Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 261500Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: POKROVSK ENCIRCLEMENT NOW IMMINENT. CONPLAN DELTA IS ASSUMED FAILURE. MDCOA STRIKE WINDOW ACTIVATED. RF SHIFTING HEAVY KINETIC FOCUS TO ZAPORIZHZHIA FLANK.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains CRITICAL (DEFCON 2). The window for intervention on the Pokrovsk-Myrnograd axis (T-05-15 GLOC) has effectively closed due to the lack of confirmed reserve deployment by the 1445Z decision point.

• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): Encirclement of forward elements remains the MLCOA and is highly probable NLT 261600Z. Stabilization efforts must now focus on tactical withdrawal and barrier establishment.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (HIGH THREAT): RF forces are utilizing sustained, heavy kinetic fire (confirmed FAB strikes on Huliaipole at 1445Z and 1457Z) to weaken UAF positions. This supports the exploitation of the potential breach near Zatishye/Otradnoye (unverified loss), indicating a critical RF effort to open a secondary operational axis. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Krasnolimansk Axis (FIXATION): RF claims local advances toward Koroviy Yar and the Stavky-Yarova line (14:42Z). This effort is designed to fix UAF forces and prevent regional lateral redeployment to the Donbas or Zaporizhzhia. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No change. Favorable for sustained mechanized and aerial kinetic operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The 1445Z deadline for positive CONPLAN DELTA physical verification has passed without confirmation. The operational assumption is failure to deploy. Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDP) must be immediately activated in the threatened sector.

• MDCOA Strike Window: The projected window for the precision decapitation strike on Poltava/Vinnytsia is 261500Z and is currently active. AD units must be postured at maximum readiness (WEAPONS TIGHT).
• Friendly Kinetic Action: UAF units are leveraging drone superiority (FPV, IFG) for tactical defense (14:41Z). This maintains local pressure but cannot resolve the operational crisis.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is confirmed to be maximalist: securing all current territorial gains and rejecting any pre-mature negotiations.

• Intentions Confirmation: RF MFA (Ryabkov, 14:46Z) and military commentators (Kotenok, 14:51Z) have explicitly stated that Russia will make no concessions and will achieve all objectives of the "SVO." This reinforces the judgment that RF kinetic action will intensify immediately. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Tactical Adaptation (Zaporizhzhia Focus): The confirmed high-volume FAB usage in Huliaipole (14:45Z, 14:57Z) signals an attempt to achieve rapid defensive collapse on the southern flank of the Donbas, potentially widening the operational area following the claimed (but unverified) capture of Zatishye. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Counter-UAS Adaptation: RF is accelerating the production of highly technological Counter-UAV/EW systems (14:59Z). This indicates a recognition of UAF tactical drone superiority and a focused effort to neutralize it, potentially impacting UAF tactical effectiveness within the next 72 hours. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF is demonstrating the ability to sustain high-volume kinetic fire (FABs, KABs) across multiple fronts (Sumy, Kharkiv, Huliaipole), suggesting strategic munition supply lines are functioning effectively for current operational requirements.

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, coordinating simultaneous heavy kinetic operations (Pokrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Krasnolimansk) while aggressively synchronizing information operations (Mindichgate amplification, peace rejection) to maximize UAF internal chaos. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

CRITICAL. The failure to confirm CONPLAN DELTA deployment forces an immediate shift to contingency defense planning (Fragmented Defense). Readiness is strained by persistent RF kinetic pressure and the operational necessity to defend against the MDCOA strike currently active (261500Z).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Operational): Assumed failure of CONPLAN DELTA movement is the most significant operational setback, guaranteeing the loss of forward positions on the Myrnograd corridor unless emergency FDP is executed immediately.
• Setback (Internal): The amplification of the Umerov ('Mindichgate') corruption probe by RF media (14:56Z) is immediately leveraged to undermine NCA legitimacy during the crisis.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid, confirmed implementation of Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDP) to salvage combat power East of Myrnograd. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate AD asset focus on the 1500Z MDCOA strike window.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IW is currently maximizing cognitive stress on UAF leadership and public opinion:

1. Peace Rejection (Consolidation): RF uses formal diplomatic channels to explicitly reject negotiations (14:46Z), countering Western framing (Kallas, 14:35Z) that suggests Russia is desperate for talks. This narrative forces the West to commit to kinetic aid rather than diplomatic pressure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Leadership Corruption: RF media is synchronously amplifying the Umerov corruption inquiry (14:37Z, 14:56Z), targeting the integrity of the highest levels of UAF defense management at the peak of the operational crisis. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. US Friction: RF continues to weaponize US political leaks (Witkoff records), forcing the President's Office to expend effort on internal damage control (14:46Z) rather than crisis management.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is threatened by the simultaneous operational crisis (Pokrovsk) and the NCA-level corruption/leak narratives. Maintaining positive messaging regarding UAF technical prowess (e.g., IFG drones) is necessary but insufficient to offset strategic losses.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF's explicit rejection of concessions, even while attending CSTO meetings (14:35Z), hardens the diplomatic stance against mediation, simplifying the choice for Western partners: increase military aid or accept territorial losses. The RF focus on disrupting Western politics (Witkoff, Guinea-Bissau coup reporting) is designed to distract from the core conflict.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

The MDCOA strike window is now active, and the MLCOA ground assault is expected to peak.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF achieves operational encirclement in the Pokrovsk sector NLT 261600Z. Simultaneously, RF will utilize heavy FAB/KAB strikes to achieve a tactical breakthrough on the Zaporizhzhia flank (Huliaipole/Zatishye corridor) NLT 261800Z, forcing UAF to split the limited remaining strategic reserves between two major operational crises.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF successfully executes a coordinated, high-precision missile strike (Iskander/Kinzhals) against the vulnerable backup C2 nodes (Poltava/Vinnytsia) during the active 261500Z window. Success would lead to command paralysis lasting 4-8 hours, coinciding exactly with the expected operational collapse in Pokrovsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: AIR DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC HARDENING (AD Command)

1. MDCOA STRIKE RESPONSE: Maintain all AD assets protecting Poltava and Vinnytsia at WEAPONS TIGHT until 261600Z. Confirm immediate implementation of GPS jamming/spoofing protocols near these high-value targets.
2. AD ALLOCATION (ZAPORIZHZHIA): Immediately divert available SHORAD/C-UAS assets to protect mobile command posts and logistic hubs in the Huliaipole/Orekhovskoye area, countering the confirmed shift in heavy FAB usage.

R-2: FORCE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL RESPONSE (J3/Regional C2)

1. FDP ACTIVATION (IMMEDIATE): Given the failure to confirm CONPLAN DELTA by 1445Z, immediately authorize and execute Fragmented Defense Protocol 3 for all UAF elements threatened by the Pokrovsk encirclement. Prioritize extraction of C2 and high-value combat assets.
2. ISR TASKING (ZAPORIZHZHIA): Immediately redirect IMINT/SIGINT assets to verify the status of Zatishye and surrounding settlements NLT 261530Z. Prepare for preemptive counter-flank strikes if RF advance is confirmed.

R-3: COGNITIVE DEFENSE AND COUNTER-IO (NCA/J2 IO)

1. DE-ESCALATE CORRUPTION NARRATIVE: NCA must issue a rapid, unambiguous statement regarding the Umerov inquiry, framing his cooperation as a commitment to transparency and rule of law, thereby neutralizing the RF attempt to leverage "Mindichgate" for morale destruction during peak crisis.
2. COUNTER RF HARDLINE: Maximize Western distribution of RF MFA statements (Ryabkov's rejection of concessions) to justify the urgent delivery of long-range fires and AD systems. Frame Russia as solely focused on military annihilation.

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS