Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 261435Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: POKROVSK ENCIRCLEMENT WINDOW IMMINENT. CONPLAN DELTA DEPLOYMENT STATUS CRITICAL/UNCONFIRMED. RF CONFIRMS KINETIC INTENT AND EXPLOITS NEW ZAPORIZHYE GAIN (UNVERIFIED).

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains CRITICAL (DEFCON 2). The defining factor is the operational encirclement window for the Myrnograd corridor, previously assessed at 1.5 km (1410Z).

• Pokrovsk-Myrnograd Axis (CRITICAL): No positive confirmation of stabilization or reserve force intervention (CONPLAN DELTA) since 1410Z. The window for RF achieving operational encirclement by 261600Z is rapidly closing. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (NEW DEVELOPMENT): RF Ministry of Defense (MoD) claims the capture of Zatishye (Zaporozhye region) (14:11Z). This settlement, if genuinely secured, poses an emerging flanking threat to the UAF defense lines previously assessed near Dnipropetrovsk (reference Previous Daily Report, Otradnoye concern). (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Requires verification)
• Northern Fixation: RF continues fixation efforts with confirmed KAB (Glide Bomb) launches targeting Sumy region (14:18Z). This pressures UAF air defense allocation away from the eastern C2 nodes and the Pokrovsk corridor. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No change. Conditions remain favorable for sustained kinetic operations and mechanized maneuver across all operational sectors. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The pre-established control measure deadline for verification of CONPLAN DELTA physical movement (261430Z) is currently being assessed. Failure to confirm movement within the next 15 minutes will necessitate activation of emergency fragmented defense protocols.

• CONPLAN DELTA Status: UNCONFIRMED CRITICAL. J3 has not yet provided the required positive confirmation of lead element location/ETA. (CRITICAL CONFIDENCE)
• Friendly Kinetic Action: UAF 81st Airmobile Brigade confirms successful anti-personnel/fortification FPV drone strikes in the Siverskyi direction (14:08Z). This shows localized tactical effectiveness but is operationally immaterial to the Pokrovsk crisis. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is confirmed: maximize military gains and reject all negotiation attempts while UAF defenses are strained.

• Intentions Confirmation: High-ranking RF commander, Apti Alaudinov, publicly dismissed "Trump peace plans" (14:22Z), supported by public warnings from influential military bloggers (Colonelcassad: 14:20Z) that refusal to negotiate will lead to further territorial losses.
  • Judgment: This signals internal RF political cohesion in maximizing the current tactical advantage before any external diplomatic pressure can mount. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Tactical Focus: The primary effort remains the Pokrovsk breach. The secondary effort includes confirmed use of EW-hardened logistics platforms (WarGonzo Dronobus, 14:20Z), indicating RF preparation to sustain high-tempo operations despite projected high attrition and contested electromagnetic spectrum. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The claimed capture of Zatishye (Zaporozhye) represents a critical shift if verified, potentially opening a new vector of operational exploitation on the southern flank of the Donbas defense. RF is leveraging KABs against Sumy to fix resources in the North. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF is prioritizing survivable logistics solutions (EW-hardened platforms). While attrition is high (reference previous SITREP), the ability to introduce and sustain advanced tactical equipment suggests critical materiel flow is maintained, at least for spearhead units. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust, successfully integrating kinetic operations (Sumy KABs, Pokrovsk assault) with effective strategic messaging aimed at discouraging UAF defense and foreign support (e.g., Alaudinov, Peace Rejection). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture remains CRITICAL. The immediate readiness of CONPLAN DELTA forces is the single greatest variable determining the outcome in the next 90 minutes.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes (Capabilities Signal): UAF public messaging regarding the operational integration of the Mirage 2000 fighter jet (14:08Z) provides an important signal of capabilities expansion and resilience to external partners.
• Setbacks (Operational Uncertainty): The continued uncertainty regarding CONPLAN DELTA status and the unverified, but potentially critical, loss of Zatishye pose immediate operational threats.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate, verifiable location and movement status of CONPLAN DELTA forces NLT 261445Z. NEW REQUIREMENT: Dedicated ISR to verify the status of Zatishye and surrounding settlements (NLT 261530Z).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Warfare (IW) is focused on two vectors:

1. Morale Degradation: Pro-RF media (Operation Z, 14:19Z) is aggressively disseminating highly edited content portraying Ukrainians fleeing mobilization and claiming UAF inferiority ("Russia is stronger, fighting means simply dying"). This targets mobilization efficacy. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. External Support Fissure: TASS reports are actively amplifying friction within the EU regarding the utilization of frozen RF assets (Estonia vs. Belgium, 14:24Z), aiming to disrupt strategic financial support mechanisms. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic Ukrainian morale is supported by the announcement of the joint NATO-Ukraine innovation initiative (UNITE – Brave NATO, 14:17Z), signaling long-term commitment and technological superiority. However, the RF domestic corruption narrative (Mindich case, 14:18Z) could generate minor domestic political friction if amplified.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Strategic support remains firm (NATO-Ukraine initiative). RF diplomatic messaging (Zakharova/Alaudinov) directly targets the core concept of Western mediation (Trump plan/Macron asset use). This hostile diplomatic environment reinforces the necessity of kinetic military aid over peace planning in the near term. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

The failure to confirm CONPLAN DELTA movement by the 1430Z decision point significantly increases the probability of MDCOA activation by the enemy.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forces will utilize concentrated kinetic pressure and sustained artillery fire to close the remaining gap, achieving operational encirclement of forward UAF elements in the Pokrovsk sector NLT 261600Z. Concurrently, RF will exploit the political pressure of confirmed KAB strikes on Sumy to fix AD assets.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF executes the pre-planned coordinated, high-precision missile strike (Iskander/Kinzhals) against the vulnerable backup C2 nodes (Poltava/Vinnytsia) NLT 261500Z. This strike will be coordinated with the anticipated peak momentum of the Pokrovsk ground breakthrough, aiming for command paralysis during the operational collapse.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: FORCE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL RESPONSE (J3/Regional C2)

1. FINAL CONPLAN DELTA CALL: J3 must provide positive verification of physical movement to the Myrnograd corridor NLT 261445Z via dedicated SATCOM link.
2. CONTINGENCY EXECUTION: If R-1 is negative at 1445Z, immediately authorize Fragmented Defense Protocol 3 for all units East of Myrnograd, prioritizing combat power extraction and establishing pre-planned defensive barriers along the T-05-15 corridor.
3. AD ALLOCATION (SUMY): Reallocate specific MANPADS/Mobile SHORAD units (if available without compromising C2 defense) to the Sumy region to counter confirmed KAB launches, mitigating the logistics fixation strike.

R-2: AIR DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC HARDENING (AD Command)

1. MDCOA COUNTERMEASURE: Place all AD assets protecting Poltava and Vinnytsia on WEAPONS TIGHT/MAXIMUM ALERT status for the 261500Z ballistic threat window. Implement immediate spoofing/jamming protocols targeting GPS guidance systems near expected impact zones.
2. COUNTER-FLANK ISR: Immediately redirect high-end ISR assets (IMINT/SIGINT) to confirm the status of Zatishye (Zaporozhye region) NLT 261530Z. Prepare tactical fire support plans for settlements adjacent to Zatishye if the loss is verified. (R-3)

R-3: INFORMATION WARFARE & COGNITIVE DEFENSE (NCA/J2 IO)

1. EXPLOIT RF PEACE REJECTION: Leverage the public rejection of peace initiatives by RF commanders (Alaudinov, Colonelcassad) across all diplomatic channels and public media, framing the RF as irrevocably committed to aggressive war, thereby justifying increased Western military aid and discouraging diplomatic pause during the crisis.
2. AMPLIFY POSITIVE SIGNALS: Maximize publicity for the NATO-Ukraine UNITE innovation initiative and the operational reporting of the Mirage 2000 to maintain internal public confidence and demonstrate future force capability.

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS