Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 261335Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: CRITICAL BREAKTHROUGH IMMINENT: RF ADVANCE ACCELERATING ON POKROVSK AXIS. FRAGMENTED DEFENSE CONTINGENCY MUST BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED. PAVLOGRAD UAS THREAT REMAINS UNMITIGATED.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture confirms the transition from kinetic shaping operations to the main effort ground assault, currently centered on the Pokrovsk/Myrnograd axis.

• Pokrovsk/Myrnograd Axis (CRITICAL DETERIORATION): Confirmed reports from UAF channels (13:15Z) indicate a significant, recent RF advance in the Pokrovsk and Myrnograd sectors, creating a serious threat of operational encirclement. This confirms the RF assault has begun and is exceeding current UAF resistance capability.
  • Judgment: Loss of Myrnograd would expose the flanks of the Kostiantynivka defensive line.
• Tactical Counter-Action: UAF Special Operations Forces (SSO) confirmed successful FPV strikes on an RF accumulation point in Pokrovsk and destruction of a 137th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (OMSB) ammunition depot in Kamianka (13:05Z). This indicates UAF tactical reserves are fighting delaying actions but RF forces are already inside immediate defensive perimeter areas.
• Supporting Operations: RF IO assets claim the encirclement and attrition of Ukrainian forces near the Kleban-Byk Reservoir (13:14Z), serving to fix UAF attention and prevent reinforcement movement toward Pokrovsk.
• Deep Strike Threat: The immediate air defense threat against the critical logistics hub of Pavlohrad remains unaddressed (as noted in the previous SITREP).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No significant change. Continued favorable conditions for mechanized maneuver and sustained UAS/drone operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The control measure shift to CONPLAN DELTA (Fragmented Defense) is now an operational imperative. The critical vulnerability caused by the failure of Reserve Force Bravo (RFB) is actively being exploited by the enemy.

• Decision Point Passed: The 261245Z NLT deadline for RFB confirmation has passed. All resources previously allocated to managing RFB must be redirected to supporting CONPLAN DELTA deployment.
• Immediate Defensive Requirement: Regional reserves must be committed NLT 261400Z to prevent the tactical encirclement threat posed by RF advances near Pokrovsk/Myrnograd.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is to achieve operational collapse along the Pokrovsk axis through coordinated maneuver and psychological warfare.

• Kinetic Capabilities: RF continues to showcase capability for multi-domain synchronization. They are successfully leveraging the post-mass-strike AD depletion to push ground forces forward rapidly. The continued RF promotion of modernized Iskander-M systems capable of evading Patriot defenses (13:20Z) reinforces the capability for a high-confidence second strategic strike. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Intentions: RF seeks to exploit the critical defensive gap caused by the failure of UAF reserves (RFB/Plan 7-B MOD) before UAF can fully implement CONPLAN DELTA. The advance toward Myrnograd is designed to collapse the western flank of the Donbas defense.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The main adaptation is the acceleration of the assault timeline and the introduction of flanking pressure on the primary GLOCs.

1. Accelerated Tempo: The presence of RF accumulation points within the Pokrovsk defensive envelope and the threat to Myrnograd indicate that the RF ground assault timeline has been accelerated, likely attempting to capitalize on UAF C2 paralysis and reserve failure.
2. Internal Strain (Strategic Context): Although operationally focused, RF is exhibiting signs of internal systemic decay. Reporting by RF sources (13:17Z, 13:07Z, 13:28Z) details high-level corruption (Ivanov assets), troop cynicism, and severe shortages in medical/rehabilitation logistics. This weakness is not immediately actionable but highlights long-term RF force generation constraints.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains focused on providing forward materiel for the assault. UAF strikes (Kamianka depot, 13:05Z) indicate RF forward logistics nodes are active but vulnerable to SSO targeting.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains synchronized, particularly between the operational field commanders (pushing the Pokrovsk assault) and the Information Operations bureaus (maintaining psychological pressure and strategic signaling via naval exercises and missile claims).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture remains CRITICAL/DEFCON 2. Frontline forces, particularly SSO elements, are fighting effectively, but operational cohesion is at high risk due to the reserve failure. The immediate threat of encirclement demands an immediate commitment of all available regional forces.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes (Tactical): SSO drone strikes (Pokrovsk accumulation/Kamianka depot) provided crucial BDA and inflicted confirmed losses on the 137th OMSB, slowing the immediate assault momentum.
• Setbacks (Operational): The confirmed significant RF advance threatening Myrnograd and Pokrovsk (13:15Z) represents the most significant operational setback since the initial threat projection.
• Resource Mobilization: Fundraising appeals for the 43rd Separate Mechanized Brigade (13:21Z) underscore the acute need for tactical logistics support at the brigade level.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate authorization and physical deployment of pre-designated CONPLAN DELTA forces (Regional Reserves) to the Pokrovsk-Myrnograd corridor NLT 261400Z. Failure to meet this timeline will likely result in the operational collapse of the western Donbas line.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is maintaining its pressure on multiple axes:

1. Kinetic Amplification: Promoting "successes" (Kleban-Byk encirclement, Iskander superiority) to demonstrate RF momentum.
2. Internal Undermining (UAF): Disinformation campaign alleging corruption cover-ups involving Zelenskyy and Yermak (13:19Z) aimed at fracturing internal political unity immediately prior to the military crisis.
3. Diplomatic Weaponization: RF is reluctant to publicly discuss any potential peace plans (e.g., Trump plan, 13:32Z), allowing them to maintain strategic ambiguity while pushing the military initiative.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF Resilience: President Zelenskyy’s public coordination with EC leadership (13:31Z) serves as a key signal of governmental stability and continued international backing, countering RF "collapse" narratives.
• RF Fatigue: Significant, uncensored critique from influential RF military channels ("Dva mayora") regarding systemic corruption and the high cost of the war indicates rising internal fatigue that UAF IO should exploit long-term.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• EU Coordination (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Confirmation of high-level strategic coordination between UAF and European Commission leadership (13:31Z) reinforces the hypothesis of sustained financial and military support, potentially including asset utilization proposals (Dempster-Shafer belief: 0.105).
• Belarus Leverage (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): US efforts to secure the release of political prisoners in Belarus (13:32Z) confirm active attempts to introduce diplomatic friction between Moscow and Minsk, potentially distracting Russia's western flank.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forces will press the assault to achieve operational depth and collapse the defense in the Pokrovsk-Myrnograd corridor NLT 261600Z. This will involve maximizing artillery and KAB strike support to prevent the deployment of UAF CONPLAN DELTA forces.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) Concurrently with the peak ground assault, RF will execute a coordinated precision strike (Iskander/Kinzhals) against critical strategic logistics and backup C2 targets (specifically Pavlohrad, Poltava, and Vinnytsia) NLT 261500Z. The objective is command decapitation during the ground breakthrough, capitalizing on the confirmed vulnerability of UAF AD (63% intercept rate).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: FORCE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL RESPONSE (J3)

1. CONPLAN DELTA ACCELERATION (IMMEDIATE ACTION): J3 must confirm physical movement and operational status of all pre-designated regional reserves (CONPLAN DELTA forces). Prioritize speed of deployment over unit cohesion; stabilization of the Myrnograd flank is the primary mission NLT 261400Z.
2. SSO TARGETING EXPANSION: Task SSO and specialized drone units to immediately prioritize RF forward Command Posts (CPs) and logistics nodes (as successfully targeted in Kamianka) along the Pokrovsk/Myrnograd axis to disrupt RF C2 during their maneuver.
3. FIRE SUPPORT (DE-FIXATION): Allocate long-range MLRS/Artillery assets to suppress confirmed enemy positions advancing toward Myrnograd to buy time for CONPLAN DELTA forces to arrive.

R-2: AIR DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC HARDENING (AD Command/J2)

1. PAVLOHRAD DEFENSE (CRITICAL): Immediate deployment of high-rate-of-fire SHORAD assets to Pavlohrad to neutralize the confirmed inbound UAS (precursor to MDCOA). Establish hardened C2 redundancy in the sector.
2. C2 AD HARDENING: Execute immediate hardening protocols for C2 nodes in Poltava and Vinnytsia. Re-task any available MRAD/L-RAD (Patriot/SAMP/T) assets to layered defense over these nodes, prioritizing C2 protection over non-critical infrastructure through 261600Z.
3. COUNTER-Iskander READINESS: Disseminate intelligence regarding RF claims of modernized Iskander capabilities (terminal evasion) to AD crews; emphasize rapid relocation and layered defense against ballistic threats.

R-3: INFORMATION WARFARE & COGNITIVE DEFENSE (NCA/J2 IO)

1. COUNTER-CORRUPTION NARRATIVE: Immediately counter the RF disinformation regarding high-level corruption (Yermak/Zelenskyy) by amplifying the positive outcomes of the Zelenskyy/Von der Leyen meeting, emphasizing strong EU support and the commitment of frozen Russian assets (if publicly confirmable).
2. EXPLOIT RF INTERNAL STRESS: Initiate a psychological operation (PSYOPS) campaign targeting RF frontline forces, utilizing confirmed internal RF media reports (Dva mayora, Putin's niece) detailing the systemic corruption and poor medical support within the RF armed forces.

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS