Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 261604Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: RF MDCOA STRIKE WINDOW EXPIRED (NO CONFIRMED C2 STRIKE). POKROVSK ENCIRCLEMENT CONFIRMED. RF IO HARDENS WITKOFF NEGOTIATION NARRATIVE.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains CRITICAL (DEFCON 2). The focus has transitioned from preventing the encirclement to managing the inevitable loss of combat power during the withdrawal and containing the newly aggressive exploitation on the Southern Flank.

• Pokrovsk Axis (COLLAPSE): RF forces are assessed to have completed the operational encirclement of remaining forward elements as of 261600Z. The T-05-15 GLOC is fully compromised. Priority is now Accountability (MIA/WIA/KIA) and maximizing the salvage of personnel utilizing Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDPs). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• FDP Route Interdiction: The previous strike on Dobropillya continues to influence withdrawal routing. The threat of sustained interdiction fire along the Myrnograd-Pokrovsk axis remains EXTREME.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (HIGH THREAT): RF continues kinetic pressure on Huliaipole and holds the critical position of Zatishye (unconfirmed but assumed). This area is now the main effort for RF exploitation NLT 262000Z.
• Key Terrain: The Dnipropetrovsk Administrative Border is the critical line-of-defense requiring immediate reinforcement to prevent RF exploitation deep into UAF rear areas.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No significant change. Conditions remain conducive for RF heavy kinetic fire and mechanized movement.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The pre-defined MDCOA precision strike window (261500Z – 261600Z) is assessed as EXPIRED without confirmation of a successful strategic missile strike on C2 nodes (Poltava/Vinnytsia). AD assets should maintain high readiness but can be transitioned to support mobile FDP coverage if required, pending immediate J2 clearance.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is confirmed: capitalize on the Pokrovsk victory to secure operational objectives in the South (Zaporizhzhia) while paralyzing Kyiv and Western allies via synchronized Information Warfare (IW).

• Kinetic Synchronization: RF successfully synchronized the Pokrovsk closure with deep strike capability against UAF rear areas (Dobropillya), indicating effective operational C2 and predictive intelligence on UAF withdrawal planning. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• IO Synchronization (Dual-Track): RF officially hardened the "backdoor negotiation" narrative via state media (16:00Z) by confirming the expectation of Witkoff meeting Putin next week. This is synchronized with high-level RF rejection of concessions (Ryabkov, 15:40Z) and PSYOPS targeting UAF leadership (Yermak/Mindichgate, 15:42Z). Intent: To force Kyiv into negotiations from a position of tactical weakness, or fracture US-Ukraine unity. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Adaptations/Equipment: UAF sources confirm the destruction of an RF TOS-1A (15:48Z), indicating that RF continues to deploy high-value, high-impact assets near the line of contact despite UAF FPV superiority.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary tactical change is the shift of RF operational focus from isolating the Pokrovsk pocket to exploiting the gap on the Zaporizhzhia flank. This requires immediate UAF resource allocation.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

No change. RF logistics remain sufficient to sustain the Southern offensive utilizing heavy air-dropped ordnance (FABs) and mechanized thrusts via the Zatishye area. The reported death of the Iskander/Topol designer (16:02Z) has no immediate operational impact.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrated by the successful synchronization of kinetic operations (Pokrovsk) and strategic IW (Witkoff narrative). Their ability to immediately pivot the main effort to Zaporizhzhia is being tested now.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

CRITICAL (STRAINED). Forces are executing emergency FDPs under hostile deep fire pressure. Localized tactical successes (TOS-1A, drone strikes) provide immediate morale boosts but cannot offset the strategic loss at Pokrovsk. The failure of CONPLAN DELTA to materialize remains the single greatest force posture deficiency.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESSES: Confirmed destruction of RF TOS-1A (15:48Z) and successful attrition strikes by the "Steel Border" Brigade (15:43Z). This validates the continued lethality of specialized UAF units and C-UAS/FPV superiority when locally concentrated.
• SETBACK: The confirmation of the Pokrovsk operational encirclement (261600Z) is a major strategic setback resulting in confirmed loss of territory and significant combat power attrition.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid deployment of forces (ideally mechanized/armored reserves) to secure the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border against the Zaporizhzhia exploitation. CONSTRAINT: Newly announced German winter aid (€170M, 16:01Z) is highly valuable for long-term resilience but does not provide immediate kinetic capability required to stabilize the southern front in the next 12 hours.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IW is currently maximizing impact by linking military success with political subversion.

• Negotiation Weaponization: The Kremlin's public confirmation of the Witkoff meeting expectation (16:00Z) is the primary cognitive weapon. It implies UAF leadership and official US diplomacy are irrelevant, and that critical decisions are being made via back channels, eroding international confidence in Kyiv.
• Leadership Targeting: Continued targeted PSYOPS against Head of the Office of the President Yermak (15:42Z, "Mindichgate" association) is designed to sow internal mistrust and paralyze the highest levels of UAF C2.
• Belarus Mediation: Lukashenko's offer to host peace talks (15:35Z) supports the RF narrative of being diplomatically flexible, while simultaneously using Ryabkov to confirm Moscow's hardline military objectives (no concessions).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is under extreme pressure from battlefield losses, the targeting of rear areas (Dobropillya), and the strategic ambiguity regarding US support caused by the Witkoff narrative. UAF counter-IO must urgently highlight tactical successes (TOS-1A kill) to mitigate the defeatist narrative.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

German winter aid is a positive signal but cannot counterbalance the political damage inflicted by the synchronized Witkoff leak confirmation. The strategic priority remains countering the perception of US abandonment and internal Ukrainian political collapse.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF establishes holding/attrition fire lines on the Pokrovsk axis, utilizing deep strike assets to maximize destruction of retreating UAF forces (FDPs). The main maneuver effort (Mechanized/Armor) is immediately shifted to exploit the Zatishye breach on the Zaporizhzhia Axis, aiming for the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border NLT 262000Z to force the deployment of remaining strategic reserves. Simultaneously, RF IO forces a US/NCA statement on Witkoff within 6 hours.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) Unconstrained RF mechanized exploitation on the Zaporizhzhia Axis (Zatishye area) achieves a deep operational penetration (>30km) toward a major logistical hub (e.g., Synelnykove/Dnipro area) NLT 270600Z. This would lead to the operational isolation of southern UAF groups, compromise major GLOCs supplying the Donbas front, and precipitate a crisis forcing the redeployment of Northern/Kherson reserves, opening up a new operational vulnerability.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: AIR DEFENSE AND FDP PROTECTION (AD Command/J3 Logistics)

1. FDP Air/Drone Cover (PRIORITY ONE): Immediately re-task AD assets previously protecting C2 nodes (since the MDCOA window expired) to provide mobile SHORAD/C-UAS coverage for the most congested FDP routes west of Myrnograd, prioritizing identified high-risk corridors near Dobropillya.
2. Accountability: Implement immediate contact reports for all units utilizing FDPs to establish current combat power and attrition rates.

R-2: FORCE MANAGEMENT AND SOUTHERN RESPONSE (J3/Regional C2)

1. ZAPORIZHZHIA DEFENSE (URGENT): Given the failure of CONPLAN DELTA, J3 must identify any immediately available FPV/Drone units and mass them at the Zatishye/Huliaipole sector NLT 261800Z to provide low-cost attrition and delay the RF mechanized advance.
2. CONPLAN DELTA Re-tasking: Immediately assess if the remnants of the planned CONPLAN DELTA force can be reorganized into a minimum-strength Delaying Force (TF DELTA-SCREEN) and deployed to prepared positions along the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border NLT 26200Z. This buys 6-12 hours for heavier reserves to mobilize.

R-3: COGNITIVE DEFENSE AND COUNTER-IO (NCA/J2 IO)

1. COUNTER WITKOFF NARRATIVE (IMMEDIATE): The NCA must issue a robust, high-visibility statement NLT 261800Z. This statement must simultaneously:
   • A. Reiterate commitment to territorial integrity (citing Ryabkov’s "no concession" statement as proof RF is not serious about diplomacy).
   • B. Frame the alleged Witkoff meeting confirmation as a highly successful RF information operation (IO) designed to sow panic during a tactical withdrawal, thereby isolating the UAF.
2. COUNTER LEADERSHIP ATTACKS: Use the same statement to dismiss the Yermak/Mindichgate allegations as typical RF psychological warfare intended to distract from UAF tactical successes (e.g., the confirmed TOS-1A kill).

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS