Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 261535Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: MDCOA STRIKE WINDOW T-25 MINUTES. POKROVSK FDP ROUTES UNDER INTERDICTION FIRE (DOBROPILLYIA STRIKE CONFIRMED). RF IO CAMPAIGN INTENSIFIES US POLITICAL LEVERAGE.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains CRITICAL (DEFCON 2). The focus remains on managed withdrawal from the Pokrovsk sector while containing the aggressive exploitation attempt on the Zaporizhzhia flank.

• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): RF forces are consolidating control over the T-05-15 GLOC. The immediate threat has shifted from encirclement completion to the interdiction of Fragmented Defense Protocol (FDP) withdrawal routes. A strike has been confirmed in Dobropillya (15:23Z), directly threatening the expected exfiltration corridor and complicating the movement of salvaged personnel and equipment to the Myrnograd defense line. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (HIGH THREAT): RF sources (Rybar, 15:15Z) reinforce the kinetic focus on the Huliaipole area. Unconfirmed advances near Zatishye/Otradnoye remain the critical threat to the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border.
• Key Terrain: Dobropillya, though not yet occupied, has become critical for FDP route management. Immediate establishment of alternative or redundant Westward withdrawal paths is necessary.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No significant change. Conditions remain conducive for RF heavy kinetic fire and mechanized movement.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) strike window (261500Z – 261600Z) is ACTIVE AND CRITICAL (T-25 MINUTES). Strategic Air Defense (AD) assets must maintain maximum readiness (WEAPONS TIGHT) over identified Command and Control (C2) nodes.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is confirmed: maximize kinetic gains to force capitulation while simultaneously degrading Western will to supply aid via cognitive operations.

• Interdiction Fire Capability: The strike on Dobropillya demonstrates RF ability to extend kinetic operations deep into UAF rear areas to disrupt withdrawal, confirming that the RF objective is not merely territorial gain but the destruction of UAF combat power. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Counter-UAS Adaptation: MoD reporting (15:05Z) confirms continued RF investment in specialized anti-drone teams (Ivanovo Airborne) and adaptation to UAF FPV superiority, specifically mentioning successes in the Kherson and Bakhmut sectors.
• Dual-Track Diplomatic IO: RF continues its highly complex, coordinated IO campaign:
  1. Hardline Position: Ryabkov reiterates "no concessions" (15:26Z).
  2. Compromise Weaponization: Russian state media confirms expectation of "detailed contacts" with Witkoff (15:21Z), exploiting the US political leak to imply negotiation is possible only through channels outside official US/Ukrainian policy, thereby undermining UAF authority. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed use of fire support (likely deep strike artillery or missile systems) against Dobropillya indicates RF is now aggressively prioritizing the disruption of UAF tactical withdrawal, moving past purely isolating the pocket.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Strategic munition readiness remains critical (GRAU SAR Score 30.41). Logistical support for the southern offensive is sufficient for continued heavy FAB usage on the Zaporizhzhia front.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrated by the synchronization of deep strike (Dobropillya), frontal exploitation (Pokrovsk), and high-level political IO (Witkoff narrative reinforcement).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

CRITICAL (STRAINED). The Dobropillya strike confirms FDP implementation is now an active maneuver under fire, severely taxing UAF coordination. AD assets remain tied to C2 node protection (MDCOA) while ground forces require immediate fire suppression/C-UAS protection on the withdrawal routes.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS: Confirmed successful FPV strike by 63rd Mechanized Brigade destroying an RF TOS-1A in the Lyman direction (15:10Z). This localized success confirms the continued lethality of UAF small-unit capabilities and provides a critical morale boost.
• SETBACK: The targeting of Dobropillya confirms that RF is achieving effective predictive targeting on UAF withdrawal operations, increasing the probability of combat power loss during FDP execution.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Mobile Counter-UAS and SHORAD coverage for FDP routes west of Myrnograd to counter RF deep fire observation assets and prevent drone strikes against exposed personnel. OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINT: The political volatility of the Witkoff/Driscoll leaks (15:14Z) severely limits the political leverage required to secure immediate supplemental Western aid packages necessary for stabilizing the Zaporizhzhia front.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IW objectives are converging: military victory (Pokrovsk) justifies political attack (US instability).

• Targeting US Support: The synchronized leak (Witkoff) and subsequent commentary (Driscoll, 15:14Z, suggesting US abandonment) are high-impact cognitive weapons designed to paralyze US decision-making regarding current aid and future commitment.
• Amplification of Defeat: RF media is actively showcasing UAF FDP failures (Mash, 15:13Z) to amplify the psychological impact of the Pokrovsk encirclement.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is stressed by the convergence of battlefield failure (Pokrovsk), the targeting of safe zones (Dobropillya), and the strategic ambiguity regarding US support created by the Witkoff/Driscoll leaks. Domestic collection efforts (Sternenko, 15:12Z) show signs of fatigue ("Просідаємо по збору").

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Shoigu’s travel to Bishkek for CSTO meetings (15:06Z) is intended to project international legitimacy and regional military solidarity, countering the narrative of Russia’s global isolation. The core priority remains countering the highly corrosive narratives emanating from the US political leaks.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF completes operational encirclement at Pokrovsk NLT 261600Z. RF will sustain deep fires (e.g., Dobropillya area) to maximize destruction of UAF combat power during FDP. Immediately following the closure, RF shifts maximum maneuver forces to exploit the Zaporizhzhia Flank breach (Zatishye area) toward the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border NLT 262000Z, likely forcing a premature commitment of remaining UAF reserves.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF successfully executes a coordinated, high-precision missile strike against vulnerable C2 nodes (Poltava/Vinnytsia) during the active 261500Z – 261600Z window. Success leads to command paralysis precisely as the FDP withdrawal is underway and the Zaporizhzhia crisis accelerates, resulting in catastrophic loss of centralized control for up to eight hours.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: AIR DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC HARDENING (AD Command)

1. MDCOA STRIKE RESPONSE: Maintain all AD assets protecting C2 nodes at WEAPONS TIGHT until 261630Z. Full-spectrum EW/jamming remains authorized and mandatory near C2 locations.
2. FDP Route Protection (URGENT): Immediately deploy available mobile SHORAD/C-UAS teams (e.g., Gepard/Avenger equivalents, if available) to cover the primary and secondary withdrawal routes leading west of Myrnograd, prioritizing areas previously targeted, such as Dobropillya.

R-2: FORCE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL RESPONSE (J3/Regional C2)

1. FDP Rerouting: Due to the Dobropillya strike, immediately reroute remaining FDP columns using secondary and tertiary routes, emphasizing movement at night or during adverse weather if possible. Prioritize speed over cohesion for personnel extraction.
2. ZAPORIZHZHIA CRISIS RESPONSE: The success of the Lyman TOS-1A strike (15:10Z) confirms UAF FPV lethality. Mass available FPV drone assets and launch teams immediately to the Zatishye/Huliaipole sector NLT 261700Z to establish a localized, attrition-based defense designed to slow the RF mechanized exploitation while awaiting confirmation on CONPLAN DELTA force status.
3. CONPLAN DELTA Re-tasking: Immediately assign any forces identified as part of CONPLAN DELTA (Gap 3) to a prepared delaying/screening position along the Dnipropetrovsk border to buffer the Zaporizhzhia exploitation NLT 262000Z.

R-3: COGNITIVE DEFENSE AND COUNTER-IO (NCA/J2 IO)

1. COUNTER US POLITICAL ATTACKS (IMMEDIATE): NCA must release a statement directly addressing the Driscoll and Witkoff narratives NLT 261600Z. Frame the alleged statements as evidence of RF deep influence operations intended to divide Ukraine and its allies at a critical tactical moment. Reiterate UAF commitment to territorial integrity (Ryabkov's hardline stance validates this).
2. INTERNAL MORALE: Use the confirmed destruction of the TOS-1A (Lyman) and similar small-scale successes to counter the narrative of total defeat (Pokrovsk Cauldron). Focus messaging on UAF resilience and lethal tactical innovation.

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS