that reliance on foreign aid for Air Defense is currently unsustainable and domestic production is now a strategic imperative. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SETBACK: RF control over the Pokrovsk urban sector is effectively established, forcing FDP activation. The failure of CONPLAN DELTA emphasizes the systemic issues Stavka is attempting to address.
• TACTICAL SUCCESS/IO WIN: Release of footage showing a French Mirage 2000 intercepting a Kh-101 cruise missile. This potentially serves as a high-value demonstration of Western support and sophisticated AD capability, counterbalancing the narrative of domestic resource strain.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: The time required to stand up domestic short/medium-range AD production (R-2). Failure to rapidly deploy these systems risks catastrophic loss of energy infrastructure and critical forward C2/Logistics nodes, especially against the background of sustained RF UAV fixation.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO strategy is two-pronged: internal demoralization and external diplomatic disruption.

• Internal Focus (Pokrovsk): RF forces are leveraging "Pokrovski zhduny" (collaborator/pro-RF elements) immediately upon entry to legitimize the occupation and create a perception of inevitability among remaining Ukrainian residents. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• External Focus: RF channels are actively mocking proposals by EU leaders (Kallas) to limit Russian military strength, framing such conditions as absurd and unattainable. This supports the larger RF narrative of total war and rejection of negotiated settlements not based on current military realities.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The Stavka's public focus on domestic AD production and reduced dependency on partners is a positive IO pivot, aiming to harness national resilience. However, this must immediately follow up with transparent implementation of the personnel replenishment restructuring to stabilize frontline morale, which is currently fragile due to sustained high attrition (as implied by the need for systemic review).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The release of advanced aircraft interception footage (Mirage 2000) reinforces high-end Western commitments but also underlines the dichotomy between high-cost, high-tech Western systems and the urgent, high-volume requirement for simple, domestic AD systems for frontline and infrastructure protection.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF mechanized forces, supported by effective counter-UAS coverage, will maintain high speed of advance through the Zatishye corridor, prioritizing the seizure of a key settlement on the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border (NLT 270400Z). Simultaneously, RF deep strike assets will continue the synchronization of UAV movements (Sumy/Kharkiv/Dnipropetrovsk) to force UAF AD expenditure and maintain the fixation of reserves NLT 270600Z.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) Given the confirmed activation of FDP and the continued high threat score at the GRAU base (previous DIS), RF executes a subsequent wave of precision strikes (NLT 270000Z) targeting UAF operational reserves or critical rear logistics infrastructure (e.g., Kremenchuk or Dnipro rail hubs), aiming to paralyze any attempt to establish a viable defensive line along the Dnipropetrovsk boundary.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: OPERATIONAL INTERDICTION AND COUNTER-EW (J3/SBS COMMAND)

1. DELAY MISSION ACTIVATION: J3 must authorize pre-planned, phased interdiction fire missions (Artillery/MLRS) targeting known chokepoints immediately West of Zatishye to slow the RF advance toward the Dnipropetrovsk boundary. Focus fire on confirmed EW/Counter-UAS vehicles accompanying the lead mechanized elements NLT 262200Z.
2. IMMEDIATE COUNTER-UAS PROTOCOL SHIFT: SBS command must immediately mandate the use of new drone tactics (e.g., electronic masking via terrain following, highly decentralized swarm attacks, or pre-programmed saturation profiles) to bypass the confirmed RF EW umbrella. Failure to adapt NLT 270000Z risks total loss of FPV attrition capability.
3. AD ASSET REPOSITIONING: Reposition mobile, short-range AD assets (e.g., Gepard/man-portable) currently fixing in the Central regions (Sumy/Poltava) to protect critical logistics hubs and command posts along the Dnipropetrovsk operational rear, accepting a calculated risk in the fixation zones.

R-2: STRATEGIC RESOURCE ACCELERATION (NCA/J4/MOD)

1. DOMESTIC AD TASK FORCE IMPLEMENTATION: The J4/MOD must immediately form a permanent task force with streamlined regulatory authority dedicated solely to meeting the Stavka requirement for domestic short/medium-range AD production. Establish a 24/7 accountability matrix for production targets and component sourcing by 271200Z.
2. MANPOWER REFORM COMMUNICATION: NCA must ensure that the public announcement regarding the restructuring of brigade replenishment (Stavka outcome) is accompanied by transparent, specific steps and assurances to current combat personnel NLT 270600Z, mitigating domestic morale decline.

---

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS