Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 260945Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: POKROVSK AXIS: KINETIC ASSAULT PEAKING. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEGRADATION EXPANDED (GAS). RF IO ACHIEVES COGNITIVE PARALYSIS VIA US PEACE PLAN NARRATIVE.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity remains the Pokrovsk Axis in Donetsk Oblast, specifically the T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) running through the Rodynske sector. RF forces are committed to achieving decisive severance of this GLOC NLT 261300Z.

• Tactical Observations (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Raw footage confirms intense, close-quarters combat involving highly trained RF infantry (parachute insignia suggests VDV/Airborne elements) operating within heavily damaged urban/interface environments. This reinforces the assessment that RF is employing specialized, high-readiness units to secure the breakthrough objective (T-05-15).
• Southern Fixation: Continued kinetic activity in Zaporizhzhia (Huliaipole/Stepnohirsk) serves to fix UAF defensive elements, preventing reinforcement of the Eastern Front.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No change. Conditions remain permissive for large-scale mechanized maneuver and continued air/UAS operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The RF deep strike campaign is expanding its target set beyond electrical generation to include critical industrial infrastructure.

• Energy and Gas Infrastructure Strikes (CRITICAL FACT): Confirmed widespread emergency power outages (Poltava, Kharkiv) are now compounded by verified Russian strikes against Ukrainian gas infrastructure (FRIENDLY FACT, Operatyvnyy ZSU). This increases the systemic risk to logistics, heating, and industrial capacity, significantly degrading UAF operational endurance during anticipated winter conditions.
• C2 Vulnerability: The sustained kinetic and EW pressure on UAF communication and command centers, exacerbated by confirmed power/gas infrastructure degradation, leaves C2 backup nodes (Poltava/Vinnytsia) critically exposed to the anticipated follow-up precision strike (MDCOA).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent: Achieve localized operational collapse on the Pokrovsk axis through coordinated high-tempo ground assault, deep infrastructure strikes, and simultaneous execution of a hyper-specific cognitive paralysis campaign targeting the National Command Authority (NCA).

• Capability: Full-Spectrum Synchronization (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF is demonstrating its ability to synchronize ground assault timings with specific infrastructure targeting (power/gas) and politically paralyzing Information Operations (IO) related to the alleged US peace plan.
• Recruitment/Manpower: RF is actively promoting highly specialized contract service through centers like "Rubicon" (WarGonzo), suggesting a sustained effort to secure technically proficient personnel necessary for modern combined arms and technical warfare (e.g., drone operators, EW specialists).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF continues the high-intensity use of glide bombs (KAB) against Kharkiv to fix forces and is utilizing specific high-readiness airborne infantry for close combat penetration on the main axis. The shift to targeting gas infrastructure (in addition to electrical) confirms a strategic effort to degrade Ukrainian winter operational resilience.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains adequate for continued high-tempo kinetic operations. The reported death of the Iskander/Topol designer (UAF IO/FACT) is a symbolic setback but will have no immediate impact on current missile inventory or operational readiness.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective. Yury Ushakov's public maneuvering regarding the Witkoff leaks and the Abu Dhabi talks (TASS) demonstrates Moscow’s proactive and adaptive control over the diplomatic-informational narrative.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: CRITICAL/DEFENSIVE. UAF forces are engaged in decisive action around the T-05-15 GLOC. The compromise of Reserve Force "Plan 7-B MOD" (Previous Daily) and the confirmed psychological paralysis surrounding the IO campaign critically delay the authorization of Reserve Force Bravo. Operational readiness hinges on the NCA immediately resolving the cognitive domain threat.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes (Morale/IO):

• UAF (DPSU) highlighted successful deployment of helicopter crews for Shahed interception, demonstrating adaptive air defense strategies.
• UAF IO capitalized on the death of Russian missile designer Valerian Sobolev to boost domestic morale. Setbacks (CRITICAL):
• Confirmed expansion of Russian deep strike targets to include gas infrastructure.
• NCA remains susceptible to the IO campaign, delaying critical reserve deployments.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

PRIORITY REQUIREMENT: Immediate authorization and physical movement of Reserve Force Bravo and the accelerated deployment of AD assets to protect C2 redundancy and critical infrastructure repair teams.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (CRITICAL THREAT)

RF IO has reached a decisive point, aiming to achieve psychological operational paralysis during the ground assault.

• Diplomatic Ambiguity Weaponized (CRITICAL, HIGH CONFIDENCE):

  • Phase 1 (Origin): Reuters (ASTRA) reports the US peace plan is based on a Russian document. This framing legitimizes RF demands internationally and politically undercuts Kyiv's position.
  • Phase 2 (Domestication): CNN (TASS) reports Kyiv is willing to agree to the majority of the US plan, excepting three points (AFU size, NATO, territory).
  • Analysis: The synchronization of these leaks confirms a high-level cognitive assault. This narrative forces the NCA to expend political capital fighting rumors of impending capitulation while simultaneously trying to manage a kinetic breakthrough, guaranteeing hesitation in deploying reserves.

• Internal Security Framing: RF media is amplifying reports of Ukrainian agents (Kotsnews) and framing Russian PSYOP leaflets as UAF volunteer sabotage (Mash na Donbasse), reinforcing domestic RF security narratives and projecting enemy weakness.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic sentiment is under severe stress from both kinetic impact (power/gas outages) and the cognitive assault suggesting US-RF collusion on peace terms favorable to Russia. Urgent, decisive communication from the NCA is required to stabilize morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The explicit exploitation of the Witkoff tapes (Ushakov response, TASS) continues to foster political friction and transactional diplomacy concerns within Western capitals, reducing the political space available for Ukraine to request emergency aid.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF ground forces, utilizing specialized infantry elements (VDV), will achieve functional severance or physical seizure of the T-05-15 GLOC (Rodynske sector) NLT 261300Z. This kinetic success will be immediately supported by a coordinated IO wave (via state media and proxies) framing the territorial gain as a fait accompli consistent with the alleged "Russian basis" of the US peace plan, driving maximum cognitive paralysis within the NCA.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF executes a follow-on high-precision ballistic or cruise missile strike targeting the Poltava and Vinnytsia C2 backup nodes NLT 262000Z. The systemic degradation of power and gas infrastructure increases the probability of C2 failure if these primary backup sites are hit. The operational necessity to maintain C2 during the Pokrovsk breach makes this target priority extremely high.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND COGNITIVE DEFENSE (NCA/J2 IO)

1. IMMEDIATE JOINT DENIAL: The NCA must issue a high-level, definitive joint statement with the highest possible US representative (State Department/White House) NLT 261030Z. This statement must explicitly:
   • a) Deny that any US peace plan is based on a Russian document.
   • b) Reject all claims regarding Kyiv's willingness to concede on territory, NATO membership, or force limitations.
2. PREEMPTIVE NARRATIVE: Link the aggressive dissemination of the false "peace plan" narrative directly to the RF ground assault currently underway at Pokrovsk, framing the IO as a precursor to kinetic action designed to break UAF morale and command structures.

R-2: FORCE MANAGEMENT AND GLOC DEFENSE (J3)

1. ACTIVATE RESERVE FORCE BRAVO: Immediately authorize and expedite the physical movement of Reserve Force Bravo NLT 261100Z to conduct counter-penetration operations along the T-05-15 corridor. Deployment must precede the anticipated 261300Z GLOC breach.
2. COORDINATE SSO FIRES: Utilize SSO/reconnaissance intelligence to prioritize long-range precision fires (HIMARS/ATACMS) against observed RF assembly areas and heavy fire support platforms (artillery, armor staging) supporting the VDV assault elements.

R-3: CRITICAL ASSET HARDENING AND MDCOA MITIGATION (AD Command/J4 Energy)

1. MDCOA MITIGATION (AD): Execute the immediate relocation of PAC-3/SAMP-T or equivalent high-tier AD assets to establish a protective AD bubble over the Poltava and Vinnytsia C2 nodes NLT 261400Z.
2. INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: J4 (Energy) must prioritize the delivery of high-capacity mobile generators to critical communications hubs in Poltava/Kharkiv. Simultaneously, deploy SHORAD units to protect mobile repair and service teams operating on confirmed damaged gas infrastructure sites.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS